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Politics of the Body and Sexual Communities: The French and the Italian Feminist 
and Gay Movements of the 1970s 
 
In 2008 the French Women’s Movement known as the Mouvement de Libération 
des Femmes (MLF) celebrated its 40th anniversary.  On this occasion, a group of women 
and feminists who made the history of the MLF published a collective work as a 
testimony of a cultural phenomenon that, in the words of its members, “a constitué 
l’événement le plus marquant de la seconde moitié du XXème siècle et [qui] a engendré 
une mutation de notre civilisation” (Fouque 7) [constituted the most incisive event of the 
second half of the twentieth century and engendered a mutation in our civilization].  In 
August 1970 a group of women including Monique Wittig and Christine Delphy 
celebrated women’s suffrage in the United States by hanging a banner from the façade of 
the Arc de Triomphe asserting, “Un homme sur deux est une femme” [One man out of 
two is a woman], and “il y a plus inconnu encore que le soldat: sa femme” [There is 
someone more unknown than the soldier: it is his wife].  The women’s movement was 
born in the midst of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggles and many women who 
joined the MLF were already active in political movements against the war in Algeria and 
the war in Vietnam.  The commemorative gesture in memory of the wife of the unknown 
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soldier thus symbolically links women’s active political voice and their protest against 
colonialist regimes.       
The MLF grew under the influence of the student movement, and the sexual 
liberation movement initiating some of the most important struggles for social and sexual 
democratization in France (Fouque 7-11).  These struggles continued throughout the 
1970s when a number of social reforms dramatically affected the bodies of single 
individuals and the body of the nation.  Laws authorizing free abortion, laws persecuting 
sexual abuses, and laws legitimating equality between women and men at home and in 
the workplace are among these historical reforms.  Social reforms of the 70s reflected 
the endeavors of New Left organizations and their commitment to a new vision of politics 
and of change.  The MLF was however not completely aligned with these organizations 
and started developing a radical critique of them, in particular of their sexism.  In this 
respect the MLF was a movement of rupture.  As French politics expert Françoise Picq 
recalls, “the MLF decided to be a completely spontaneous and democratic movement 
without any power structure or hierarchy” and “women were the objects and the subjects 
of their own struggle determining the means and the ends of their own liberation” (315).  
Personal and political autonomy was the MLF’s unifying aim along with a few principles 
that Picq identifies with “male exclusion, rejection of hierarchy and leadership and 
independence from political parties” (316). Women’s desire for political autonomy 
translated in the creation of a physical and symbolic space from which women could 
develop a critical consciousness of gender oppression and discrimination.  Women 
thought and envisioned such a space in terms of a “révolution du symbolique” (Fouque 
19) that Monique Wittig powerfully conveys and enacts through the pages of Les 
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guérillères (1969) in which a group of female warriors overthrows the symbolic order of 
patriarchy.1  
Despite the refusal of political affiliation in the form of a disengagement from 
institutional politics, the MLF had a crucial investment in social and political issues.  
Struggles against rape and over abortion and the rejection of compulsory motherhood all 
represent initiatives of the MLF.  Soon divisions and splits both between the movement 
and the political institutions and among women within the movement itself became 
apparent.  Picq sees in the divisive nature of the MLF the mark of the “French exception” 
in feminism, for “nowhere were the violence and divisions among political and feminist 
groups as absolute and destructive as in France” (319).  Divisions were also internal to 
the MLF, which was diverse from social, sexual, and theoretical points of view.2  The 
feminists of the movement came to a fragmentation in the mid-`70s.  Following the split a 
new group named Psych et Po emerged around the leader Antoinette Fouque.  Fouque, 
who refused to be labeled as a feminist, believed in the existence of an essential feminine 
difference [“féminitude”] which she condensed in the motto “on naît femme” [we are 
                                                 
1 Regarding the creation of Les Guérillères and of the MLF Fouque writes that “Monique vient me 
rejoindre dans le Midi, à la Redonne, avec son copain de l’époque, qui revient du Vietnam où il a touré un 
film sur le movement de libération avec Joris Ivens et Marceline Loridan.  Il nous explique que là-bas les 
femmes prennent les armes. Monique me lit tous les jours ce qu’elle écrit, qui deviendra Les Guérillères. Et 
nous décidons de créer un groupe de femmes (Fouque 19).  [Monique joined me in the South at the 
Redonne accompanied by her partner who had just returned from Vietnam where he had shot a movie on 
the liberation movement with Joris Ivens and Marceline Loridan.  He explains to us that over there women 
arm themselves. Each day Monique reads to me what she writes and hat will become Les Guérillères.  
Hence we decided in the same breath to create a group of women against May ’68.] 
2 Frédéric Martel writes,“Le parcours politique de ces femmes est varié…certaines sont trotskistes ou 
maoïstes. D’autres ont milité dans un syndicat étudiant (l’UNEF)…certaines ont eu 20 ans sur les 
barricades de 1968, d’autres pourraient être leurs mères: elles ont milité lors de la guerre d’Algérie ou, plus 
tard, dans les comités de Vietnam” (Martel 42).  [The political journey of these women is diversified...some 
are trotskistes or Maoists.  Some others have been active in student unions…others have been on the 
barricades of 1968 for 20 years, others could be their mothers: they were militant during the Algerian war  
or later in the movements against Vietnam.]  Picq also notes that many of them “often had mothers and 
grandmothers who were ahead of their times, with personal independence and cultural confidence” (315-
316).  Also many of them because of their lifestyle and personal choices affected and reflected an evolution 
of patterns of family life.  They experienced “free union with or without cohabitation, single motherhood, 
recombined families, homosexuality” (Picq 316).      
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born women].  Thereafter the MLF became polarized between the women of Psych et Po 
following Fouque (among whom were Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous) and others 
following Wittig.   
The reasons for this divide may be found in the different meanings that Fouque 
and Wittig gave to the material and symbolic experiences of gender and sexuality.  For 
Fouque the MLF was intrinsically and fundamentally an all-feminine experience of 
exchange (“movement homosexué”) (Martel 49).  The need for this politics of feminine 
exclusivity resides, according to Fouque, in the inherent homosexuality of every woman, 
a component that women inherit from their relationship with their mothers.  Female 
homosexuality, which is matrocentric and intrinsic to women, should remain invisible in 
order for homosexuality to be a tool of women’s political liberation. In other words, 
Fouque openly opposed lesbian visibility and was at odds with MLF members like 
Wittig, who embraced lesbianism both as a sexual orientation and as a political stance.  
Wittig and the women gathering around her were also preoccupied with issues of gender 
and class exploitation.  For Wittig lesbianism was first and foremost a way out of the 
heterosexist confinement of women to an oppressed gender role.  In general it seems that 
the homosexual or the lesbian question was one that profoundly divided the MLF, and the 
lesbian experience was an element of internal dissidence that modified and shifted 
alliances among women in the movement.  I would say that the identity of the lesbian 
was not only a matter of personal and political identification, but one that revealed and 
determined the movement as such with its dynamics and its ruptures. 
The MLF was also characterized by a certain level of cross-cultural and 
transnational dialogue.  Within national borders the MLF had ties with the French gay 
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movement FHAR (Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire), which included, for a 
limited time, lesbians of the MLF.  Due to the masculine orientation of FHAR, which 
historian Frédéric Martel calls “un théatre de désir masculin” (56) [a theatre of masculine 
desire], the lesbians of FHAR progressively distanced themselves from this group.  The 
so-called “Gouines Rouges” (Red Dykes)this is the name that Christine Delphy 
ironically gave to lesbiansstrove to differentiate themselves both from the overtly 
feminine orientation of Psych et Po and from the male-oriented atmosphere of FHAR 
while still remaining attached to the MLF.  The lesbians of the MLF came then to 
embody a further break with the gay movement whose members were said to have been 
initially inspired by the women’s movement: 
Le MLF a été l’inspirateur de notre mouvement à ses débuts et peut-être n’y 
aurait-il jamais eu de début si les femmes n’avaient elles-mêmes commencé. Nous 
en avons copié le style et le fonctionnement.  Nous nous sommes appelés frères et 
sœurs. (Martel 52) 
 
[The MLH inspired our movement in the beginning and perhaps we would have 
never had any beginning if women had not begun the movement.  We imitated 
their style and their functioning.  We called each other brothers and sisters.] 
 
MLF and FHAR were different facets of a discourse of sexual liberation that proliferated 
in France between 1968 and 1972.  Yet the dialogue between the two groups became 
more and more difficult due to the different emphasis that each group gave to the 
experience and the embodiment of sexuality and desire.  In the words of feminist Marie-
Jo Bonnet, gay men were far more interested in reproducing gendered roles and 
active/passive sexual dynamics than lesbians, who were instead trying to destroy them.3  
                                                 
3“Au FHAR…les garcons évoquaient les roles actif-passif, alors que nous étions en train de détruire ces 
rôles” (Martel 56).  After distancing themselves from the FHAR some lesbians like Marie-Jo Bonnet 
befriended the all lesbian group of the “Polymorphe perverses” which ironically plays with the Freudian 
6 
 
After initial enthusiasm their encounter became a site of as many conflicts as those 
between Psych et Po and Wittig.  In this respect the configuration of the MLF resembles 
a series of encounters and exchanges that failed because of theoretical and experiential 
differences.  The idea of encounter is a fundamental component in my dissertation and 
takes as a point of departure the actual exchanges between feminists and gays and 
develops them into a theory of embraces.  
Another important encounter of the period was between the MLF and the Italian 
feminist movement.  Like the MLF, the Italian movement of the 60s and the 70s was 
diverse in nature and constituted by a variety of different groups.  From the end of World 
War II until the 60s Italian neo-feminism was dominated by the UDI (Unione delle 
Donne Italiane), a women’s group that had a strong political engagement that, according 
to historian Aida Ribero, had no equal in Europe (51).  A distinguishing feature of the 
UDI was women’s active participation in institutional politics and social activism.  UDI 
strove to locate the reason for women’s subordination in society and in the public sphere, 
rather than in the relationship between the sexes.  UDI won some important battles in 
favor of women’s social emancipation and equality, and launched campaigns for the 
recognition of housework, and for equality in agricultural jobs.  They put the foundation 
for future changes in legislation on family rights, divorce, sexual education and abortion.  
Because of the involvement of UDI feminists in institutional politics, Italian feminism 
has had a unique tradition of “doppia militanza” (double militancy).  In other words 
feminists were both involved in institutional politics and in feminist groups that, by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
idea of a polymorphous sexuality while also echoing one of the FHAR’s principle of the free-flowing 
experience of sexual desire.   
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end of the 60s, started organizing independently from political parties and made their 
own politics.          
In the 60s the social discourse of Italian feminism began to change due to the 
impact of the rising New Left.  Some feminist vanguard positions emerged, including the 
Milanese groups of DEMAU (Anti-authoritarian demystification) and Anabasi, and the 
Rome-based group of Rivolta Femminile.  As scholar Andreina Clementi points out in her 
article “The Feminist Movement in Italy,” these groups articulated “a rejection of 
Marxism [that] led to the vindication of feminine otherness and extremist separatism” 
(335-336).  At the turn of the 1970s Italian feminism went from being a feminism of 
equality and emancipation to a separatist politics articulated by women for women and 
emphasizing sexual difference.  As in France, in Italy women started denouncing the 
pervasive sexism of the New Left and began thinking that one outlet from oppression was 
the development of a personal consciousness of female oppression.  Through the practice 
of consciousness-raising (autocoscienza), the women’s movement spread, assuming a 
more diffuse character across the North and South of the country: small workshops 
collectives were organized in major and smaller cities.  In the words of Andreina 
Clementi, 
the practice of “the small consciousness-raising group” aimed at these objectives; 
these groups were strictly separatist, and formed on the basis of sympathies, 
affinities and personal friendships…seized by an irresistible urge to eradicate 
signs of dependence, submission and indulgence. (336) 
 
Alongside this practice was also an important promotion of education and information by 
various reviews and journals of the period, managed independently by women’s 
collectives: Effe, Noi Donne, Sottosopra, and DWF are a few titles.  Although some of 
them like Effe were discontinued in the early 80s, others are still published thanks to the 
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active contributions of several Librerie delle Donne (Women’s Bookstores) or 
Biblioteche delle Donne spread throughout Italian major cities, in particular Milan, 
Bologna, Firenze, Rome, and Naples.4  Significant work on women’s sexuality and 
women’s issues such as abortion, prostitution, sexual abuse and maternity began to 
appear along with the translations of work of foreign feminists especially French and 
Anglo-American writers.5 In general the movement impacted the lives of thousands of 
women by giving them analytical tools that enabled them to create “a cultural 
independence” and achieve “epistemological revolutions” in Clementi’s words (336).  To 
be sure, one major revolution was the discovery of one’s own body, which literally 
became a source of new knowledge and, even, for radical feminists like feminist Carla 
Lonzi, a site of theorization.   
The body as an epistemological site is a crucial aspect of French and Italian 
feminist work of the 1970s.  “Notre corps nous appartient” [our body belongs to us] was 
a very popular slogan that condensed the transformative spirit of the MLF and promoted 
the idea that any powerful and radical change starts from the body.  The investment in the 
body is thus the common denominator of French and Italian feminism and also the reason 
for the double focus of my research on France and Italy.  The French-Italian feminist 
connection was articulated through a series of encounters between some French and 
Italian feminists.  These exchanges make for a productive trans-cultural dialogue that 
constitutes the cultural ground of my dissertation.  A parallel dialogue took place in the 
same years between the gay movement and the feminist movement as I mentioned above.  
                                                 
4 Some of the material for my dissertation (both primary and secondary sources) can only be found in 
women’s bookstores or libraries.  
5 The work of Betty Friedan, Luce Irigaray, Juliet Mitchell, Anne Koedt, Adrienne Rich, Kate Millett, and 
Germaine Greer informed the work of Italian feminists in the 1970s. 
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Psychoanalysis provided all these groups with analytical tools for rereading bodies and  
sexualities.  But if the basis for the encounters between feminists and gays resides in their 
engagement with psychoanalytically-defined bodies, the “body” of psychoanalysis is also 
the text that Italian and French feminists and gays alike constantly challenge and reread.  
It is from these rereadings that new bodies emerge as epistemological sites not only of 
knowledge production“gaia scienza” in Mario Mieli’s wordsbut also as performative 
sites of a new consciousness of gender and sexuality. 
Consciousness-raising was a key factor in the production of the epistemological 
bodies of gays and feminists.  As I note above, the French-Italian feminist connection 
was consolidated through the encounters between the French women of Psych et Po and 
some Italian feminists.6  Some scholars tend to associate French and Italian feminist 
discourse on the basis of their psychoanalytic component (i.e. Sapegno, Parati and West) 
which derived from the common practice of consciousness-raising. In Italy, this practice 
translated first in autocoscienza and then in pratica dell’inconscio.  When doing 
autocoscienza, which Carla Lonzi initiated with her group of Rivolta Femminile, women 
used their personal experiences in the family to analyze and question the mechanisms of 
oppression and of gender role conformity within the family and as well as in society as a 
whole.  The cultural analysis of these personal experiences aimed at providing women 
with a renewed consciousness of themselves, their bodies, and their sexual identity. 1  
According to Teresa De Lauretis, autocoscienza, as political and cultural practice, was 
ultimately more significant in Italy for the development of feminist theory than in the US 
where “easier institutional access and a less gender-segregated history of white women in 
                                                 
6 The women of the Milan Women’s Bookstore documented a few of these encounters that took place in 
different Italian and French towns in their collective work Non credere di avere diritti (1987).  
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the public sphere favored the diffusion, much earlier on, of the sites and modes of 
feminist consciousness” (Sexual Difference 7). 
Soon autocoscienza began losing its effectiveness due to the separatist ethos of 
the consciousness-raising groups.  Pratica dell’inconscio instead began to spread as a 
new phase of consciousness-raising that corresponded with the encounter with the French 
feminists of Psych et Po.  This practice stressed the importance of getting to know the 
repressed or the unconscious self as a necessary process of women’s politicization.  
Historian Maria Teresa Sapegno emphasizes the role psychoanalysis played as the 
“fundamental intellectual structure of a political practice” and as the consolidating 
element of the Franco-Italian connection.  I should note however that Italian feminists 
were already familiar with psychoanalysis even before encountering French women.  
However, feminists such as those of Rivolta Femminile viewed psychoanalysis with 
suspicion and claimed a certain critical distance from it.  It is also true that Carla Lonzi, 
who was an assertive detractor of psychoanalysis, reappropriated Freudian concepts to 
build her own feminist theory, as I will discuss in my second chapter.      
Both autocoscienza and then pratica dell’inconscio were conducive 
to the creation of spaces of exchange, complicity and solidarity among women.  Pratica 
dell’inconscio, as historian Maria Teresa Sapegno describes, “opened up the possibility 
of a different relation among women, in which “sexuality [was] no longer imprisoned in 
masculine desire” (47-48).  In France and Italy the practice and the politics of women’s 
relations came to be associated with political homosexuality, a term that was at times 
preferred to feminism and to lesbianism, but that not all women embraced as mentioned 
above.  Political homosexuality was a practice of female relationality that aimed to 
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creating and reinforcing alliances among women and their sense of a common 
consciousness of gender oppression.  In her book Movimento a più voci Maria Schiavo 
recalls the transformative impact that political lesbianism had in Italy during the 1970s.  
She distinguishes between lesbianism as erotic practice and political homosexuality, 
“qualcosa di più mobile e sfumato” [something more dynamic and vague], which Italian 
women inherited from Psych et Po and Antoinette Fouque.  “La leader di Psych et Po, 
che si rifiutava di definirsi femminista,” explains Maria Schiavo, “si appellava a un 
féminisme minimum, minimo, che permettesse di difendersi, di sopravvivere nella società 
del padre” (63). [The Psych et Po leader, who refused to define herself feminist, 
reclaimed minimum feminism which would enable women to defend themselves and 
survive in the society of fathers.]  Hence political homosexuality put more emphasis on 
the reevaluation and the strengthening of women’s sense of self, agency, and subjectivity 
as opposed to a private sexual orientation and a masculine identification for women 
(116).  In Italy political homosexuality à la Fouque, became another way to signify the 
political process through which women organized socially and politically out of a lack of 
structures of institutional support for women.  Yet it seems that the adoption of political 
homosexuality as a structure of female support contributed to the dismissal of lesbianism 
as a sexual orientation and as a critical category, a fact that became source of tensions as I 
discuss in depth in my second and my fourth chapters.     
French and the Italian feminist groups embodied the tensions between sexual and 
political categories in very productive and provocative ways.  Looking at what these 
tensions produced is one goal of my dissertation.7  Autocoscienza was not an exclusively 
                                                 
7 Italian feminism still retains some features of 1970s feminism, much of which has been translated into the 
practice of “women’s relationality” (previously known as affidamento) among the feminists of the Milan 
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feminist practice.  The Italian gay movement FUORI (Fronte Unitario Omosessuale 
Rivoluzionari Italiano), founded in Turin in April 1971, inherited autocoscienza from 
feminist groups, and it is through autocoscienza that gay and lesbiansthe so-called 
”froci rivoluzionari” [revolutionary fags]came together to explore “l’intima 
problematicità ‘diversa’ che appartiene ai diversi” [the problem of “queer” intimacy that 
belongs to the “queer”] (Pezzana 8).  As a practice that intersected body and 
discourseliterally implying to analyze discourse starting from the body autocoscienza 
contributed to a queer feminist exchange while giving rise to new ways of thinking 
through bodies and embodying sexual categories.  The complex intertwining of symbolic 
and material constructions of bodies constituted the privileged terrain for the articulation 
of a “politica del corpo” [body politics] whose queerness I investigate in my work.   
 La politica del corpo (1976) is the title of a collection of essays by feminist and 
gay thinkers who were active members of FUORI.8 Gays and lesbians of FUORI did a 
massive coming out to celebrate and assert their visibility in April 1972 during the 
International Sexology Congress held in the Italian city of Sanremo.9  They talked about 
the importance of “colore sessuale” [sexual color] and of “gioia omosessuale” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Women’s Bookstore and the feminists of the Diotima group. Italian feminists seem to be involved today in 
the cultural and historical recollection of the 1970s culture of feminism, which has become legacy for new 
generations of Italian feminists.  Italian feminism is not the monolithic label French feminism has become 
in American academia.  On the contrary, “Italian feminist theory, as itself a site of dialogue and difference, 
if not conflict, is anything but monolithic,” argue Parati and West, even though “the theories and practices 
that originated in Italy have deep ties with aspects of French feminism” (16).  For instance Italian feminist 
theorists Luisa Muraro and Adriano Cavarero have benefited from the dialogue with Luce Irigaray and vice 
versa.  Yet very often that dialogue has been limited to certain aspects of Irigaray’s theory, namely the 
mother-daughter  relation, the idea of a maternal symbolic, and that of sexual difference, which circumvent 
other features of Irigaray’s thinking that Anglo-American scholars have emphasized, in particular sexuality.    
8 Although FUORI is an acronym, the word “fuori” means “out.”  Other gay groups such as FLO (Fronte di 
Liberazione Omosessuale) were present in Milan and Rome, and a journal FUORI gathered contributions 
from all these groups.      
9 Gays and lesbians from France, Belgium, and Great Britain took part in this event thus reaffirming the 
transnational character of the gay movement.  The gays boycotted the conference and the news of the 
boycotting was in the national press (Pezzana 22). 
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[homosexual joy], a term that Mario Mieli recuperated in his work to indicate the full and 
free expression of sexual diversity.  In the introduction to La politica del corpo editor 
Alfredo Cohen refers to “politica del corpo” as a culturally and historically specific 
practice that challenged old paradigms of sexuality and made public, by means of 
autocoscienza, what was previously kept private and hidden.  FUORI was also engaged 
in the analysis of oppression in situations that went beyond sexual matters.  These 
included the experience of male and female prisoners, the question of abortion, and the 
issue of mental illmess and the abolition of psychiatric hospitals.  The body politics was 
thus a discourse that took marginal bodies as a site of politicization. Women were 
considered the initiators of this process of politicization since “la donna è 
protagonista…rivendicatrice della politica del corpo, di un corpo che è stato utero 
schiacciato” [women are the protagonists…they claim a politics of the body, a body that 
has been an oppressed uterus] (Pezzana 10).  The “utero schiacciato” is thus the material 
and symbolic site from which a queer body politics of the 1970s began articulating 
bringing together feminists, gays and marginal subjects.  
The body politics of the movements of the 1970s produced a heterogeneous body 
of work made of essays, pamphlets, diaries, journals, stories, and personal testimonies.  
My dissertation focuses in particular on feminist and gay theoretical and literary texts, 
including feminist diaries.  It is by no means an exhaustive reading of feminist and gay 
work of the period, but rather a comparative analysis of a few authors10 (namely Dacia 
Maraini, Monique Wittig, Carla Lonzi, Mario Mieli, Guy Hocquenghem, and Luce 
Irigaray), whose work allows me to interrogate the complex intersection of bodies and 
discourses in the 1970s; to reread a particular cultural moment in the production of sexual 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that authors like Wittig or Maraini objected to the label “feminist.” 
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discourses through a queer feminist perspective; and to ask what kind of queer dimension 
these discourses produced before the queer came into being as a critical term.  Some of 
the authors I selected use Freudian and Lacanian notions of sexuality, but their readings 
are not a simple endorsement of psychoanalytic concepts−castration, the phallus, the 
clitoris, anal retention, de-sublimation, the polymorpous perverse.  They are instead 
deconstructive and critical rereadings of these constructs.  The reading strategies that 
authors deploy provide them with a creative space from which they imagine new ways of 
embodying subjectivity that trouble gender and sexual lines.  I myself use some of these 
reading strategies to articulate my own queer feminist methodology for reading gay and 
feminist texts together.   The reading space of these embraces represents the moment of a 
preliminary cultural articulation of a queer feminist discourse in the 1970s. 
In the 1970s the feminist and gay movements were the cultural spaces that 
reunited gays and feminists in spite of their historical disagreements.  These spaces were 
also sites for production and proliferation of new discursive figures such as the “lesbian,” 
the “donna clitoridea,” and the “transessuale.”  The authors I examine not only theorized, 
but also embodied the product of their theory, as in the case of Carla Lonzi and her 
“donna clitoridea,” or Mario Mieli and his/her “transessuale.”  While theory was the body 
that feminist and gay thinkers envisioned and embraced, textual/sexual embrace is the 
methodological figure that I use to engage the encounters between feminist and gay 
bodies/texts.  The embrace functions at different levels in my dissertation: as a queer 
feminist methodology through which I perform simultaneously a queer critique of 
feminism and a feminist critique of gay theory and as a queer mode of reading that looks 
at the theoretical embodiments of the 1970s not as the mere products of identity politics, 
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but as the subversive production of a discourse (queer ante-litteram) that speaks to the 
unstable and the fluid intersection of gender and sexuality.  Furthermore my chapters and 
textual embraces work through a notion of queer temporality other than the linear cause-
and-effect narrative that a number of queer theorists have characterized as hetero- or 
repro-normative.  The queer temporality of my chapters is articulated through three 
temporal dimensions that translate into three different kinds of textual embraces. There is 
the time of the political movements of the 1970s, then the time of the embrace, which is 
produced through textual analysis. Finally there is the time of queer theory that, although 
some critics limit to the early nineties, can be traced back in time to the seventies and 
thus be read as queer time.     
 















One is Not Born a Mother: Queer Abortions in Dacia Maraini’s Donna in guerra 
and Annie Ernaux’s L’événement 
 
 
Women and Abortion in the 1970s 
“Mon ventre m’appartient!” “L’utero è moi!  E me lo gestico io!”  In the early 
1970s women and feminists shouted these slogans, demonstrating at university lectures 
and courts in Italy and France and proclaiming their right to decide the reproductive fate 
of their own bodies freely and unconditionally.  In Italy slogans such as “Aborto libero 
e gratuito” [access to free abortion] punctuated women’s demands that abortion be de-
criminalized, legalized, and made accessible regardless of class and economic status.  
Abortion was, in fact, until the mid-seventies, considered a crime in most European 
countries, due to the persistence of Fascist laws related to post-war natalist policies.11  
On January 17, 1975, France passed the long awaited “loi Veil,” which, for the first 
time since 1920, granted women the freedom to end their pregnancy “en situation de 
détresse” (Gauthier 18).  In Italy, a constitutional amendment was passed in February 
1975 that declared the 
                                                 
11 In France a couple of laws ensured the persecution of women having clandestine abortion: one law of 
1923 punished women with prison and a fine. In 1941, abortion was declared, under Pétain’s régime, a 
crime against the State.  In Italy the Codice Rocco of 1930 was among the crimes “contro l’integrità e la 
sanità della stirpe” [against the integrity and the health of the race].  According to Article 54 of Codice 
Rocco, the “stato di necessità” recites as the following:  “Non è punibile chi ha commesso il fatto per 
esservi stato costretto dalla necessità di salvare sé o altri dal pericolo di un danno grave alla persona” 
(Ribero 273). [It is not subject to punishment whoever has committed the fact because of being forced by 




“non punibilità dell’aborto terapeutico” [unpunishable status of therapeutic abortion.]  
Those first reforms eventually resulted in a definite liberalization that occurred in 
1979 in France and in 1981 in Italy.  Since 1975, the preliminary changes in the 
legislation had put an end to the persecution of women who were tried for seeking 
abortions.   
The struggles against the persecution of women began a few years earlier in 
France and in Italy.  In 1971, 343 French women signed the manifesto of the 343 
bitches (“343 salopes”), published in Le Nouvel Observateur declaring that they had 
had abortions.  In 1972 in France, Gisèle Halimi, known as the “lawyer for women” 
(“avocate des femmes”) took on the defense of a working-class mother persecuted for 
having helped her fifteen-year-old daughter procure an abortion.  This case made 
history as the Bobigny trial and constituted a turning point in the struggle towards the 
decriminalization of abortion in France, because it helped stir public opinion and 
make the bodies of aborting women a political matter.12  In Italy, a similar case 
exploded in 1973, in Padova, where a young woman of modest origins, Gigliola 
Pierobon, was persecuted for self-induced abortion (“autoprocurato aborto”).  On this 
occasion the Movimento Femminista declared war and gathered women who had 
performed abortions on their own to make an assault to judges during the trial.  As a 
                                                 
12 The “Manifeste des 343” reads in full: “Un million de femmes se font avorter chaque année en 
France.  Elles le font dans des conditions dangereueses en raison de la clandestinité à laquelle elles sont 
condemnées alors que cette operation, pratiquée sous contrôle médical, est des plus simples.  On fait le 
silence sur ces millions de femmes.  Je déclare que je suis l’une d’elles.  Je déclare avoir avorté.  De 
même que nous réclamons le libre accès aux moyens anti-conceptionnels, nous réclamons l’avortment 
libre.” Among the women signing the manifesto were actresses, intellectuals, professionals,and  
militant feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir, Monique Wittig, Violette Leduc, Jeanne Moreau, 
Annie Leclerc, Catherine Deneuve, Gisèle Halimi, Marguerite Duras, and many others (Fouque 443). 
[In France each year a million women have abortions.  They do it in dangerous conditions due to the 
secrecy to which they are condemned.  This practice, if performed under medical control, is very easy. 
Millions of women are silenced. I declare that I am one of these women,  I declare that I have had an 
abortion.  As well as we claim free access to anticonceptionals we demand free access to abortion.]   
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result of this massive denunciation, this massive coming out of women with a history 
of abortion, Pierobon was acquitted.   
According to the French manifesto, women’s protests began at least in part 
because of the many clandestine abortions that endangered women in both 
countries.13  Other reasons were at stake, including women’s desire for autonomy in 
making decisions about their futures and their bodies.  The number of secret abortions 
was particularly high, according to feminists, among poor and working-class women.  
But those abortions had serious consequences for their bodies because of the 
carelessness of those performing abortions and the fact that abortions were sometimes 
self-induced.14  The way abortions were performed also reflected inaccurate or 
inadequate sexual education, to which the MLAC (Mouvement pour le libre 
avortement et la contraception) [Movement for free abortion and contraception] in 
France tried to respond.  The MLAC was organized in 1973 to promote education 
about contraception and abortion. 
At the time the question of abortion ignited several debates among 
intellectuals who were also invested on the issue of the State regulation of bodies and 
sexualities.  Among them Pier Paolo Pasolini made a provocative intervention 
                                                 
13 In her book Una questione di libertà:  Il femmnismo degli anni 70, Italian historian Aida Ribero 
reports that the Ministry of Health counted 850,000 clandestine abortions per year while the feminist 
movement and the political parties, favoring legal intervention, counted 3 million a year (Ribero 273).  
14 Ribero describes how Italian women handled their abortion through the so called “rimedi della 
saggezza popolare” [remedy of people’s wisdom].  Her portrayal discloses the lack of information and 
education that would put in serious danger women’s bodies and lives: “La grande maggioranza delle 
interruzioni volontarie della gravidanza avveniva clandestinamente, a opera delle donne stesse, che 
tentavano di abortire con i decotti di prezzemolo, con il chinino o sottoponendosi a faticosissimi sforzi 
fisici, o ancora, a opera delle “mammane” che, per una bassa ricompensa, usavano metodi primordiali 
(come introdurre nell’utero un corpo estraneo, ago da calza o sonda), non sempre efficaci e talvolta 
gravemente lesivi della salute.  Solo le donne più abbienti, e con le necessarie conoscenze, potevano 
fare affidamento sull’intervento di un medico e, comunque, sempre in condizioni di clandestinità” 
(273). [The great majority of abortions were clandestine; they were carried out by the same women 
who would try to have abortions by means of parsley “decotti,” with the aid of “chinino” or by 
straining themselves to exhaustion; abortions were also performed by women called ‘mammane’ who, 
in exchange for a sum of money, would apply rudimentary methods (such as introducing foreign bodies 
into the uterus of women, like needles or catheters), which were not always effective, but were at times 
very harmful to women.  Only the wealthiest and knowledgeable women could they had put themselves 
in the hands of doctors, but always, most in a clandestine manner.]  
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reflecting on the link between abortion and the regulation of sexuality that caused 
angry reactions among feminists.15  Pasolini wrote that he was utterly traumatized by 
the legalization of abortion and defined it as a legalized homicide and “ecological 
move.”16  For him the legalization of abortion was simply an expression of the 
conformity of the progressive political class that saw abortion as a strategy to promote 
and reinforce the easy consumption of normative sexuality.  He wrote, for instance, 
that the legalization of abortion is “una enorme comodità per la maggioranza perché 
rende il coito ancora più facile a cui non ci sarebbero più praticamente ostacoli (Scritti 
124) [a huge convenience for the majority because it would make coitus easier and 
there would not be practically any obstacle to it.]  The problem was, for Pasolini, that 
the campaign for the liberalization of abortion excused people and politicians from 
talking about the dysfunctions of coitus (heterosexual intercourse) and furthermore 
contributed to the perpetual misrecognition of the “sessualmene diverso” (the sexually 
different, the queer).   
That coitus was to be reconsidered and critiqued was a valuable argument, as 
certain feminists recognized.  However, Pasolini’s exclusive focus on coitus had the 
unfortunate consequence of leaving out the immediate victims of a repressive and 
unreasonable law.  Not a single time does Pasolini mention the word “women,” 
except for a quick dismissive reference to anguished feminists.  By avoiding the 
women’s bodies that were damaged and mutilated in clandestine abortions, Pasolini 
disavows both the material experience of women and the classist implications of 
clandestine abortion and displays, perhaps inadvertently, a subtle form of sexism that 
                                                 
15 His intervention appeared in the Corriere della Sera with the title “Il coito, l’aborto, la falsa 
tolleranza del potere, il conformismo dei progressisti” on January 19, 1975 and was later included in 
Scritti Corsari. 
16 I claim that Pasolini uses the term “ecologic” in a rather ironic way to emphasize how clandestine 
abortions contributed to balance the system of reproduction by avoiding the risk of high demographic 
growth.    
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did not go unnoticed among some Italian feminists.  Those women welcomed the 
liberalization of abortion as a freedom to question rigid paradigms of sexuality and 
reproduction, a questioning that Pasolini did share with feminists.  A few days after 
Pasolini’s intervention in the Corriere della Sera, on January 21, feminist journalist 
Natalia Aspesi responded to him.  With courage and eloquence, Aspesi confronted 
Pasolini’s opposition towards whoever “è convinto che l’aborto, pur restando una 
tragedia personale, una colpa, una privazione, una amputazione fisica, una ferita della 
coscienza, debba essere depenalizzato o richieda comunque una nuova legislazione 
non fascista” (Faccio 66) [is convinced that abortion, although remaining a personal 
tragedy, a guilt, a privation, a physical amputation, a wound of the consciousness, 
must be decriminalized or requires a new non-Fascist legislation.]  For Aspesi, 
Pasolini’s take on abortion was the reflection of an enduring taboo that the traditional 
alliance between Fascism and the Church perpetuated, thereby fostering suspicion 
about any form of sexual diversity and dissent.17  Aspesi thus urged Pasolini to 
reconsider his own misrecognition of women’s bodies and experiences of abortion as 
linked to cultural suspicion towards the queer (“quell’odio per il diverso”) and any 
minority (“ogni tipo di minoranza”) that Pasolini himself invoked in his own article.  
Natalia Aspesi’s feminist attack on Pasolini’s queer male perspective on abortion 
addresses the dangerous consequences of Pasolini’s implicit reproduction of 
normative discourses: on the one hand, Pasolini denied the physical and emotional 
pain involved in the experience of abortion, and on the other, he silenced the enforced 
regulation of bodies and sexualities, which he so sharply stressed in his intervention 
concerning queer sexualities.    
                                                 
17 Aspesi’s skepticism concerning the Church was not an isolated case.  In a slogan from the `70s some 
feminists attacked the Church for implicitly encouraging clandestine abortion for demographic reasons: 
“Il regime clericale fonda l’equilibrio demografico sull’aborto.  Vuole l’aborto” [The clerical regime 
found demographic balance through abortion.  The regime wants abortion] (Effe 13).    
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Pasolini also seemed unconcerned with the impact that social class had on 
abortion, although he was known for being very sensitive to class issues.  Women’s 
battles for free abortion brought to light the fact that abortion was a class issue before 
being an issue of sexuality (or of coitus), one reason why its decriminalization was 
considered so important.  Legalization was not endorsed unanimously by all women.  
There were feminists, for instance, who considered legalization a further 
expropriation of women’s bodies, as feminist historian Lia Cigarini explains in her 
book La politica del desiderio:  
Quando abbiamo sostenuto, a proposito dell’aborto, la depenalizzazione 
invece che una legge che lo regolamentava, abbiamo detto una parola 
giuridica che esprimeva la volontà che non si legiferasse sul corpo della 
donna, senza appunto presentare leggi alternative. (86) 
 
[With regard to abortion, when we supported decriminalization instead of a 
law that could regulate it, we spoke juridically to express the will that none 
could rule about women’s bodies, without presenting alternative laws.]   
 
In Italy the radical feminist group Rivolta Femminile acknowledged in their 1971 
pamphlet “Sessualità femminile e aborto” that abortion was not to be considered a 
freedom, but a necessity.  They therefore proclaimed free abortion (“la libertà di 
aborto”) against a new legislation on it (“contro un nuova legislazione su di esso”) 
(Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel 67).  The feminists’ support of decriminalization did not 
necessarily take into account the different conditions that affected women deciding to 
have abortions.  Feminist historical records show that women of all classes practiced 
abortion, but middle- and upper-class women could obtain it with far fewer risks, 
because they could afford better care.  Some of those women traveled to countries 
such as Switzerland or Great Britain where they could receive an abortion legally.  
Abortion therefore remained a luxury for the few, but a peril for most.  It was 
considered urgent to give voice to the stories of the clandestine experiences of 
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socially disadvantaged women in order to highlight the silenced effects of a law that, 
by its very presence, discriminated first and foremost against lower and working-class 
women.     
The dispute between Pasolini and Aspesi underscores the complexity of the 
issue of abortion as one that cuts across material and symbolic experiences of 
sexuality, gender and class.  The question of abortion gathered feminists and queers 
alike, perhaps because abortion revealed how bodies were and remain a complex site 
of material and symbolic constructions that goes well beyond the mere identification 
of gendered bodies.  This complexity is reason to reconsider abortion not merely as a 
feminist or a women’s issue.  I think that the link that Pasolini makes between the 
regulation of sexuality and abortion is useful to understand and explore why abortion 
is not merely a woman’s question or a feminist issue.  In this chapter I investigate 
what it means to read abortion from a queer standpoint, thereby eliciting a perspective 
that may bring the feminist together with the queer and consider how abortion can 
have farther implications in the articulation of a queer feminist body politics.  The 
queer was not a critical category among 1970s feminists, nor one that could have 
explicitly informed positions on issues such as abortion.  Yet Pasolini’s intervention 
reveals that debates on abortion prompted a reflection on the regulation of bodies, 
sexualities, and desires that is reminiscent of the poststructuralist trend that, in the 
early `90s, engendered the queer.         
Women’s battles for abortion and its consequent liberalization in the 1970s 
had some fundamental consequences in undoing long-standing assumptions and 
paradigms about gender and sexuality.  For instance, women could question maternity 
and reproduction as a natural destiny for themselves following the footsteps of a 
whole generation of thinkers pioneered by Simone de Beauvoir.  It is noteworthy that 
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both thinkers resisted being labeled “feminist,” but they both aligned themselves with 
women on the legalization of abortion.  They were among the “343 bitches” who 
signed the manifesto to disclose their own abortion in 1971.  Their political and social 
activism paralleled their theoretical engagement concerning women’s bodies and 
reproduction.  For Beauvoir there was a lot that women could gain by withdrawing 
from a reproductive role: “Soustraite en très grande partie aux servitudes de la 
reproduction elle peut assumer le rôle économique qui se propose à elle et qui lui 
laissera la conquête de sa personne toute entière” (I, 209). [Now protected in large 
part from the slavery of reproduction, she is in a position to assume the economic role 
that is offered her and will assure her of complete independence (121).] Women’s real 
gain, once liberated from enforced maternity, was the perception of themselves as full 
subjects and persons.  Contesting reproductive paradigms allowed women to access a 
domain of subjectivity that was previously considered a masculine domain.   
If access to subjectivity signified, in Beauvoir’s view, women’s acquisition of 
a role within a masculine economy, for Wittig that access to subjectivity coincided 
with a radical re-consideration of women’s link to materiality.  In particular, Wittig 
questioned the assumption that women are a “natural group” based on the material 
specificity of their bodies and their supposed ability to procreate.  Wittig, unlike 
Beauvoir, does not deal explicitly with abortion.  In her theoretical work The Straight 
Mind, she does nonetheless call into question the concomitant and mutual 
naturalization of motherhood and womanhood that the act of giving birth seals.  
Giving birth has traditionally been considered, explains Wittig, both “the female 
creative act” (11) and “what defines a woman” even in a matriarchal regime (10).  As 
such, this act reproduces and legitimizes heterosexuality as a discursive regime based 
on the division of the sexes; moreover, it posits pro-creation as female (the creative 
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act is indeed female) while perpetually producing the category of sex on the premise 
of that “creative act.”  In other words, Wittig views maternity not only “as the most 
palpable sign of woman’s difference” (Katz and Epps 426), but also as a socially 
constructed reality which has been naturalized through the material link between 
women and maternity:  
For example, instead of seeing giving birth as a forced production, we see it as 
a “natural,” “biological” process, forgetting that in our societies births are 
planned (demography), forgetting that we ourselves are programmed to 
produce children, while this is only social activity “short of war” that presents 
such a great danger of death. (Straight 11)   
   
Maternity as the capacity of giving birth thus assumes in Wittig’s view the form of a 
social activity and not a natural characteristic.  Here it would be more appropriate to 
talk of maternity not exclusively in terms of procreation, but also in terms of 
nurturing.  In this perspective maternity would be closer to motherhood as a social 
construct, a nuance that the terms “maternité” and “maternità” risk obfuscating.  In 
her now famous book The Reproduction of Mothering (1978), Nancy Chodorow 
analyzes the way mothering has been reproduced across generations and transmitted 
from mother to daughter based on “the seemingly natural connection between 
women’s childbearing and lactation capacities” (3).  The linear transmission of 
mothering along with the association between mothering and gender has been taken 
for granted, writes Chodorow, as a reinforcement of a gendered division of labor:  
I argue that the contemporary reproduction of mothering occurs through social 
structurally induced psychological processes.  It is neither a product of biology 
nor of intentional role-training.  I draw on the psychonalytic account of female 
and male personality development to demonstrate that women’s mothering 
reproduces itself cyclically.  Women, as mothers, produce daughters with 
mothering capacities and the desire to mother.  By contrast, women as mothers 
(and men as not mothers) produce sons whose nurturant capacities and needs 




Much in the same way as Wittig in The Straight Mind, Chodorow seems to suggest 
that mothering is the foundational process through which sexual difference is 
perpetuated.  In her analysis of the social construction of mothering, which informs 
the mother-daughter relationship, Chodorow suggests how women “may come to 
mother” (4) in order to transform cultural and social perceptions of mothering.  
Chodorow’s account of mothering has not gone without criticism by those who saw in 
it “a paradigmatic case of problematic feminist theorizing,” as Chodorow explains in 
the preface to the second edition of her book (vii).  In particular, one critic takes the 
book to task for “generalizing beyond the White western middle class and for 
assuming a heterosexual nuclear family form” (xi).  While asking the question of why 
mothers are women, and analyzing why nurturing is strictly associated to female 
gender, Chodorow still remains within a gendered and feminist frame.     
  Instead Wittig seems to challenge the link between gender, procreation and 
mothering in the following exhortation:  
As long as we will be “unable to abandon by will or impulse a life-long and 
centuries-old commitment to child-bearing as the female creative act,” gaining 
control of the production of children will mean much more than the mere 
control of the material means of this production: women will have to abstract 
themselves from the definition “woman” which is imposed upon them. (11).   
 
What is exactly this task to which Wittig is calling women?  Does Wittig mean that 
the ability to control the “material means” involves a more radical and complex 
elaboration of the bodies that we call women or men?  By urging women to abstract 
themselves from the definition of “woman,” Wittig asks them to do away with a 
narrow notion of materiality and to disengage from an act–giving birth–that produces 
and reduces them to a “sex,” both materially and symbolically.  Hence the “task” of 
women may be precisely that of exceeding the material and the symbolic limits of 
their gender.  
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In Wittig’s theoretical imaginary the lesbian is the only subject that can 
perform such an abstraction of the category of sex, for the lesbian is the only subject 
that can stand beyond the category of sex.  Hence, theoretically speaking, giving up 
procreation could translate into the simultaneous destabilizing of “woman” and 
“mother” and gesture to the creation of a new queer subjectivity and queer nurture.  
Relinquishing the act of giving birth is also what abortion is about, and it seems 
plausible to argue that abortion has a queer dimension to it on the basis of Wittig’s 
contention.  Wittig does not explicitly name abortion in the essay “One is not born a 
woman,” yet her involvement in the issue and her materialist analysis of women and 
reproduction seems to evoke rather forcefully her position on abortion.  Wittig does 
include her critique of “giving birth” alongside with the theorization of the lesbian.  
This rhetorical move prompts an association of abortion, the lesbian, and the critique 
of “natural” motherhood.  In this chapter I will re-read Beauvoir’s and Wittig’s “one 
is not born a woman” as “one is not born a mother.”  This rereading allows me to 
argue for and interrogate the notion of queer abortion as a moment of creation that 
dislodges heterosexual procreaction, in which female gender is linked to procreation 
and nurturing, and thus to re-appropriate creation as a fundamentally queer 
production.  As a result, a broader queer notion of nurture replaces the gender-
oriented and naturalized notion of maternity and mothering based on a strictly 
feminine material specificity.     
Two literary texts will help me articulate the notion of queer abortion: one is 
Donna in guerra (1975) by Dacia Maraini and the other is L’événement by Annie 
Ernaux (2000).  The first is often celebrated by critics as an accomplished feminist 
novel and an example of “écriture feminine,” two denominations that Maraini does 
not embrace and that my own critical approach aims at problematizing.  According to 
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Rodica Diaconescu-Blumenfled, “Maraini does not call herself a feminist writer” 
neither does she claim a “female style” (11-12).  Nonetheless, the gender specificity 
of Maraini’s writing, writes Diaconescu-Blumenfeld, cannot be negated for “her work 
is context bound, and that context is essere-donna (‘being-woman’), a practice of 
gender in culture” (12).18  Althought Maraini does not call herself a feminist writer, 
Donna in guerra resonates with the vivid climate of 1970s women’s emancipation in 
Italy; abortion has a minor place in Donna in guerra, particularly if we consider that 
Maraini writes the novel, in the form of a woman’s personal diary, during the years of 
the feminist battles for the legalization of abortion.  Maraini herself was involved in 
the question of abortion as evidenced by her interventions in the national press and 
her treatment of abortion in a good portion of her work.19  In an article appeared in La 
Stampa on February 26, 1975, Maraini writes:  
La questione dell’aborto riguarda qualcosa di molto profondo e radicale nel 
rapporto donna-potere.  L’aborto non è solo un fatto sociale, una ‘piaga di 
classe,’ ma il risultato di una cattiva relazione, di autorità da una parte e di 
sottomissione dall’altra, fra donna e struttura familiare. (Faccio 63)   
 
[The question of abortion is about something very deep and rooted in the 
relation woman-power.  Abortion is not merely a social matter, a ‘class 
plague,’ but the result of a bad relationship, of authority on one side and of 
submission on the other, a relationship between the woman and the family 
structure.]20   
 
Maraini embeds abortion into the question of women’s submission to the power of the 
family.  Donna in guerra highlights the function that abortion has in changing both 
women’s positions within the family structure because abortion involves a choice that 
empowers women and destabilizes families.        
                                                 
18 Italics are in the original text.     
19 Maraini’s texts that include treatment of abortion or miscarriage are L’età del malessere, Il treno per 
Helsinki, Lettere a Marina, Voci, La donna perfetta (a theatrical piece), and Storia di Piera (an essay).  
20 Translation is mine. 
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 My second text, L’événement, is a first-person testimony of abortion published 
in 2000.  It is deliberately removed from the 1970s feminist battles over abortion as 
the author explicitly claims no direct association with them.  Abortion is the subject of 
Ernaux’s text, the event (“l’événement”) that occasions her writing and that makes the 
novel a unique cultural and historical contribution to the testimony of abortion.  In 
Italy and in France few novels have taken abortion as one of their main subjects; none 
as the main one.  Acknowledging the lack of narratives on the subject of abortion, 
Xavière Gauthier attributes it to the trauma and the shame that made abortion 
unspeakable for so many women.  Telling the experience of abortion thus becomes 
“le devoir de mémoire” [a duty of memory] (89), a way to reestablish a historical 
memory that would be otherwise lost, or mutilated like the thousands of women’s 
bodies struck by clandestine and illegal abortion until the 1970s.  Gauthier actually 
quotes Ernaux’s text as the only one courageously devoted to the subject of abortion.  
The fact that Ernaux’s own testimony, published in 2000, comes so much later than 
her actual abortion (in 1963) suggests that, if doing “it” was still criminal, talking 
about “it”was strictly forbidden.  The social and linguistic taboo that struck abortion 
has a more or less overt relationship with the taboo surrounding sexuality.21  Secrecy 
shapes not only women’s relation to abortion, but also, as in Donna in guerra, the 
relation of some characters to their queer sexuality.  The connection that secrecy 
produces between the narrative of abortion and the queer narrative is worth exploring 
for what it may tell us about its destabilizing effects within the narrative structure and 
the heterosexual discourse as a whole.   
                                                 
21 As a matter of fact, secrecy is an element that characterizes not only women’s relation to abortion, 
but also the relation of certain characters to their queer sexuality–this is true for Donna in Guerra.   
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Annie Ernaux’s L’événement: Writing Abortion, Killing the Mother22 
 Ernaux’s novel is particularly significant in its lucid portrayal of the 
circumstance that led to Ernaux’s clandestine abortion.  As we learn from Ernaux, at 
the time she became pregnant she was more interested in her personal development 
than in being a mother (she was a university student at the time).  She uses the 
unreliableand in this case ineffectiveOgino-Knaus method–the 1967 law Newirth 
authorizing the sale of contraception was not effected until 1972.23  When she finds 
out that she is pregnant, Ernaux goes repeatedly to her gynecologist in the attempt to 
convince him that she does not want to keep the baby.  The doctor evades the question 
of abortion and confirms to her that “tout allait bien” [everything went right].  
Pregnant women with no money and no connections were an annoyance to doctors, 
explains Ernaux, since “elles les obligeaient à se rappeler la loi qui pouvait les 
envoyer en prison et leur interdire d’exercer pour toujours” (45) [they were forced to 
remember the law that could sent them to prison and prevent them from practicing 
again].  As the doctor continues to circumvent the question of abortion, Ernaux is 
unable to communicate her needs openly.  She is thus forced to think of tactics that 
can gain her access to abortion, with little or only a vague knowledge of how to do it.  
The doctor thus becomes the embodiment of a prohibition and a vehicle of non-
communication that Ernaux strives to circumvent:    
En sortant du cabinet, je me suis accusée d’avoir gâchée ma dernière chance.  
Je n’avais pas su jouer à fond le jeu qu’exigeait le contournement de la 
loi…Ni lui ni moi n’avions prononcé le mot avortement une seule fois.  
C’était une chose qui n’avait pas de place dans le langage. (59-60) 
                                                 
22 Translations of L’événement are mine. 
23 In 1967 France authorized contraception with the Newirth law, did not go into not effect until 1972.  
However, the impact of Catholic morality was felt among those women who continued to practice the 
only methods recognized by Christian orthodoxy, the Ogino-Knaus method and the amplexus 





[As soon as I came out of the doctor’s office, I blamed myself for wasting my 
last chance.  I had not been able successfully to play the game that was 
involved in the avoidance of law.  Neither he or I pronounced the word 
abortion a single time.  It was a thing that had no place in language.]  
 
As a prohibited practice punishable by law, abortion is also governed by a linguistic 
prohibition.  Ernaux is made to feel guilty and disempowered by the impossibility of 
even mentioning the subject of abortion.  Ernaux’s situation only confirms and 
reinforces what Gauthier points out in her historical study of abortion: abortion was a 
taboo and remained such for a long time.  As a result, women did not talk or write 
about it.  Its illegal status not only made the act unspeakable, it also the stigmatized 
bodies of the aborting women who were discriminated against in hospitals, as we 
learn from the author.  Ernaux eventually manages to circumvent the doctors and the 
law by turning to a “faiseuse d’anges” (or “avorteuse”), a woman who carry out an 
abortion for a fee.  After a first failed attempt to insert a “sonde” [catheter], the 
“avorteuse” finally provokes Ernaux to have a miscarriage (“fausse couche”) or an 
involuntary abortion. 24   
The procedure of inducing a “fausse couche” often turned out to be dangerous 
and risky for women, especially for those women who, like Ernaux, could not afford 
more expensive and better abortive methods.  Ernaux’s own portrayal of herself 
between life and death has some very powerful narrative effects.  After the 
“avorteuse” inserts the catheter in her uterus, Ernaux feels that she is alive again: “Il 
me semble,” she writes, “que cette femme qui s’active entre mes jambes, qui introduit 
le spéculum, me fait naître” (85). [It seems to me that this woman who is operating 
between my legs, who inserts the speculum, brings me to life (85).]  More important, 
                                                 
24 The cheap methods of the “avorteuse” appear even in her request to Ernaux that she return the 
catherer to her for recycling.    
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the impression of being reborn is accompanied by the idea of having killed the 
mother: “J’ai tué ma mère en moi à ce moment là” (85) [I killed my mother inside of 
me at this very moment.]  For the narrator becoming mother against her will was to 
follow into the footsteps of her own mother and to be destined for social failure:   
J’établissais confusément un lien entre ma classe sociale d’origine et ce qui 
m’arrivait.  Première à faire des études supérieures dans une famille d’ouvriers 
et de petits commerçants, J’avais échappé à l’usine et au comptoir.  Mais ni le 
bac ni la licence de lettres n’avaient réussi à détourner la fatalité de la 
transmission d’une pauvreté dont la fille enceinte était, au même titre que 
l’alcolique, l’emblème. J’étais rattrapée par le cul et ce qui poussait en moi 
c’était, d’une certaine manière l’échec social. (31-32) 
         
[I vaguely established a link between my social milieu and what was 
happening to me.  I was the first one to have accessed higher education in a 
family of workers and shopkeepers.  I had escaped the factory and the store.  
However, neither my high school nor my college degree enabled me to avoid 
the fatal transmission of poverty of which the pregnant girl was, just like the 
alcoholic, the symbol.  What was growing within me was, in a certain way, 
social failure.]   
  
The link between maternity and her social milieu of origin haunts Ernaux’s tale of 
abortion.  As part of her heritage, Ernaux was expected to become a mother and 
follow that physiological destiny, that natural vocation, as Simone de Beauvoir calls it 
ironically, which made maternity seem a natural choice to some women.  However, 
Ernaux’s conception of maternity as social failure may already be the sign, in 
Ernaux’s view, that maternity is a constructed and compulsory identity for women.  
To a certain extent Ernaux seems to problematize the idea of maternity as women’s 
natural vocation, as Beauvoir did in Le Deuxième Sexe.25  
The circumstances of abortion only made Ernaux more aware of the prejudices 
and the social assumptions surrounding the women of her class.  The “fausse couche” 
                                                 
25 “La function reproductrice n’est plus commandée par le seul hazard biologique, elle est controlée par 
des volontés” (Deuxième II, 326). [The reproductive function in particular has no longer been at the 




provokes a dangerous hemorrhage which forces Ernaux to go to the public hospital, 
the Hôtel Dieu.  The hospital was known for taking in women who could not afford 
the luxury of better care.  Remarkable is the scene in which the Hôtel Dieu surgeon 
replies to Ernaux’s request for an explanation of how he will treat her: “Je ne suis pas 
le plombier” [I am not the plumber], he says.  Through this abrupt answer the doctor 
may imply that it is not proper of her to ask or that, being in a position of power and 
knowledge, he does not need to justify his act.  “Cette phrase,” comments Ernaux, 
“continue de hiérarchiser le monde en moi, de séparer, comme à coups de trique, les 
médecins des ouvriers et des femmes qui avortent, les dominants des dominés” (108). 
[This sentence continues to hierarchize the world inside of me, to separate, under a 
cudgel, the doctors from the workers and the aborting women, the dominant from the 
dominated.]  On top of the pain of the actual abortion, Ernaux must bear the 
denigrating language of those who have the “droit des ‘haut placés’ à se mettre au-
dessus des lois” (111) [right of the privileged to put themselves above the laws.]  
What the material experience of abortion reveals to Ernaux is the language of power:  
the extent to which the society’s rigid division into categories of class and of sexuality 
was reinforced by the use of language that made some appear more privileged and 
powerful than others.  The body of the aborting woman is defined by the discursive 
mechanisms of domination, another facet of the way in which women’s reproductive 
bodies have always been appropriated.  The power of Ernaux’s text is in showing how 
discursive domination is enacted on the bodies of women.  Abortion is the context in 
which this domination becomes the more evident.  Discursively, abortion impacts 
women’s bodies as much as maternity does.  Experiencing her own body as 
devastated and exposed to prejudices and social inequalities, Ernaux was suddenly 
reminded of her mother’s body.  Yet because abortion was the expression of her will 
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not to fall into a coerced maternity, Ernaux’s abortion should not be read as a 
rejection of maternity once and for all.  As she herself claims, years later she became 
a mother and thus felt prepared to “accepter cette violence de la reproduction dans 
[s]on corps et devenir à son tour lieu de passage des generations” (124) [accept this 
violence of reproduction in her body and become in turn the site of passage of 
generations.]  Nonetheless, the choice of abortion, at a time in which it was illegal, 
enabled Ernaux to experience, through her own body, the discursive effects that came 
with the refusal to yield to a compulsory identity.   
A considerable amount of time separates the narrative of the abortion from the 
feminist battles on abortion.  This distance is functional to the telling of abortion: 
C’est justement parce que aucune interdiction ne pèse plus sur l’avortement 
que je peux, écartant le sens collectif et les formules nécessairement 
simplifiées, imposés par la lutte des années soixante-dix…affronter, dans sa 
realité, cet événement inoubliable. (25) 
 
[It is precisely because no taboo weighs any more on abortion that I am able to 
face this unforgettable event in its reality, doing away with its collective 
dimension and the simplified formulas of the 1970s battles.]   
 
Ernaux is finally allowed to describe her experience when abortion is no longer 
socially and linguistically a taboo.  The feminist struggles to legalize it have become a 
chapter of history as well, and Ernaux can now narrate abortion with lucidity.  
Perhaps the lucidity is simply the internal struggle to “résister au lyrisme de la colère 
ou de la douleur” [resist the lyricism of rage and of pain] (95), the effect of a 
rationalization of pain, and a rational detachment from the event.  Lucidity is a 
constitutive part of Ernaux’s narration of abortion.  We say that someone is lucid and 
can recall things when we suppose one was previously in a shock or an altered state of 
mind that prevented one from remembering or speaking.  Lucidity is Ernaux’s effort 
to both recall and let go of of that altered state in order to share her most intimate 
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experience with her readers.  Hence lucidity can be seen as the narrative quality that 
can convey the experience of alterity and establishing its memory:  
Il ne me semble disposer d’aucune certitude concernant les sentiments et les 
pensées, à cause de l’immatérialité et de l’évanescence de ce qui traverse 
l’esprit.  Seul le souvenir de sensations liées à des êtres et des choses hors de 
moi m’apporte la prevue de la réalité.  La seule vraie mémoire est matérielle. 
(74-75) 
 
[It appears as if I could not be certain about any of my thoughts or my feelings 
because of the immaterial and evanescent quality of what traverses my 
miemory.  The memory of sensations linked with people and things outside of 
myself are a reality check.  The only true memory is material.] 
  
Lucidity is ultimately the memory that only bodies can convey: it is material memory.  
But since lucidity is related to the trauma of abortion, lucidity becomes specifically 
the language of the material memory of abortion.  Lucidity, as a narrative quality of 
abortion, is the place where the symbolic and the material fold into each other. 
Lucidity has also a destabilizing effect.  In this tale of abortion it can be 
troubling because it performs the “killing of the mother” time and again.  Yet the 
matricide through the writing of abortion disrupts not just a potential family, but a 
socially and symbolically valorized notion of motherhood.  By her lucid narration of 
abortion as matricide Ernaux also shows herself more as an agent and less as a victim.  
Her agency comes from the destruction of a socially constructed body, that of the 
traditional mother.  It is important to stress that such a textual destruction reads more 
as a deconstructive move towards the reproduction of a compulsory identity. It is by 
no means a way to radically differentiate and hierachize the woman-mother from the 
woman-not mother.  As I signaled above Ernaux will actually come to embody both 
by means of her possibility and her ability to make a choice.  Ernaux’s choice 
likewise comes from her ability to convey this destructive event through a creative 
form, the writing of her testimonial.  As a result abortion is not merely the pretext nor 
the object of creation.  It is the very subject of creation.  Mentions of desire for 
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creation are scattered in the novel.  Ernaux confesses that for some time she attributed 
her inability to write a novel to her fear of embody the intellectual, and the feeling of 
being “retenue par quelque chose de très ancien, lié au monde des travailleurs 
manuels” (50-51) [being restrained by something atavistic, linked to the world of 
manual workers.]  This sensation increased during the short period prior to abortion in 
which that memory in her body felt like a mental impediment.   Would Ernaux ever 
have become a writer had she not had an abortion?  Perhaps a different choice would 
have entailed a different career for her, as she suggests.  Abortion seems to have 
played a considerable role in shaping her activity as a writer.   
Writing Bodies from Testimony to Diary  
  At the end of her testimony, the woman explains that abortion was ultimately 
a gift to share through writing, “car par delà toutes les raisons sociales et 
psychologiques que je peux trouver à ce que j’ai vécu,”  she says, “il en est une dont 
je suis sûre plus que tout: les choses me sont arrivées pour que j’en rende compte” 
[because beyond all social and psychological reasons that may explain what I have 
lived, there is one of which I am more than certain : things have happened to me so 
that I may account for them.]  Things have happened to her so that she can turn them 
into writing, thus giving them a discursive and collective dimension: 
Et le véritable but de ma vie est peut-être seulement celui-ci: que mon corps, 
mes sensations et mes pensées deviennent de l’écriture, c’est-à-dire quelque 
chose d’intelligible et de général, mon existence complètement dissoute dans 
la tête et la vie des autres. (124-125)   
 
[The true goal of my life can only perhaps be this: that my body, my 
sensations and my thoughts become writing, that is to say, something 
intelligible and general, dissolving my existence into the head and the life of 
others.]   
   
The remarkable effect that writing abortion produces is that it transforms the aborting 
body into a shared experience.  In this way a personal embodied experience becomes 
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the site of collective consciousness and identification (“mon existence complètement 
dissoute dans la tête et la vie des autres”).  The inscription of abortion provide a space 
of solidarity with all women who, at different times and in different places, armed 
with fear and determination, went through the painful experience of abortion: “Des 
milliers de filles ont monté un escalier, frappé à une porte derrière laquelle il y avait 
une femme dont elles ne savaient rien, à qui elles allaient abandoner leur sexe et leur 
ventre” (77). [Thousands of girls have climbed stairs, knocked on a door behind 
which there was an unknown woman to whom they were going to entrust their sex 
and their wombs.]  Perhaps similar to those women who consigned their bodies to the 
mid-wife’s hands and knowledge in the hope of “being reborn,”  Ernaux projects onto 
her writing the excruciating moments of “the event,” allowing for a transition and a 
transformation to take place.  Her text is the place of dissolution of those experiences 
and sensations, the site where her personal and intimate story collapses into the 
multiplicity of women’s voices once silenced and secreted.      
  Collective consciousness is a central theme of 1970s feminist movement.  
Abortion was among the most important issues around which women gathered, 
developing a sense of commonality and of self-consciousness regarding the control 
and exploitation of their bodies and their sexuality.  Consciousness-raising was one 
collective practice that gave women better access to the understading of their bodies.  
Although widespread in Western countries, consciousness-rasing has some culturally 
specific elements.  In Italy many women practiced autocoscienza.  This 
consciousness-raising practice, which Italian women inherited and translated from the 
American version of the practice, helped women recognize, engage in, and come to 
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terms with forms of dependence and subjection within the family and within society.26  
Autocoscienza consisted of a recollection and a sharing of the lived experiences of 
women in relation to the cultural assumptions surrounding their gender and their 
sexuality.27  Moreover, women’s organization into collective groups provided women 
with an alternative living source of emotional and material support to that of the 
family.  One practice common in some women’s groups was that of keeping a diary 
as an instrument facilitating self-analysis and discernment.  Whereas autocoscienza 
was mainly an oral practice among women, the diary was a written record of that oral 
practice.  As such it constitutes an important cultural document of the years of the 
Italian feminist movement and a vivid record of the practice of autocoscienza.                
  Donna in guerra is a fictional diary that records Vannina’s coming to 
consciousness as a lower-middle class woman in the early 1970s, and becoming 
emancipated from a traditional image of womanhood and from a dysfunctional 
marriage.  Vannina’s diary starts in August 1970 while the narrator is spending her 
holidays with her husband Giacinto on a fictional island of Southern Italy.  The 
narrator is a school teacher and a devoted wife to her husband, a mechanic.  Her story 
is situated a few years before the struggles for the decriminalization of abortion 
began.  Although apparently removed from that context (because the story takes place 
during a vacation on a fictional island), the story reflects the changing climate of 
those years in its representation of Marxist social movements, the critique of State 
violence, of working-class exploitation along with women’s exploitation and 
                                                 
26 Radical feminist Carla Lonzi is considered to be the creator of autocoscienza in Italy.  My second 
chapter is devoted to the vicissitudes of her group and of her theories in the 1970s.  
27 Autocoscienza was not the only consciousness-raising practice, but it was certainly the earliest 
known in the first half of the 1970s.  After the encounter with French feminists of Psych et Po some 
Italian women progressively disengaged from autocoscienza and embraced practica dell’inconscio 




oppression in a patriarchal regime.  The women in the novel do not belong to any 
specific female group or collective; they nonetheless develop bonds of solidarity and 
complicity that take Vannina out of her initial isolation and disrupt her domestic 
routine.  The author’s attention to this kind of solidarity echoes Maraini’s personal 
engagement within women’s groups, which she welcomed as an outlet from an 
anguished isolation and as a source of inspiration for her work.  In an interview with 
Ileana Montini, Maraini acknowledges the benefits that women’s groups and 
autocoscienza brought to her: 
Per me il femminismo è stato importantissimo, soffrivo d’angoscia, non so 
come dirti, di angoscia, di paura, di una specie di tristezza senza ragione: un 
senso di inesistenza.  Il femminismo mi ha tolto questa angoscia. (112) 
 
[For me feminism has been very important.  I used to suffer from a malaise, I 
don’t know how to explain, an anguish, a fear, a kind of sadness without 
reason: a sense of non-existence.  Feminism took away this malaise.] 
  
Io nei gruppi mi sono trovata bene, l’autocoscienza mi viene spontanea, forse 
perché c’è stato un lungo lavoro, io ho cominciato nel `68-69 con Rivolta 
Femminile.  Poi il fatto di scrivere è stato molto utile per imparare a uscire da 
me stessa, a vincere certe cose.  Pian piano sono uscita fuori da Rivolta 
Femminile, ho trovato altre femministe, ho fatto del lavoro di gruppo con il 
teatro. (114) 
 
[I found myself at ease in the groups, consciousness-raising is spontaneous for 
me, perhaps because I worked a lot on it, I began in 68-69 with Rivolta 
Femminile.  Then I found writing very useful in order to learn how to get out 
of myself, conquer my fears.  Little by little, I came out of Rivolta Femminile, 
I met other feminists, I did teamwork with theater.]28  
 
The creative component of feminism is a crucial aspect of Maraini’s feminism and 
one that she translates in Donna in guerra through the representation of Vannina’s 
creative activity of writing a diary.  This activity enables Vannina to establish her 
body not merely as an epistemological vehicle of her emancipation as a woman, but 
also as site of queer differences.  In this regard Vannina’s diary prefigures in part the 
                                                 
28 Translations are mine. 
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formation of an Italian discourse of sexual difference, based not on “difference 
constructed from ‘biology’ and imposed as gender,” but on “symbolization, a 
different production of reference and meaning” (De Lauretis, Sexual Difference p.13).  
But that intricate relationship between materiality and symbolization that Vannina’s 
diary and body stage makes space for an unforeseen and unspoken queer dimension.             
During her holidays Vannina starts recording in her diary the circumstances 
and encounters that punctuate her daily routine.  Vannina writes things down 
objectively as an observer, without really questioning what she is observing and 
recording.  Yet the facts and encounters she depicts eventually force her to question 
the state of apparent passivity and dependence in which she dwells, and to determine 
to make a change in her life.  A few encounters affect the course of Vannina’s life: the 
acquaintance with matrons Giottina and Tota draws her into the picturesque world of 
their voyeuristic gossip about the rich people vacationing on the island.  Then young 
Orio, with his innocence and tender masculinity, seduces Vannina out of her 
unfulfilling marital life.  Finally, Suna, a rich disabled girl involved in a Marxist 
movement, opens Vannina’s eyes to the reality of women’s oppression and the 
misogynist environment they both inhabit.  Little by little Vannina comes out of her 
sheltered life, taking several initiatives on her own, although in order to do so she 
goes against her husband’s will.  One major initiative is that of joining the Marxist 
movement and taking a trip to Naples to follow the plans of the movement.  This trip 
discloses to her the reality of women’s oppression and exploitation in the black 
market (women work under the table) thus revealing an important dimension of 
oppression that intersects with Vannina’s private subjection.  After Vannina comes 
back from her trip, some members of the movement are arrested and put in jail.  
Vannina goes back to her earlier life, her work at home and at school, while Giacinto 
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attempts to convince her to have a child.  Vannina resists Giacinto’s efforts, and she 
grows even more distant from him.  The relationship between husband and wife 
comes to a crisis when Vannina becomes pregnant and finds out that her best friend 
Suna has committed suicide.  These two events represent a turning point in the 
woman’s life as she finds the courage to undergo an abortion and leave eventually 
Giacinto.                        
The narrative of abortion takes up a very small part of the novel whose 
structure and content are quite intricate and heterogeneous.  The novel opens and 
closes with the narration of two of Vannina’s dreams.  These dreams are very 
important narrative references in that they record Vannina’s complex negotiation of 
inner changes.  This is why the dreams are also crucial moments for the articulation of 
my argument.  A closer look reveals that the novel has a circular structure in which 
the first dream anticipates the last one.  I refer to this structure in terms of the abortive 
structure of the novel because abortion is presented in the novel and in the dreams 
simultaneously as the end of one life and narrative and the beginning of new ones.   
From the beginning of the novel we are plunged into the monotonous rhythm 
of Vannina’s uneventful life.  Vannina constantly thinks of her duties as a wife and 
she performs them methodically and compulsively even during vacation time.  
Housework seems to be a spontaneous task to her, and it would go unnoticed if it 
were not for the insistent repetition of chores which punctuate the diary throughout: 
“Alle dieci mi sono messa a sparecchiare.  Ho lavato i piatti.  Ho sgrassato le pentole.  
Ho sciacquato i bicchieri” (4). [At ten I started cleaning the table.  I washed the 
dishes, scoured the saucepans, rinsed the glasses (4).]  Sentences like this one are 
almost redundant and show that, as Giancarlo Lombardi points out, “Vannina still 
remains, while on vacation, a woman defined by those duties that patriarchal society 
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demands of her” (95).  Yet the fact that Vannina records these duties and perform 
them again through writing has the effect of exposing Vannina’s unconscious 
subjection to those domestic rituals.  The act of writing then destabilizes Vannina’s 
subjection rather than reinforcing it.  Moreover, the description of a bizarre dream 
intervenes to disrupt the monotony of housework chores:   
Ho sognato che una talpa scavava un tunnel nel mio ventre.  Mi sono svegliata 
con una fitta, un dolore sordo e fondo.  Qualcosa di caldo mi bagnava le cosce.  
Ho cacciato una mano sotto la gonna.  L’ho ritirata macchiata di sangue.  Ho 
respirato a fondo per vincere quel senso di tensione al ventre.  Non avevo 
voglia di alzarmi.  Ho lasciato che il sangue colasse, dolce, tiepido.  Dopo 
dovrò lavare la tella della sedia, mi dicevo.  Dovrò strofinarla col sapone.  
Dovrò metterla ad asciugare.  Dopo.  Non avevo voglia di mettermi in piedi.  
Ho chiuso gli occhi.  Il sole batteva vischioso e bruciante sulle gambe nude.  
Così comincia la mia vacanza: un rivolo di sangue benefico, la gioia di stare 
all’aperto, l’odore pungente del basilico.  La scuola è lontana.  Giacinto 
tornerà più tardi coi pesci.  La casa è in ordine.  Le camicie da stirare, il sugo 
da preparare, le pentole da pulire, sono rimandati a stasera a stasera.  Ora non 
voglio pensare a niente.  Sono contenta.  (3-4)   
     
[I fell asleep and dreamed a mole was digging a tunnel through my stomach.  I 
woke with a sudden stab of pain.  A dull intense ache was welling up from 
deep down inside me and something warm was wetting my thighs.  I took a 
deep breath the overcome the tension in my belly.  I didn’t feel like moving, I 
just let the blood trickle down my thigh, sweet and lukewarm.  Later I shall 
have to wash the canvas of the chair, I told myself, I shall have to scrub it with 
soap, I shall have to leave it out to dry.  Later.  Just now I don’t want to stand 
on my feet. I close my eyes and the sun shines scorching and vicious on my 
naked legs.  So starts my holiday.  A reassuring trickle of blood, the joy of 
being in the open, the pungent smell of basil.  School is long way away.  
Giacinto will come back later with the fish.  I’ve tided the house.  This 
evening I’ll iron his shirts, prepare the sauce, do the washing up.  Just now I 
don’t want to think of anything.  I am content. I am happy (3).] 
 
The dream begins with the image of a mole making its way into Vannina’s belly and 
ends with Vannina’s awakening in a pool of blood.29  The image of the stream of 
blood in which Vannina sits with contentment is one that conveys the woman’s 
                                                 
29 The English edited version translates “ventre,” which is actually “belly,” with “stomach”.  I prefer 
however using belly or womb given the context of abortion and the fact that my analysis establishes a 
narrative link between the image of a mole digging into Vannina’s belly and the hands of the doctor 
digging into Vannina’s womb. 
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emerging desire for autonomy for some critics.30  The physical manifestations of 
Vannina’s body signal a process of consciousness-raising and of inner change.  In this 
perspective the initial oniric figure of the digging mole is also significant, but it only 
can acquire its full meaning when put in relation to Vannina’s retelling of her own 
abortion–which does not come until the end of the novel.  The dream of the “digging 
mole” may serve as a kind of premonition that rhetorically links the beginning with 
the end of the novel.    
The feeling that something is growing inside her grabs Vannina again towards 
the end of the novel.  This time it is the foetus in her womb, the one she did not 
expect and that she discovered some weeks after Giacinto made love to her in her 
sleep.  Vannina records feeling “una durezza nel ventre, qualcosa che tira e si 
arrotola” (261) [feeling of hardness in my belly, as if something was pulling and 
coiling in (274)], and from that moment on her story becomes that of the thousands of 
women who faced unwanted pregnancy.31  With no knowledge of how to get an 
abortion–a similar ignorance and lack of support characterizes Ernaux’s story–
Vannina turns to Rosa Colla, a colleague who had an abortion and was still suffering 
the consequences of the insufficient care provided to women who procured 
abortions.32  Vannina does not specify how Rosa had this abortion or whether it was a 
cause of emotional pain.  The silence surrounding Rosa Colla’s abortion is perhaps 
                                                 
30 Elisabetta Properzi Nelsen, for instance, notes that “the existential story of the main character 
coincides with what she is undergoing physiologically during the course of her inner experiences and 
with the ordinary physical manifestations of the female body.  It is in this sense that the diary of her 
vacation begins with a ‘rivolo di sangue benefico’ (4; a trickle of healthful blood), which marks her 
potential sense of freedom and happiness” (84). 
31 Nor is Vannina’s case the only one in the novel.  Apart the aforementioned abortion of Rosa Colla, 
another woman, Marta, undergoes abortion in solitude and pain, comforted only by the cares of Suna.   
32 Rosa is an odd and marginal character.  She has no family and she lives in low income housing with 
a number of animals in poor hygienic conditions.  One day she makes love with a homeless man, 
whom she had found and fed out of pity and sympathy.  She discovers she is pregnant.   The man 
disappears leaving her alone; Rosa decides to have an abortion, which forces her to bed with a 
hemorrhage.   
43 
 
one more instance in which women’s real experience gets silenced.  Rosa offers 
important support for Vannina’s decision.  She gives her the name of a doctor and 
lends her some money to help pay for the abortion.33  Without Giacinto’s support and 
approval, but with some money handy, Vannina finally finds the courage to go to a 
doctor to have an abortion.  Vannina’s words are here more powerful than any 
summary I could give of them:    
Mi ha ficcato le mani dure, gelate nel corpo.  Mi ha aperta, squarciata, 
raschiata a lungo con insistenza.  Per il dolore brutale, selvaggio, mi mordervo 
le mani  Sentivo il sangue che sgorgava a fiotti dall’utero martoriato.  Sono 
svenuta.  Mi sono risvegliata.  Passavano le ore, i giorni, gli anni, lo scavo non 
finiva mai.  Tutto il male del mondo si era accumulato nel fondo del mio 
ventre, fra le mani metalliche del carnefice. (267)  
 
[He thrust his hard, icy hands into my body.  He opened me up, he ripped me 
apart and scraped me thoroughly.  I bit my hands with clenched teeth to 
endure the brutal pain; I could feel the blood gushing out in streams from my 
tortured uterus.  I fainted.  I woke up again.  The hours, the days, the years 
were passing by and excavation never finished.  All the pain in the world had 
accumulated at the bottom of my belly, amongst the torturer’s metallic hands 
(280-281).]  
 
Reminiscent of Ernaux’s narration, Vannina’s words strikingly and lucidly portray the 
violence of the ironically named Doctor Petalo and the operation on the woman’s 
body.  Unlike his name (petal, in English), he is far from delicate.  The 
“raschiamento” is a truly violent and hurtful procedure which the dream of the 
excavating mole anticipated only to make its description more poignant.  Moreover 
the “raschiamento” describes the aborted woman for what she is: the victim of the 
cold hands (“mani metalliche”) of a criminal doctor.  The word   “carnefice” is 
properly linked with killing. By criminalizing the doctor and his violent behavior, 
                                                 
33 Rosa thus comes across as a woman socially different who has carved a space of autonomy for 
herself at a moment in which women were not socially organized in collectives, the “consultori” (free 
care centers) were not yet in place, and women had far fewer means of psychological and financial 




Vannina’s poignant tale subverts the myth that made aborted women into criminals, a 
characterization that served to reinforce the persistence of a legal prohibition.  Here 
there is no foetus.  There is only a woman in front of the doctor, a victim in front of a 
persecutor who savagely scrapes her uterus, caring only for the money he will make 
out of it. Maraini, by focusing on the martyrizing pain of the woman, manages to 
dehumanize the doctor and the institution he represents.   
 “Raschiamento,” the operation of “scraping” the foetus off the uterus was an 
old abortive method.  Its enduring practice among doctors signaled a lack of concern 
with women’s health conditions, as Adele Faccio recalls in her book.34  The practice 
of “raschiamento” was indeed known among women who experienced abortion and 
one that cannot be easily described, as Ernaux’s testimony also reveals.  Was the 
dream of the digging mole that excavates into Vannina’s womb one way to represent 
the act of “raschiamento?”  If so, it bridges the beginning and the end, thus forming 
the narrative circle I referred to above and revealing that abortion has a much greater 
influence in the economy of the narrative than we may think.  But there is more at 
stake in reading Vannina’s abortion.  The foetus scraped off of Vannina’s womb may 
also be read symbolically as the destruction of a woman’s link to maternity as a 
biological destiny.  I don’t intend here to minimize the physical and psychological 
suffering involved in the decision and the act of abortion.  I however would like to 
explore this moment as one representing the culmination of a process of 
                                                 
34 “Invece per lo più sono insensibili, mal preparati, incapaci di aggiornarsi, se non altro sulle tecniche 
più attuali, aggrappati al loro maledetto raschiamento che distrugge l’utero delle donne almeno tanto 
quanto la lavanda alla candeggina di cui mostrano di scandalizzarsi tanto, legati ad un gioco di interessi 
che fa vergogna e disonora una categoria di persone che per molti versi meriterebbe più rispetto.” 
(Faccio 21). [Instead (doctors) are for the most insensitive, not well-prepared, unable to stay updated 
with the more recent techniques, attached as they are to their damn method of scraping which destroys 
women’s uterus at least as much as bleach of which they themselves seem to lament the use.  They are 
tied to a game of interests, a political game which shames and dishonors a category of people who 
would deserve more respect for many reasons.] 
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deconstruction.  Through it what is deconstructed is the cultural and social equation of 
woman and mother which is at once rejected and re-imagined.  Ernaux’s text is 
articulated around a similar rejection (‘the killing of the mother”), but Maraini’s text 
does more than reject the equation, it deeply disrupts the hetero-normative 
construction of sexuality.  
A Compulsory Relationship 
Vannina’s resolution to undergo abortion is the outcome of a slow process in 
which Vannina has come to question her marital role as a form of submission not only 
to Giacinto, but also to socially accepted views of womanhood.  In the beginning of 
the novel, and for a good part of it, what we know of Vannina is that she passively 
conforms to these views by acting in ways that reinforce traditional constructions of 
gender.  She seems intent in performing duties among which there is the obligation to 
satisfy her husband sexually.  In a number of passages Vannina yields to Giacinto’s 
sudden sexual impulses such as the following:    
Abbiam fatto l’amore.  In fretta, come al solito, senza darmi il tempo di 
arrivare fino in fondo…Gli dico di aspettarmi.  Mi dice che se non fa presto 
gli passa la voglia.  Ha fretta di gonfiarsi…ha fretta di esplodere, come se 
indugiando potesse perdere qualcosa…Così io rimango a metà, ansante, 
contratta.  Lui corre, inseguito dalla paura di non so che.  Si afferra a me, 
frenetico, morde, si scuote, grida.  Non so fermarlo, né acqueitarlo, né 
trattenerlo.  Quando lo afferro è già scappato.  Il liquido caldo cola sul 
lenzuolo.  Sono presa da un rabbioso scoraggiamento. (11) 
 
[We made love.  Quickly, as usual, without giving me time to come properly.  
I tell him to wait for me, but he says that if he doesn’t hurry he loses 
momentum and then he can’t make it.   He’s in a rush to grow big. He’s in a 
hurry to explode as if he’d lose something if he hesitated.  So he rushes on, 
pursued by the fear of God knows what, he clings to me in a frenzy, bites, 
jerks, screams.  I can’t stop or restrain him, and when I grab him he’s already 
come.  The hot liquid trickles down on to the sheet.  I come half-way panting 
and frustrated (11).]     
 
The mechanical gestures of Giacinto are equaled only by the dissatisfaction of 
Vannina who has come “half-way.”  This passage recalls Pasolini’s idea of 
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“dysfunctional” coitus as an unfulfilled sexual relationship, in which the couple plays 
roles in a coercive setting.  The dysfunctional aspect of this relationship is apparent in 
its compulsory nature and in Vannina’s lack of full pleasure.  Vannina’s docile 
submission to her husband’s desire is part of an attitude of passivity that she also 
reproduces outside her home.  Evidence of it can be found for instance in Vannina’s 
inadequate response to her neighbors’ arrogance or in her servile attitude towards the 
petty requests of Vittorio, the leader of the Marxist movement that Vannina joins.  
Husband and wife will soon channel their unexpressed desires outside their marriage, 
defining a whole range of queer extramarital situations.35  Vannina’s awakening 
sexual desires for the teenaged Orio and Giacinto’s close bond with Santino are 
examples of a queer dimension of desire and pleasure that questions the limits of the 
marital bond based on reproduction and intersects with Vannina’s growing political 
consciousness.  The relevant space that the queer dimension acquires in the novel is 
also the space where Maraini’s feminism can dialogue with Pasolini’s queerness 
towards a re-articulation of the “sessualmente diverso” [the sexually different, the 
queer.]   
  As Suna comes into Vannina’s life, she alerts the woman to what she 
describes as her overly passive bent.  She also insinuates that what really binds 
Vannina to Giacinto is not love, but a form of obedience: 
 - Scommetto che con Giacinto non ci vai per niente d’accordo. 
 - Sì invece. 
                                                 
35 In a collection of essays called La bionda, la bruna e l’asino Maraini reflects on the nature of sexual 
pleasure and its not being exclusive to reproductive coitus.  She seems to agree with Pasolini when she 
writes: “Il piacere sessuale non è limitabile al coito.  Anzi scopriamo chef a il nido nelle pieghe più 
impensate della nostra quotidianità: nel rapport fra madre e neonate, fra padre e figli, fra fratelli, fra 
amici, fra colleghi, fra rivali, fra persone e fantasmi, persone e miti, persone e sogni, persone e cibo” 
(11). [Sexual pleasure cannot be limited to coitus.  Instead, we find out that it can hide in the meanders 
of our daily routine: in the relationship between a mother and her baby, between fathers and sons, 
among brothers, friends, colleagues, rivals, among people and phantasms, people and myths, people 
and dreams, people and food.]   
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- Perché fai quello che vuole lui, ma questo non è accordo è passività ; sono 
sicura che Giacinto non ti accontenta in amore. 
- Come fai a dirlo? 
- Lo vedo da come ti prende il braccio quando viene al bar, lo vedo da come ti 
parla, da come ti guarda; mi dispiace dirtelo ma tuo marito di te non è 
innamorato per niente, ti vuole bene sì, ma pensa ad altro. (64) 
 
[I bet you don’t get on with Giacinto at all. 
You are wrong, I do. 
Because you do what he tells you, that’s not getting on with someone, it’s 
passivity.  I am sure Giacinto doesn’t satisfy you sexually. 
How can you say that? 
I can see from the way he holds your arm when you come to the Bar, I can see 
it from the way he talks to you, the way he looks at you.  I’m sorry to tell you 
this, but your husband is not in love with you in the least.  He’s fond of you, 
maybe, but his mind’s elsewhere. (64)] 
 
Suna immediately understands that Vannina’s acquiescence to her role can result in a 
lack of pleasure and desire, a reason why Vannina appears to Suna lifeless (“candela 
spenta,” 64).  With her sharp sense of consciousness, Suna helps Vannina to 
foreground the experience of marital sex and her marriage in general as compulsory.  
She thus plays a mediating role, nurturing Vannina’s awakening consciousness.  In 
this respect Suna and Vannina’s bond prefigures one of the fundamental structures of 
the social practice of Italian feminism, the structure of “affidamento” (entrustment), 
as some scholars pointed out.36  The main feature of entrustment is that of providing 
women a nurturing bond from a social, psychological and physical stand point.  When 
seen in terms of entrustment, Vannina and Suna’s relationship acquires a nurturing 
character that replaces and dislodges the traditional role played by biological mothers.  
In this sense entrustment is already a re-reading of motherhood that can produce some 
                                                 
36 Scholars of Maraini have referred to Suna’s and Vannina’s relationship in terms of “affidamento” 
[entrustment].  Entrustment is a form of female alliance through mutual support that came into being in 




important queer effects for the characters in the novel, and not only the female ones, 
as I shall discuss shortly.    
The relationship that binds Vannina to Suna has the effect of shaking Vannina 
from her passive state.  Following Suna’s footsteps, Vannina becomes more alert and 
more involved in public matters.  She joins a Marxist student movement, to which 
Suna belongs, where women conduct interviews about female exploitation in the 
black market of Southern Italy.  Here as well the women face the sexism of the group, 
whose male members display attitudes that reflect cultural assumptions about gender 
roles.  For instance, Vittorio, who seems to welcome the presence of Vannina and 
Suna into the movement, at times uses Vannina for those tasks with which he does not 
want to be bothered.  Vannina responds to his requests without questioning his 
authoritative position: “Volevo dire di no, ma mi sono lasciata andare alla dolcezza di 
dire di si, di farsi attenti, unili, di eseguire con remissività un incarico era quello che si 
aspettavano da me, era naturale, era il mio compito di donna” (108). [I wanted to say 
no, but I let myself be carried away by the pleasure of saying yes, of being 
ingratiating, carrying out a task without question it was just what they expected from 
me, naturally, it was my role as a woman (110).]  Vannina’s response is however 
symptomatic of her acceptance of what seems to be “natural” to women.  When she 
says that obedience is what is expected from her, what is natural for her reveals that 
Vannina takes obedience and passivity as the distinctive marks of being a woman.  As 
Vittorio tries to explain to Vannina the meaning of oppression, he interestingly 
denounces that same pernicious association between women and passivity only to 
reject it when it comes to his own position towards Vannina:   
La passività ti fa complice, lo prendi in culo senza neanche saperlo, sei una 
vittima complice, qualcosa come una pulce che non può vivere senza il sangue 
del ricco. Poi sei una donna oltre tutto e le donne sono più portate alla 
49 
 
passività, al masochismo, un casino, dovresti fare un salto di qualità, difficile 
però, c’è da rompersi le gambe. (69) 
  
[Passivity makes you an accomplice, it fucks you up without you knowing it, 
because you’re not only an accomplice you are also a victim, you’re a flea that 
can’t live without the blood of the rich.  Besides, you’re a woman and women 
are even more inclined to be passive and masochistic, they are even more 
messed up.  You need to make a qualitative leap, but it’s not easy, you could 
end with both your legs broken. (69)] 
 
Vittorio’s explanation discloses that passivity is not merely the result of oppression 
but also a mechanism of complicity between the oppressor and the oppressed.  For 
women to reject something for which they seem to be “naturally” more inclined 
implies doing violence to themselves.  Does Vittorio mean that women should destroy 
what they are in order to overcome the social construction of their passivity?  
Interestingly Vittorio deploys the image of broken legs, which evokes Suna’s 
disability.  The image of disability is therefore an empowering one even in Vittorio’s 
speech. I claim that the image of women’s broken legs signify Suna’s and Vannina’s 
act of doing violence to their own bodies in order to denounce the violence of the 
system.  
Suna’s Queer Body 
          Suna’s active and demystifying attitude towards those cultural assumptions 
about women leaves a lasting impression on Vannina.  Suna does not accept the easy 
association between women and passivity, perhaps because her disability has made 
her more combative.  For what really hinders Suna’s self fulfillment is not her 
disabled state, but a family situation which mirrors somewhat Vannina’s conjugal 
dependence.  She does not work and she is dependent on her father’s money.  Suna is 
subject to her padre-padrone (father-master) we learn, from whom she can escape 
only by finding herself a husband: 
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Io sono ricca sì, ma senti in che modo: I soldi li tieni stretti al cazzo mio padre, 
che mi dà un tanto al mese, come a una mantenuta dei coi suoi coglioni e 
basta, non guadagno, non posseggo niente, e non sono io che decido sul come 
e quando spenderli, non ho poteri, tiene tutto in mano lui il turco e sai cosa 
vuole? Che io mi trovi al piu’ presto un marito per togliermi dalle scatole; ma 
con queste gambe non e’ facile. (73) 
   
[Ok, I’m rich.  But just listen how rich I am.  It’s my father who has all the 
money and he keeps it tightly tied to his balls.  He gives me so much a month 
like a kept woman.  That’s how it is, I earn and own nothing, and it’s not me 
who decides how and when to spend that money, I have no power whatsoever.  
The Turk holds everything tight in his hand, and do you know what he wants?  
He wants me to get myself a husband as soon as possible so that I’ll be off his 
hands and out of the way.  But unfortunately with these legs of mine it’s not 
going to be easy. (73)] 
 
Suna’s father wants his daughter to find a husband in order to get her off his back, but 
her disability, in her father’s eyes, can only gain her the attention of a man who is 
“boorish and ugly (73) [“bruttino e cafone” (73)].  This social prejudice that father 
shares makes her even more dependent on him: “Del resto se devo comprare un 
vestito, un paio di scarpe, un libro, devo chiederlo a lui, se voglio dieci lire, dico dieci 
lire da spendere come cavolo mi piace.  Devo raccontargli un sacco di palle, devo 
sedurlo, devo blandirlo, devo accativarmelo, e poi sentirmi in colpa per questo” (73).  
[So if I want to buy myself a dress, a pair of shoes, a book, I must ask him.  And if I 
want ten liras, and I mean ten to spend as I want, without giving him an account of it, 
I have to tell him a pack of lies.  I have to cajole him, win him over, and then feel 
guilty because of it (73).]   
 Rather than pitying herself because she doesn’t have a husband, Suna 
disparages marriage as a form of servitude to which Vannina is subjected; Suna’s 
rejection of marriage is thus one way of opposing her rich father’s will, but also of 
escaping another compulsory situation.  Unlike Vannina, Suna acknowledges her state 
of dependence and tries to circumvent it.  She is not passive.  She is outspoken and 
she does not hesitate to denounce forms of oppression.  During a debate she has with 
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Vittorio, the leader of the Marxist movement, over the effects of internalizing social 
violence and oppression, she condemns the violence implicit in Vittorio’s paternalistic 
tones towards women: she compares these tones to the violence of the state against 
the citizen.  In this respect, Suna’s outspokenness is a truly feminist form of social 
critique that takes gender as a tool of analysis.     
 Suna’s analytical attitude towards the hidden gender dimension of social 
oppression may well be the reason why Suna is ill regarded by the locals who 
consider her a threat.  Giacinto as well grows suspicious of his wife’s bond with Suna.  
He confronts his wife on her decision to follow the comrades of the movement in 
Naples and holds Suna responsible for “corrupting” his wife: 
Da quando siamo sposati è la prima volta che fai di testa tua. 
Beh.. 
Che cazzo significa? 
Non lo so 
È la storpia che ti mette contro di me. 
Perché ce l’hai tanto con lei? 
La giudico per quello che è: una troia. 
Ma perché? 
Perché non è naturale; mi rompe i coglioni. 
Che vuol dire naturale? 
Che segue la natura 
Cioè? 
Per una donna la natura è una cosa dolce, femminile; quella non fa che parlare 
a vanvera e dire cazzate e rompere l’anima alla gente. 
Io sono naturale? 
Tu sì, fin’ ora sì, ma ora proprio ora ti metti contro natura. 
Perché decido di partire? 
Tu di natura sei buona, calma, affettuosa, paziente, remissiva; oggi invece fai 
la stravagante, vai contro natura… 
Tu di natura sei diversa, sei una donna vera, molto femminile e ora fai così  
solo per imitare quella mezza donna. (141-42) 
 
[Since we got married this is the first time you’ve acted off your own bat. 
Well… 
What the fuck does it mean? 
I don’t know. 
It’s that crippled girl that’s set you against me. 
Why do you hate her so much? 




Because she isn’t natural.  She gets on my tits. 
What do you mean by “natural”? 
That follows nature’s rules 
That is? 
A woman nature is something sweet, feminine, but that one keeps talking off 
the top of her head and getting on everybody’s nerves. 
Am I natural? 
You are, yes, up to now you have been anyway, but now you’re putting 
yourself against nature. 
Because I’ve decided to leave? 
By nature you’re good-hearted, calm, affectionate, patient, submissive.  
Recently though you’ve been acting oddly, you’re going against your nature… 
I know you so well, it’s no use pretending: your real nature is quite different, 
at heart you’re very feminine.  But now you’re acting like this just to imitate 
that runt of a woman. (144-45)] 
 
Giacinto attempts to reinforce his authority over Vannina by upholding a binary view 
of what he thinks it is natural and unnatural in the behavior of a woman.  The effect is 
also that of using Suna’s disability (“storpia” is a derogatory term) as a way to 
demonstrate the unnaturalness of her behavior and discredit her as a woman.  For 
Giacinto Suna is a “half woman” because she does not conform with his traditional 
gender views and because she encourages Vannina to go against his will.  Here 
Giacinto understands “natural” in terms of “feminine,” “sweet,” “good.”  But all these 
attributes are also synonyms of submission and compliance or complicity as Vittorio 
puts it.  The threat to Giacinto’s authority is here taken as a pretext for the 
reaffirmation of a gender hierarchy which Suna’s presence disturbs.  Giacinto’s 
derogatory appellation “mezza donna” sounds very different from Suna’s own use of 
the expression “mezzo uomo mezza donna” with which she defines herself.  Suna 
appropriates the expression, reclaiming it in a positive and critical way, that is to say, 
in a way that subverts commonly accepted views of gender and sexuality.  In this 
respect I agree with Tommasina Gabriele who, in an article devoted to gender identity 
and subversive sexuality in Maraini, notes that Suna’s bisexuality is an attempt to 
escape a binary system and the imposition of rigid categories of sexuality (246).  
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Whereas Giacinto uses “mezza donna” in a derogatory manner as he does with the 
term “storpia,” Suna reclaims both in a subversive style.  As a consequence Suna’s 
disability can be read productively in conjuction with her own alternative construction 
of gender.37     
Writing Clandestine Abortion: Subverting Motherhood and Family 
     Giacinto also thinks that Vannina has become “less of a woman” because of her 
increasing expressions of autonomy.  In order to re-establish a family order that seems 
compromised he confronts Vannina again about the necessity to be a mother:  
Fai un figlio come vuole natura, pianti quel lavoro di merda  di cui non te ne 
frega niente. Mica ti voglio costringere, sia chiaro, io voglio solo che ritrovi te 
stessa, amore mio, voglio che torni quella Vanna di prima, di quando to ho 
sposata, naturale, inamorata, dolce, timida, laboriosa, gentile. (246-47)  
 
[But it’s natural to have a child, then you can give up that shitty job you’ve 
never liked. I don’t want to force you into it, Vannina, of course not, I only 
want you to find yourself again, my lovie, I want you to go back to what you 
were before, when I married you, so natural, so spontaneous, so much in love, 
sweet, shy, so hardworking. (259)] 
 
Giacinto seems to think that, by becoming a mother, Vannina will get back to her 
previous docile self, her supposed “natural” bent.  By being a mother, she will 
become “natural” and “feminine” again, as Vannina defiantly notes in her diary soon 
after finding out she is pregnant: “Giacinto mi spia. Con il figlio lui pensa che tornerò 
la donna dolce, remissiva, disponibile, arresa di prima” (261). [Giacinto is spying on 
me.  He is waiting for a sign of change.  With a child he believes I’ll become the 
sweet, submissive, ever-available woman I was before (274).]  Vannina’s remark 
stresses the way in which maternity and passivity are strongly intertwined and, in 
Giacinto’s view, natural to a woman.  But the relationship to maternity and passivity 
                                                 
37 Although this is beyond the scope of this chapter, I think that a more in-depth analysis of Suna’s 
disability can enrich the reading of the novel.  
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must be undone in order for a woman like Vannina to forge a new sense of self within 
society.  Abortion eventually enables Vannina to question both maternity and 
passivity as a woman’s “natural” self natural.  Here again a dream becomes the 
metaphorical space that describes Vannina’s transition from one life to another, and 
from one self to a different one.  The dream, which occurs right before Vannina’s 
abortion, actually prefigures its painful experience and offers a poignant portrayal of a 
woman’s survival.  
This delicate moment of a woman’s surviving abortion is one that Maraini 
witnessed herself thorugh her political and intellectual engagement in the issue, and 
her own personal abortion: 
Io ho avuto degli aborti, ne ho avuti due procurati e uno naturale, ma fino a tre 
anni fa non avrei mai, neanche confessato di avere abortito una volta, lo 
nascondevo accuratamente, perché mi sembrava una delle cose più 
vergognose della mia vita. (Montini 111) 
 
[I had abortions, I had two self-procured ones and a miscarriage, but up to 
three years ago I would not have even confessed having had abortion.  I hid it 
carefully because I considered it to be one of the most shameful experiences of 
my life.]38 
 
Although Maraini did not talk about her own abortion she wrote about abortion in 
general.  The personal and political experience of abortion has had a large impact on 
Maraini’s writing.39  In particular she analyzed it in the context of women’s position 
in a web of power relations.  In Un clandestino a bordo Maraini explains how 
abortion exemplifies a complex relation between institutions and the regulation of 
bodies and sexuality:  
Le Chiese, gli Stati, i poteri constituiti hanno sempre reclamato a sé la 
regolamentazione del corpo sessuato: come e quando accoppiarsi, come e 
quando figliare.  Il controllo della riproduzione è la più antica preoccupazione 
di ogni legislatore. (29)   
                                                 
38 Translation is mine. 
39 In her book Multitude of Women Italian scholar Stefania Lucamante has a very interesting and 





[Churches, States, and constituted powers have always reclaimed the 
regulation on the sexualized body: how and when to copulate, how and when 
to reproduce.  Control of reproduction is the most ancient preoccupation of 
any legislator.] 40   
 
In an intervention I mentioned in the introductory section to this chapter, Maraini 
stresses abortion as the result of a bad relationship between women and authority 
within the family (Faccio 63).  Vannina’s opposition to Giacinto’s views of what is 
“natural” for a woman, including maternity, is first and foremost an opposition to a 
“bad relationship” which is symptomatic of a dysfunctional and compulsory family 
and heterosexual order.  Vannina’s decision to have an abortion will have a dramatic 
effect on that order and, more generally, on the construction of the “natural” mother 
and the “natural” woman.  Suna’s lesbian embodiment, her expulsion from the 
Marxist movement and her suicide are determining factors in Vannina’s decision and 
in her critical destruction of a naturalizing link between woman and mother.   
Suna’s Coming out and the Politics of Privacy 
Vannina has just learned of the death of her best friend Suna, a fact that 
plunges her into a deep state of depression.  A month before Vannina finds out she is 
pregnant, Suna writes to her that she has been expelled for having come out as a 
lesbian and having entertained a relationship with Mafalda, another member of the 
group.  Suna is expelled because she is not considered a true revolutionary subject 
because of her disruptive interest in matters of sexuality.41  Vittorio discredits Suna’s 
                                                 
40 Translation is mine. 
41 Suna’s expulsion as lesbian is emblematic of the situation of many lesbians in the movements in the 
1970s.  As it appears in the 1974’s issue of FUORI Donna, lesbians complain of the accusation of 
lesbianism on the part of male members who use the label of lesbianism in a derogatory and 




arguments about lesbianism by confining the question of sexuality to the private and 
reiterating that sexuality and sex are not political issues.  Women can make love with 
each other provided that such love be kept secret, a tacit agreement into which the 
same Mafalda is coerced:  
A tutto questo Mafalda reagisce in modo ambiguo che mi fa venire mal di 
pancia: in segreto dà ragione a me, in pubblico fa dei discorsi severi sulla 
disciplina di gruppo e sulla morale del movimento che non va tradita.  Le ho 
chiesto se intende continuare a fare l’amore con me.  Ha risposto che pensa di 
sì; ma in segreto. (260) 
   
[In the face of all this Mafalda reacts in an ambiguous way which gives me 
belly-aches.  Secretly she tells me I am right, publicly she makes strict 
speeches about group discipline and the Movement’s morality which should 
never be betrayed. I asked her whether she’s going to carry on making love 
with me.  She answered yes, she thinks so, but secretly. (273)] 
 
Mafalda’s silent complicity with the homophobic views of the movement and her 
ambivalent behavior suggest the extent to which women participate in the cultural 
constructions of their gender and their sexuality; the male members of the group 
embrace those constructs in the name of an ideological cause.  However, Mafalda’s 
complicity with those constructs gains her the sympathy of the group members and 
the possibility of integration into their circle.  But her integration is double-edged, 
since it depends upon a subtle exploitation of women like Mafalda on the part of the 
male members (“senza di lei non sanno dove mettere le mani, l’organizzazione la 
porta avanti lei” (260) [without her they wouldn’t know what to do, she is the one 
who takes charge of organizing everything (273)].  Suna is after all in a similar 
situation.  The main reason why Vittorio and other members insist on her 
participation is because she can finance the movement.  It seems that Suna’s 
expulsion on the premise of her sexual orientation covers up the financial interest of 
the group and its gendered exploitative logic.   
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 I emphasized earlier the sexism implicit in Vittorio’s paternalistic tones 
towards the women of the group.  It is worth noticing that Vittorio’s revolutionary 
views are totally embedded into a sexist frame both publicly and privately–Vittorio 
marries a woman who is completely devoted to him and submitted to his will.  His 
views accurately reflect the sexist character of the conventional discourse of the 
1970s Marxist movements, which feminists such as Monique Wittig and Carla Lonzi 
strongly criticized for their failure to consider and promote women’s interests.  Suna’s 
expulsion therefore brings to the fore the tensions between the Marxist discourse on 
working-class oppression (that misrecognizes the gender dimension of such 
oppression), feminist discourse, and queer sexuality.  In Maraini’s novel not only is 
gender exploitation dismissed because it serves the Marxist agenda of the group, 
queer sexuality is also excluded.  Whereas Lonzi focuses mainly on gender, Maraini 
highlights the inextricable relation between gender and sexuality in conditions of 
oppression.  The group targets Suna’s and Mafalda’s lesbianism because of a general 
suspicion concerning homosexuality.  Imitating Vittorio’s speech, Suna reveals what 
homosexuality is for him: “L’omosessualità,” explains once Vittorio, “fa parte della 
marmellata borghese, non ci sarà posto per sdolcinatezze del genere” (187). 
[Homosexuality is a symptom of bourgeois shit, there won’t be space for 
mawkishness of that sort (195).]  Vittorio sees homosexuality as a form of bourgeois 
weakness, una “sdolcinatezza” (mawkishness) to be kept under control.  It must 
remain private and secret.  “Sdolcinatezze” is a word that mockingly refers to a sort of 
overt feminine romanticism.  As such it is a derogatory term that enables Vittorio to 
discard homosexuality as something feminine and inferior; he thus reproduces a 
heterosexist understanding of queer sexuality based on a hierarchy of the sexes.   
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Suna’s ejection from the group can be read as an attempt to construct a 
normative body based on what is proper revolutionary morality.  Vittorio tells Suna 
that she is not a true revolutionary subject, given her interest in women’s causes.  
Ironically mimicking Vittorio’s statements, Suna says that “la disciplina non so dove 
sta di casa, dico quello che penso, non ho senso politico, la strategia non la capisco, 
mi interesso solo alle disgrazie delle donne” (261). [I don’t even know what discipline 
is, I say what I think, I don’t have any political sense, I don’t understand a damn thing 
about strategy, I only care about women’s misfortunes (274).]  For all this Suna is 
considered a “maniac” and a “write-off” (274), but her irony appears as a veiled or 
not-so-veiled critique of the relation between women and politics.  Suna’s expulsion 
actually contributes to denouncing the dangerous exclusion of women from the public 
and the political sphere and to publicize women’s concerns.  
The episodes of Vannina’s abortion and Suna’s expulsion offer a social and 
political denunciation of the mechanism of gender oppression and of patriarchal code 
of privacy.  In an interview with Ileana Montini Maraini explains that “riservatezza” 
used to guarantee the masculine power in patriarchal cultures and it was associated 
with the private dimension.  “Il `68” she states, “ha portato a compimento la rottura 
della riservatezza come valore e caratteristica della vita femminile, del ghetto delle 
donne; garanzia e indice della loro emarginazione” (83-84). [1968 has effected the 
rupture of privacy as a value and characteristic of women’s life, of a ghetto of 
women; it both guaranteed and was the sign of their marginalization.]42  Suna comes 
to break this association that Maraini describes between women and discretion.  Suna 
is expelled from the Marxist group because she is in a lesbian relationship and her 
overt love for women seems to disrupt in the views of the groups, the cohesiveness of 
                                                 
42 Translation is mine. 
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the group.  The figure of the lesbian reveals the intersectional component of sexual 
and gender discrimination which the lesbian emblematically embodies.   
The novel’s sexual politics are not limited to Suna’s lesbian affair, but include 
other non-normative expressions of desire.  The novel sketches a whole range of 
queer encounters, through prostitution, pederasty, male companionship, whose 
inscription plays both as counterpoint to and as tacit endorsement of the idea of 
patriarchal privacy.  I will focus here on three relationsships: the one between 
Vannina and Orio, that of Orio with Hans, the German pederast who vacations on the 
island, and that of Giacinto and Santino.  Those encounters gesture at a space in 
which such diverse narratives as abortion and queerness may be put into dialogue to 
produce a narrative of queer abortions. 
Secret Desires, Secretive Masculinities 
 Suna’s role is not merely that of disturbing the association between women 
and secrecy, as described by Maraini; it also exposes the relation between men and 
secrecy, a relation that has been underestimated by critics of Maraini.  Suna initially 
approaches Vannina on the premise that she wants to know more about Santino 
Pizzocane who is a good friend of Giacinto.  Suna is attracted to Santino, a young 
man who comes from a patriarchal family, is unemployed and spends most of his time 
fishing with Vannina’s husband.  Raised in a family where his father and his brothers 
embody a violent virility, Santino is constantly diminished by his father who calls him 
“uno sfaticato, senza spina dorsale” (31) [“a loafer, he’s got no backbone” (31)].  
Because of his mysterious and not quite virile temper, Suna sees him as a half man 
half woman an identity she claims for herself.  Santino and Suna have a relationship 
that resembles prostitution.  In order to keep him at her side Suna buys him the things 
he cannot afford.  But Santino remains evasive about his feelings towards Suna who 
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begins to suspect that Santino is actually attracted to men.  While approaching 
Vannina on the subject of Giacinto, Suna hints at a possible attraction of the man for 
Giacinto and viceversa, a reason that would explain Giacinto’s lack of attention 
towards Vannina.  When Vannina mentions to Giacinto that she has met Suna, 
Giacinto carelessly dismisses her: “Ma lui non era incuriosito per niente dal mio 
incontro con la ragazza paralitica.  Continuava a occuparsi dei suoi pensieri segreti, 
opachi” (59). [He wasn’t at all curious about my encounter with the disabled girl.  He 
continued to occupy himself with his own secret thoughts (59).]    
  Suna asks Vannina not to mention anything to Giacinto about her suspicion.  
Suna’s precaution may have to do with the secrecy that surrounds men’s private 
selves in the novel, as if masculine desires were to be kept hidden and protected.   
Vannina is nonetheless often perplexed by Giacinto’s moodiness and pensiveness: 
“Ha qualcosa nella pancia che gli gira, lo succhia” (89) [he’s got something stirring 
inside him that’s swallowing him up (90).]  Giacinto seems happy only in company of 
men.  In those moments he is cheerful, “diventa ragazzino” [becomes a boy], he 
rediscovers his own nature (“la sua natura è quella,”) [that’s his nature (90)].  By 
contrast, when he is with Vannina, he plays the husband’s role, which results often in 
the defensive and fearful attitude of someone who is insecure and seeks protection.  
Vannina’s commentary on her sleeping husband is quite evocative: “Giacinto dorme.  
Se ne sta rannicchiato tutto nudo sul letto, nascondendo il sesso fra le ginocchia.  La 
schiena curva, la testa incassata fra le spalle, le gambe piegate esprimono un’accanita 
difesa.  Di che cosa, non lo so” (6). [Giacinto’s asleep.  He’s curled up naked on the 
bed, hiding his genitals between his thighs.  His hunched back, his head deeply set 
between his shoulders, his bent legs, all express a tenacious self-defense.  Against 
what, I wonder (6).]  Giacinto’s fearful posture during sleep is also accentuated by the 
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gesture of covering his genitals, the most vulnerable part of his body and his 
masculinity.  Giacinto’s gesture of protecting his vulnerable zones evokes to me 
Suna’s precaution about revealing Santino’s hidden desires.  Such an evocation 
suggests that silence and secrecy are discursive markers of some masculine bodies in 
the novel.  Moreover, secrecy is also a defining element in the novel’s depiction of 
some masculine bonds that exceed and disrupt the heterosexual narrative.  
 The day following Suna’s and Vannina’s first encounter, Vannina is in her 
apartment when her husband and Santino come back from fishing; Giacinto is visibly 
happy because he has a lot of fish in his hands.  However, we also learn that this is not 
what Giacinto always feels upon returning with fish, especially when Santino is not 
with him.  Fishing is not only a diversion for Giacinto, it is also a time to bond with 
Santino.  Fishing is instead an occasion for Giacinto to instruct Santino on how to use 
the fishing tools and how to clean fish:    
Giacinto tratta Santino come un bambino.  Gli insegna a usare il fucile, la 
maschera, le pinne; gli pela i pomodori, gli pulisce il pesce.  Santino non si 
offende; neanche quando Giacinto gli dice che è un ignorante.  Sorride, 
incassa la testa nelle spalle con un gesto contrito e dolce.  Beve il vino a 
piccolo sorsi e quando manda giù un sorso più grosso, si porta la mano alla 
gola strizzandogli occhi.  Non parla quasi mai.  Mangia lentamente portandosi 
il cibo alla bocca con movimenti delicati e calmi. (18) 
 
[Giacinto treats Santino like a child.  He teaches him how to use the gun, the 
mask, the flippers; he peels his tomatoes for him and fillets his fish.  Santino 
doesn’t take offence, not even when Giacinto tells him how stupid he is.  
Instead he smiles and sinks his head down between his shoulders with an air 
of contrition.  He drinks his wine in small sips and when he swallows a 
slightly larger sip he lifts his hand to his throat and blinks his eyes.  He hardly 
ever speaks.  He eats slowly, bringing the food to his mouth with calm, 
delicate gestures. (18)]    
 
Fishing acquires a specific social and symbolic value for Giacinto for it is an activity 
in which Giacinto mentors Santino and transmits some skills to him.  Moreover, 
Giacinto’s caring attitude towards Santino resembles that of a father for a son and it is 
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furthermore in contrast with the unaffactionate and unloving behavior of Giacinto 
towards Vannina and of Peppino Pizzocane (Santino’s father) toward Santino.   
 Santino’s and Giacinto’s bond, in spite of the unequal roles, describes a 
complicity among men that is nurtured less through words than through silences and 
gestures.  The bond is so strong that Giacinto is jealous of Vannina when she speaks 
to Santino or tries to draw Santino out of his enigmatic silence.43  The nurturing 
nature of the men’s bond also echoes Vannina’s and Suna’s bond and thus shows how 
homoeroticism may serve the purpose of reinforcing one’s sense of self.  Entrustment 
is not merely a strategy of bonding and mutual nurturing among women and 
feminists, but also a queer masculine one.  Manhood is not a given, but is nurtured as 
much as womanhood can be.  This kind of nurtured and nurturing masculinity is in 
striking contrast with the display of violent virility on the part of Santino’s brothers, a 
form of virility Santino opposes through his silences and his secret complicity with 
Giacinto.  The difference between the female bond and the male bond is that while the 
second exists in the shadow of marriage and because of it, the first constantly 
threatens marriage by exposing the inequalities of Vannina’s and Giacinto’s marital 
relationship.  The women’s bond is powerful precisely because it threatens to make 
public all forms of exploitation, even those carried out privately, as I discussed above.  
At the same time, the silent existence of male desire can be read alongside Giacinto’s 
supposed inability to fulfil Vannina, and Santino’s evasive response towards Suna’s 
personal and sexual approaches.   
                                                 
43 Although their companionship does not explicitly translate into sexual attraction, it is nonetheless 
erotic.  It portrays a form of nurturing eroticism that is very much reminiscent of Pasolini’s bonds with 
his peasant students in Atti Impuri.  Although beyond the scope of this chapter, I would find very 
interesting to do a queer feminist reading of Pasolini’s first homoerotic novels, which include Atti 
Impuri and Amado Mio.  Atti Impuri is a coming of age tale that recalls Pasolini’s years in the 
countryside of Northern Italy where he spent his days teaching young peasants, whom he fancied.     
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 Giacitnto’s queer masculinity is further addressed in a passage which Vannina 
records without any commentary.  While she and her husband are having a walk 
Giacinto stops and lingers before the shopwindow of a store, attracted to its queer 
allure: 
Giacinto si è fermato un momento davanti al Pussy Pussy Bang Bang.  Degli 
slips a fiori rosa svolazzavano sull’albero di una nave di cartone, a mo’ di 
vela.  I due proprietari stavano dietro la vetrina, malinconici, vestiti con 
eleganza, bene abboronzati, ben pettinati, a guardare la strada vuota. (43)   
 
[Giacinto stopped for a minute in front of the Pussy Pussy Bang Bang shop.  
Some pink floral slips fluttered from the mast of a cardboard ship, like a sail.  
The two owners stood behind the shopwindow, tastefully dressed, perfectly 
suntanned, well combed, gazing with melancholy down the empty street. (43)] 
  
While the text does not explain why Giacinto stopped in front of the store, the 
reader’s attention is unequivocably drawn to the queer image of the pink slips 
fluttering like a sail and the two men “tastefully dressed, perfectly suntanned” behind 
the window.  The pink slips and the two fashionable men evoke an idea of queerness 
which is only suggested through images, but not overtly spoken.  Giacinto’s stopping 
in front of the windowshop makes him for a moment (“un momento”) part of this 
queer scenario.  The man’s silent comparticipation in this queer scenario may be an 
invitation to read Giacinto’s masculinity as a queer but undisclosed one.  
Interestingly, Giacinto’s queerness finds a place of inscription within a feminist 
narrative, an element that contributes to looking at masculine bodies in Maraini’s 
novel as the product of a feminist writing.   This element can only demonstrate the 
extent to which Maraini’s supposed feminist and feminine writing is already queer 
insofar as it reflects on the intersecting construction of feminine and masculine bodies 
around desires.   
 Male homoeroticism is not limited to the portrayal of Giacinto’s masculinity 
and his bond with Santino.   It also includes a representation of male-to-male 
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prostitution in which the young locales engage for money.  Among them are Santino 
and his brothers, as we find out from the confession that Orio, Santino’s teenage 
brother, makes to Vannina.  Orio’s confession does not disclose a random event, but 
an extensive male homoerotic practice otherwise silenced.44  What si intriguing to me 
is that the silent componenent of queer masculinitywhether in the form of male 
nurturing or male prostitutioncan find a space of inscription in Vannina’s narrative 
and through women’s words.  This fact makes of Maraini’s novel not so much a 
feminist novel, but a novel that explores the material and symbolic links between 
differently gendered and sexed bodies. 
 In Maraini’s novel the young brothers of the Pizzocane’s clan turn to 
prostitution to make up for unemployment in the area and the lack of financial support 
from their father.  Supposedly, male hustling is a secret activity, as opposed to that of 
the “belli” who flaunt their bodies for women in the village main square.  The gain 
made through homoerotic prostitution remains secret.  Yet such secret complicity 
among men provides some money to the unemployed youth of the island while 
representing an outlet for gay men and pederasts who often belonged to privileged 
milieux.  Here’s how Orio talks about Hans, an older tourist from Germany who seeks 
out young boys:  
Quando veniva a scuola, mica veniva sempre, aveva paura dei miei fratelli che 
se lo vedevano, lo stangavano, ma anche loro pure l’avevano fatto però con 
lui. 
-- Che cosa? 
                                                 
44 Orio’s story is reminiscent of an episode of Pasolini’s Ragazzi di Vita which recounts the adventures 
of Riccetto and his gang from the outskirts of Rome.  These jobless young men who do not have jobs 
survive on little tricks, thefts, and prostitution.  When approached by an older man for sex, Riccetto 
recalls that, after World War II, young men used to sell their bodies to older strangers.  While Riccetto 
declines the proposal, his friend Alduccio, who walks around singing “zoccoletti, zoccoletti” (little 
sluts, little sluts) agrees to go with the “froscio” [fag], an attitude which, in Riccetto’s eyes, makes 
Alduccio look like a woman (204).  Orio’s story bears resemblance to that of Alduccio and Riccetto.   
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-- Farsi toccare il pesce a pagamento, Gigi gliel’ha pure messo di dietro però a 
isso gli piacciono i ragazzini piccoli e quando crescono non li guarda manco 
più’ lo chiamano “ricchionaccio,” gli buttano le pietre addosso, ma quando 
uno ha bisogno di soldi ci va. (101) 
 
[Whenever he came to school.  He did not come everyday because he was 
scared of my brothers in case they saw him and beat him up.  But they’ve done 
the same to him though. 
-- The same what? 
-- Let him feel their cocks for money.  Gigi even gave it to?  him from behind.  
But Hans only likes little boys, once they grow up he doesn’t even deign to 
look at them; they call him a ugly pouffe and throw stones at him, but the 
moment they need money they go with him. (103)]  
 
The German man looks for prostitutes to satisfy his pederastic desire, a desire which 
the hustlers punish by insulting and lapidating him.  Gigi’s form of prostitution serves 
to reinforce the hustler’s position as a masculine one–he is the one who penetrates–
while diminishing that of the queer man who likes being penetrated.  In a way, Gigi 
embodies the 1970s type of the maschio doppio [double male] described by Mario 
Mieli.  The maschio doppio was the label for a man who publicly passes as straight, 
but who engages in homosexual prostitution.  Even more specifically, this individual 
belongs to the proletariat, but does “business” with upper-class men who, in turn, hide 
their sexual preferences for fear of social stigma.45  Maraini’s Gigi is a sottoproletario 
                                                 
45 Si tratta dei ‘maschi doppi’ e di tutti quegli eterosessuali di sesso maschile che, malgrado affermino 
costantemente la loro eterosessualità, hanno piuttosto di frequente o addirittura in continuazione 
rapporti omosessuali.  Molti di questi maschi vivono ai margini del ‘mondo omosessuale’ in senso 
stretto, di cui divengono e–spesso –i boia: sono le ‘marchette,’ i ‘ragazzi di vita,’ ovvero tutti i giovani 
proletari che si prostituiscono ai gay e che i giornalisti del capitale (e delle sinistre del capitale, 
soprattutto) chiamano oggi ‘sottoproletari,’ per evitare di riconoscere nelle loro azioni e nel loro ‘stile 
di vita’ un’espressione specifica del proletariato soggiogato dal sistema…Il sistema li frega 
doppiamente: infatti, oltre a castrarli fin dalla nascita economicamente e socialmente, dà loro 
gratificazioni palliative legate al privilegio fallico, gratificazioni che li inducono a comportarsi in modo 
funzionale al dominio del capitale. (Mieli 164). [There are many other homosexuals far more repressed 
as far as their homosexuality goes, and particularly their homosexuality.  These include the ‘double 
males’ and all those male heterosexuals who have often had, or still have, homosexual relations, even 
while constantly maintaining their heterosexuality.  Many of them live at the margins of the 
hhomosexual ‘world’ proper, on which they become parasites andoftenexecutioner.  These are the 
hustlers, or all those working-class youths who act as prostitutues to gay men, and whom the journalists 
of capital (and its left-wing in particular) class as sub-proletarian so as to avoid recognizing in their 
actions and ‘lifestyle’ a specific expression of the proletariat in thrall to the system…the system cheats 
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and a maschio doppio whose sexual activity is both a form of sexual diversion, and 
one of the ways in which the men, who are “socially and economically castrated,” to 
use Mario Mieli’s expression, can make their living.  In the prostitution activity of the 
maschio doppio the economic component displaces and covers homoerotic desire.    
  Like Gigi, Santino and Orio have taken turns with the old man, but the fact 
that Santino has made lots of money may suggest that he has accepted to being 
penetrated, an act that can earn up to twenty thousand lire.  Playing the “feminine” is 
more lucrative, a reason why the hustlers are willing to accept such erotic position.  
Orio admits that he himself has allowed the German man to penetrate him.  In his 
case, though, the brothers use this episode to tease him about his presumed lack of 
virility; they then coerce him into having intercourse with a German female tourist so 
that he can prove he is a real man.  As Orio cannot get it up, he gains the reputation of 
the impotent among his brothers.  The brothers’ response to Orio’s presumed lack of 
virility mirrors the gender education they have received in the family.  Their father 
says of Orio that he is “lay about” and “good-for-nothing,” (Woman 30) like his 
mother.  From his first appearance in the novel, Orio is feminized: in the house he is 
the only male son who helps out with domestic tasks that usually fall to his mother.  
Peppino Pizzocane uses Orio’s resemblance to his mother only to discredit his young 
son while, by contrast, he cherishes the other brothers who follow in his footsteps and 
embody a different form of virility.  The fact that Orio needs to “prove” his virility to 
his brothers through a “test” is the result of a gender education that has very dramatic 
consequences for the brothers’ attitude.  Obsessed with proving their own virility, 
they assault a woman who is bathing in the sea and rape her.  Virility is therefore 
                                                                                                                                           
them in two ways.  Besides castrating them economically and socially right from birth, it gives them 
palliative gratifications that lead them to behave in a way that is functional to the role of capital (150).] 
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associated, in the father and the brothers’ view, with abuse and violence against 
women, the “feminine,” or the queer. 
Orio’s confession to Vannina assumes a strategic purpose in the novel that 
plays out in the complex relation between desire and masculinity: on the one hand, the 
confession uses the hidden world of male homoeroticism to disclose the social reality 
of male prostitution; on the other hand, it emphasizes the tension between contrasting 
models of masculinity, a patriarchal violent one and a queer domestic one.  It also 
shows that these two types of masculinity can coexist, and that queer masculinity can 
silently emerge within the frame of a more violent virility which contains it through 
repression.  But queer masculinity does not necessarily undermine the status of 
violent virility insofar as it remains a private issue, and never becomes a political tool.   
Vannina’s Pederasty and Sexual Pedagogy 
Very different is the function that Vannina’s secret encounters with Orio play.  
She meets him during a dinner at Santino’s house and from that moment on she will 
feel strangely attracted to this figure of a boy who is not quite a man yet.  Vannina is 
immediately struck by Orio’s resemblance to one of her male students, Fidelio.  Orio 
is a solitary teenager who does not like school so much and who tries to earn some 
money by selling old comics and, as I discussed above, through prostitution.  He is 
sick with a disease that doctors cannot name, an element that adds to the mysterious 
allure of the character.  Once Vannina accidentally comes across Orio on the street 
and the boy offers to help with her groceries.  The occasion is the pretext for a 
seduction initiated by Vannina.  In this occasion Vannina shows a different side of 
herself, that of an active seducer, a quality that is in striking contrast to her submissive 
sexual attitude with Giacinto: “L’ho preso per mano e l’ho portato dietro la tenda, sul 
letto …L’ho spogliato.  Gli ho fatto saltare con un colpo il berretto di lana blu.  Gli ho 
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sfibbiato la cintura dalle grosse borchie d’oro” (102). [I took his hand and led him 
behind the curtain to the bed.  I undressed him.  With a flick I knocked off his blue 
woollen beret.  I unbuckled his belt with his gold studs (104-105).]  Orio makes no 
attempt to resist Vannina’s seduction and instead let himself be led by Vannina’s 
expert hands.  Vannina’s and Orio’s erotic encounter provides the frame for another 
encounter, that of Orio with the German pederast, which Orio recalls in this occasion.  
The intertwining of these two narratives offers an insight into Vannina’s experience 
of gender and sexuality, an experience which I would not hesitate to define as queer 
because it inscribes a woman’s desire through the modality of queer masculine desire 
and viceversa. 
Unlike the encounter with the German man, here Orio is the object of 
seduction and lets himself be played upon.  In both cases Orio is taking the passive 
position, but what is interesting is that Vannina’s position in the role of the seducer 
turns her into an active subject of eroticism.  Pederasty is an erotic expression that 
grants the sexual agency and pleasure denied to her within her marriage.  But since 
pederasty in the novel is also generally associated with queer men, the nt novel 
suggests that Vannina appropriates a queer masculine form of eroticism in order to 
discover her sexual agency as a woman.  While Orio’s passive erotic bent with the 
German man is publicly derided by his brothers, it acquires here a different 
connotation in light of Vannina’s growing sexual awareness.   
 There is yet another subversive aspect to Vannina’s pederasty, an aspect that 
markedly differentiates Vannina’s seduction from male pederastic prostitution.  
Interestingly, the episode of Orio’s seduction takes place in Vannina’s house.  
Vannina is aware that Giacinto may show up at any minute.  In spite of this 
possibility, she continues her work of seduction, even hoping that her husband will 
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come back.  But Orio leaves right before Giacinto’s return.  As Giacinto comes back 
from his daily fishing, Vannina challenges him by confessing that she has just made 
love to Orio, which upsets Giacinto because, he states, he does not want to know 
anything about what is going on with Vannina: “Con la verità mi ci pulisco il culo, 
non mi va di essere tirato per i capelli in questo amore che non capisco e non voglio 
capire, possibile che non hai un po’ di pudore” (104). [Stuff that up your arse.  Don’t 
drag me into this affair of yours.  I don’t understand it and don’t want to understand it.  
Haven’t you even a little bit of shame? (106).] Giacinto is bothered not so much by 
the fact that Vannina has made love to a boy, but rather by Vannina’s lack of 
discretion (“un po’ di pudore”) with regard to sexual matters.  She takes further 
advantage of the situation to tell her husband what is wrong with their own 
relationship: “E il sesso? Noi due facciamo l’amore così male insieme…tu quando fai 
l’amore pensi solo a te, di me te ne freghi; Orio con tutto che è un ragazzino, ha avuto 
più attenzione per me” (104). [What about sex? You and me make love so badly 
together…when you make love you only think of yourself, you don’t give a damn 
about me.  In spite of being only a boy Orio showed me more consideration than you 
ever do (106).]  Repeating Suna’s argument, but making it her own this time, Vannina 
confronts her husband about the nature of their love, pointing out the inadequacies of 
their relationship.     
 Vannina’s encounter with Orio and its confession have then the effect of 
revealing the dysfunctional character of the marital couple.  Unable to defend himself 
against Vannina’s “truth,” Giacinto hits her using violence to reinforce his threatened 
authority.  Giacinto’s reaction is only the sign that Vannina has struck a chord.   
Although he comes back to hug her, his aggressive reaction shows that Vannina’s 
revelation has somehow destabilized his assumptions about marriage and marital 
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realtionships.  Giacinto’s vulnerability surfaces in relation to Vannina’s 
argumentation, revealing a sense of threat that Giacinto feels in his position as 
husband and as authority within the family.   
 This episode also differentiates the meaning of Vannina’s pederastic seduction 
from that of the old German man.  Whereas for the male pederast, prostitution is an 
outlet for queer desires that are socially unacceptable, for Vannina, pederasty 
becomes a form of outright protest against the dissatisfying role of woman and wife.  
In this respect, Vannina’s pederasty has something in common with Suna’s coming 
out as a lesbian in that both are forms of denunciation of gender and sexual 
oppression and exploitation.  Vannina’s and Suna’s queer embodiments (as a pederast 
and a lesbian) are strategic moments in which women speak up and break with the 
silence that preserves and even encourages oppression.  An episode preceding Suna’s 
coming out portrays Vannina dealing with an appalling case of gender violence in her 
classroom.  A group of young men immobilizes a female schoolmate as they mime a 
scene of rape: 
Due bambini tenevano Maria Stella per i piedi e per le braccia, mentre altri 
due le erano montati sopra.  Uno se ne stava sdraiato su di lei e si torceva in 
mosse ridicule ed esagerate, spingendo avanti e indietro il sedere…L’altro 
stava a cavalcioni sul collo della bambina in modo che i suoi pantaloncini 
andassero a schiacciare la faccia di lei.  Si dimenava, rosso e sudato gridando: 
Succhia succhia puttana. (255-256)    
 
[Two boys were holding her (Maria Stella) by the feet and arms while two 
others had climbed on top of her.  One was sprawled on top of her, wriggling 
with ridiculous, exaggerated movements, pushing his bottom back and forth… 
the other was astride the little girl’s neck so that his shorts were pressed 
against her face.  He too was wriggling, red in the face and sweating, and as he 
wriggled he was shouting: “Suck it, go on, suck it, you whore. (268-269)] 
 
Although this violence is far from being an isolated episode in the novel, what this 
particular passage strongly puts forth is that violence is a behavior based on imitation.  
The kids reproduce attitudes that they have witnessed and that are culturally 
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embedded, as the novel suggests elsewhere (for instance in the sexual assault that 
Orio’s brothers carry out).  The fact that it is an imitation does not diminish its 
gravity.  What is equally disturbing is also the response of Maria Stella who comes 
out of the assault “sorridente e compiaciuta” (256) [gleeful and satisfied (269)] after 
Vannina has intervened to separate the boys from the girl.  Maria Stella’s reaction is 
evidence of the extent to which certain gendered behaviors are unconsciously encoded 
and taken as normal, something we have seen at play in Vannina’s attitudes.  Perhaps 
Vannina identifies with Maria Stella, a good enough reason for her to take the staging 
of rape as a motivation for a sex education lesson.  Calm, but determined, Vannina 
explains the meaning of the word “stupro” (rape) and ask the girls in the class to 
explain the passivity of Maria Stella’s and the other female schoolmates vis-à-vis the 
male assault: “Non sarà perché pensano che i maschi hanno diritto di fare queste 
cose?” (257).  [Was it perhaps because they think the boys have a right t do these 
things? (270).]  To which the girls cannot but answer that this is the way boys do 
things with girls sexually: the former always dominate and the latter are subdued (“la 
femmina fa la donna e sta sotto, il maschio fa l’omo e sta sopra”) (257). [The girl does 
the woman and stays underneath, and the boy does the man and stays on top and fucks 
her (270).]  As this exchange unravels, the girls mix up the meaning of love, sex roles, 
and domination, showing that they are far more sensitive to gender role expectations 
than to feelings.   
 The girls’ attitude mirrors Vannina’s acquiescence to gender expectations in 
the beginning of the novel.  There it is Suna who questions Vannina’s acceptance of 
gender norms and behaviors within marriage.  Now empowered, Vannina highlights 
the importance of feelings and of love: “L’amore è una cosa che si fa in due, con 
dolcezza, con tenerezza, senza prepotenze e tutti e due devono essere contenti” (257-
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58).  [Love is something that two people share with gentleness, with tenderness, and 
without bullying, and both people should be happy (270-71).]  Vannina teaches her 
students the value of love as an act that gives mutual pleasure and happiness.  This 
pedagogy of love adds a nuance to her own practice of pederasty as if her seduction of 
Orio was indeed one way for her to love Orio and to teach him a lesson of love that 
opposes the violent lessons of his brothers on sex and virility.  Vannina’s pederasty is 
at once a form of pedagogy and an act of love–as ancient pederasty between men was.  
In this perspective Vannina’s relation to Orio is germane to that of Giacinto and 
Santino.  In both, erotic desires have a nurturing effect and a pedagogical value. 
A Lesbian Embrace: Queering Maternal Nurture 
Suna’s lesbianism and Vannina’s pederasty provide a frame for re-reading the 
final dream of Donna in guerra and also for reinterpreting two acts that mark the end 
of the novel: Suna’s suicide following her expulsion from the political group, and 
Vannina’s abortion.  Both are, in a way, forms of expulsion.  The fact that they are 
closely situated in the text gestures at a possible connection.  Yet such a connection 
would be problematic in that it could cast Suna symbolically as Vannina’s unwanted 
foetus.  This is not what the novel suggests, I think.  Rather, with Suna’s expulsion 
(also the one self inflicted through suicide) Maraini takes an exclusionary act and turn 
it into a constructive moment of critique and denunciation.  We may say that the 
narrative inscription of abortion plays a similar function.  For it stages how a 
woman’s body, surviving a very dramatic experience, can become a site of 
reconstruction and regeneration, which in turn opens up a whole new discourse of 
womanhood.  This transformation acquires symbolic significance in the narration of 
Vannina’s second dream, which occurs in between Suna’s suicide and Vannina’s 
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abortion.  Suna’s suicide is also the trigger of the dream as Vannina has fallen into a 
deep state of depression following the loss of her friend. 
The woman dreams that her body takes a flight from the ground becoming 
lighter and lighter [“ho sognato di volare,” “il corpo leggero e contratto,” (265)].  The 
flight is soon interrupted by an abrupt and vertiginous fall:     
Ero presa dalla vertigine ed ecco di colpo perdevo le forze.  Cominciava la 
caduta.  Cercavo disperatamente di rimanere a galla ma il corpo rotolava 
irrefrenabilmente verso terra, la gola stretta, il ventre sconvolto. (266)  
 
[Then all of a sudden I lost my strength, the air offered no more support 
beneath my body. My fall started, I could feel myself being sucked down 
towards the earth by a piercing force.  My body plunged to the ground, my 
throat tightened and my stomach churned. (279)] 
   
One cannot help seeing in this flight Vannina’s desire to break free from a material 
condition that encumbers her (clearly her pregnancy) as a force that pulls her 
obstinately to the ground.  Vannina falls back into the ground with a ravaged belly 
[“ventre sconvolto”], an image that recalls the idea of abortion, which Vannina is 
about to undergo.46 Moreover, Vannina’s traumatic fall suggests not only pain, but 
literally a comatose state bordering death:   
Ho urtato contro la terra dura, fangosa.  Sono rimasta lì immobile, svenuta. 
Ero morta.  Avevo le membra a pezzi, il sangue si spargeva attorno a me.  Ero 
senza occhi, senza bocca, disfatta.  Ma qualcosa continuava a vivere.  Ho 
provato a tirare il fiato.  Ce la facevo ero salva. (266) 
 
[I hit the hard muddy ground.  I lay there motionless, unconscious.  I was 
dead.  My limbs were in pieces, my blood spread around me.  I had no eyes, 
no mouth, I was crushed, destroyed, wiped out of existence.  But something 
was still alive.  I tried to draw breath.  I could. I was safe. (279)]   
 
Vannina’s dream becomes here a tale of survival, the story of a body that finds itself 
alive amidst blood and destruction.  The dream is revelatory for Vannina who wakes 
up and finds the courage to have the abortion.  Seeing abortion from the point of view 
                                                 
46 I think that here a literal translation of “ventre” would be more appropriate given the fact that what 
encumbers Vannina is her pregnant belly. 
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of survival may give us a different insight into understanding the second part of 
Vannina’s dream, in which Suna reappears.   
Suna comes into the dream after Vannina has fallen and has survived, in order 
to give her friend her crutches as a sign of support.  While reaching to the crutches, 
Vannina also receives from her friend another unexpected gift:       
Volevo baciarla per ringraziarla…Mi sono chinata, ma al posto della sua 
faccia ho trovato il suo sesso: una conchiglia bianca di marmo all’interno 
rosso, palpitante.  Dalla conchiglia sgorgava un fiotto di latte dolcissimo.  Ho 
accostato le labbra; ho bevuto di quel latte che sapeva di alghe marine e 
bevendo sentivo che mi riempivo di di forza, di coraggio. (266) 
 
[I wanted to kiss her to thank her…I bent down but instead of her I found her 
sex: a white marble shell with a red pulsing interior.  From the shell poured 
out a stream of very sweet milk.  I brought my lips close to it: I drank some of 
that milk which tasted of seaweed, and as I drank I felt it was filling me up 
with strength, with courage. (280)] 
 
As she approaches Suna to kiss her, Vannina actually finds her vulva.  She begins 
sucking milk from it in a striking image that collapses a lesbian cunnilingus with a 
nurturing act.  Whereas several critics have seen in it a metaphor of maternal 
nourishment, it appears to me rather as an allegory that displaces the topos of breast-
feeding and maternal nurture.   Milk does not come from the traditional source of 
maternal nurture, the breasts, but it pours like vaginal secretions from the sexual 
organ of another woman.  The vaginal secretions, fluid of pleasure, are a counterpoint 
to the blood gushing from Vannina’s uterus during the “raschiamento” as the fluid of 
pain.  Rhetorically then we can see a shift from the uterus, symbolizing womanhood 
through maternity, to the vulva, symbolizing womanhood through sexuality.  
Moreover, the site of nourishment is displaced from breasts to vulva.  The nurturing 
figure and nourishment itself are also different: Suna is the nurturing figure and the 
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fact that she identifies herself in queer ways has also some queer implications for the 
way we look at the substance that nourishes Vannina.47 
  After sipping Suna’s nourishing liquid, Vannina feels reinvigorated and ready 
to get up and walk on her feet: “ Poi ho puntato le grucce contro le ascelle; mi sono 
alzata.  Le mie spalle gracili erano diventate robuste, sicure.  E camminavo, senza 
gambe, andavo avanti leggera” (267). [Then I thrust the crutches under my armpits: I 
stood up.  My frail shoulders had become sturdy and I found myself walking without 
my legs, walking alone lightly without any strain (280).]  Vannina wakes up with the 
impression that her body is now lighter and freer.  That sensation, in contrast with the 
initial sensation of heaviness, will accompany her through the choice of abortion and 
later of separation from Giacinto.  Lightness is already the mark of a new Vannina, 
liberated at once from an unwanted pregnancy and from the ties of a relationship she 
finds more dutiful than pleasurable.  Although painful and dramatic, abortion is 
nonetheless the foundational moment of Vannina’s agency and autonomy.  “Ora sono 
sola e ho tutto da ricominciare” (269) [I am alone and I must start everything again 
from the beginning (282),] says Vannina to herself, shutting the door to Giacinto and 
to her previous life.  As Elisabetta Properzi Nelsen points out, abortion provides 
Vannina with an opportunity for self-affirmation.  In Vannina’s choice of abortion 
resides the moment of her liberation and self-creation.  Although Vannina has 
elsewhere shown that she can make choices of her own in her life (for instance in the 
relationship with Orio, in the sexuality class, in the trip to Naples) abortion seems the 
very event that proves once and for all that Vannina is the agent in her own life.  On 
this point, Nelsen writes, “It is as though the writer saw in the decision to have an 
                                                 
47 Suna does not of course use the word queer, but she certainly embodies a queer language throughout 
the novel by means of her bisexual identifications, her lesbian life-style, and her disability.     
76 
 
abortion one of her protagonists’ few opportunities for self-affirmation as authors,”48 
ans she shows that in it is in the decision not to reproduce that Vannina can recreate 
herself (88).  For this critic, Vannina’s abortion is emblematic of how a woman can 
create a new language for herself by starting from a bodily experience, just as Hélène 
Cixous theorized in Le rire de la Méduse. Nelsen devotes her article to the analysis of 
Maraini’s écriture feminine and she inserts her into the tradition of those French 
writers and intellectuals who used writing to affirm a woman’s sense of autonomy and 
authorship.  However, Nelsen embraces the concept of écriture feminine quite 
uncritically in the case of Maraini and the French writers, even attributing it to a 
thinker like Wittig who was overtly against sexual difference and écriture féminine.  
Her reading has the unfortunate consequence of eliciting, without naming it, a queer 
component (deconstruction of reproduction) of these narratives only to push it aside 
in favor of an exclusive feminist frame.   
  In the texts of Annie Ernaux and of Dacia Maraini, abortion provides a 
narrative moment of rupture from a traditional notion of mothering.  The queer nature 
of this rupture is differently characterized in each text.  In Ernaux’s testimony the 
queer dimension comes from the re-writing of abortion which allows Ernaux to take 
control over her body and reaffirm agency thorugh narration.  Moreover, the narration 
of abortion consists of a shift from procreation to creation, a transposition which 
reconfirms Eranux as a writer through the socially and culturally destabilizing image 
of the matricide.  In Donna in guerra the aborting body of Vannina engenders a new 
language of self-affirmation that is inscribed through the symbolic and material shift 
that Suna and Vannina’s embrace represent.  This new language departs from 
traditional maternity which the uterus symbolizes.  Hence the language that permeates 
                                                 
48 Italics are mine. 
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Vannina’s diary makes of the diary not so much a space governed by heterosexual 
procreation, as one characterized by the queer creations which the vulva symbolizes.  
If abortion is the transformative event that affects Vannina’s language, queer abortion 
seems an adequate definition to refer to the discursive production of bodies that re-
conceptualize mothering and nurturing as queer.  What Maraini offers is a radical 
reformulation of mothering and nurture that responds on the one hand to Wittig’s 
exhortation to relinquish procreation as the female creative act that inscribes the 
category “woman;” on the other hand, it rereads and problematizes mothering as 
exclusively female and heterosexual.  In The Reproduction of Mothering, Chodorow 
points us to the cultural assumption that only women can mother, the view that 
women want to mother and that men are excluded from mothering based on a link 
between gender and lactation.  However, this association results in an exclusion of 
other nurturing possibilities, such as women’s fathering or men’s mothering, that are 
per se already queer.  Vannina’s dream is constructed around the link between women 
and breast-feeding, except that this connection is subverted to describe a new and 
powerful symbolization of gender and mothering.  As the dream seems to suggest, the 
transition from the uterus to the vulva symbolizes and prefigures a different way of 
embodying nurture which is not exclusive to women, and does not follow a straight 
line from mother to daughter.  Rather, it includes men (Giacinto’s homoerotic bond), 
lesbians (Suna’s bond with Vannina), or even allows for a reinscription of woman’s 
nurture in queer masculine terms as in Vannina’s female pederasty.  These queer 
subjectivities provide powerful readings into pressing issues of prostitution and class, 
of gender and sexual oppression, and of social constructions of violent virility.  They 
should help us see Maraini’s writing not exclusively as a form of feminist or feminine 
writing, but also as a fundamentally queer writing in its subversion of 
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heteronormative structures and its inscription into abortion and non-reproductive 
sexuality.      
  Finally, the notion of queer nurture as developed in Maraini’s text gestures to 
the development of a discourse and a practice of Italian feminism first through the 
feminist collectives in the 1970s and autocoscienza, and later through the pratica 
dell’inconscio and entrustment.  My next chapter will problematize the practice of 
autocoscienza and the socio-symbolic experience of female-to female bonds as a 
homoerotic and socially-segregated form of nurturing experimented in the group of 




The Clitoris Diaries: Symbolic Excision and Female Sexual Autonomy in 1970s 
Italian Radical Feminism 
 
Il femminismo mi si è presentato come lo sbocco possible tra le alternative simboliche della condizione 
femminile, la prostituzione e la clausura: riuscire a vivere senza vendere il proprio corpo e senza 
rinunciarvi, ritrovare una completezza, un’identità contro una civiltà maschile che l’aveva già resa 
irraggiungibile.  
[Feminism appeared to me as the possible outlet among the symbolic alternatives of the feminine 
condition, the prostitute and the nun: managing to live without selling one’s own body or without 
renouncing it, finding a sense of plenitude and of identity against a masculine civilization that has 
made it unattainable.] 
Carla Lonzi, È già politica (1977) 
  
Donna in guerra ends with the powerful image of a sexual embrace between 
two women which, I argue is a queer rereading of maternal nurture between two 
women.  This embrace in its allusion to queer nurture seems to prefigure the 
homosocial practice of women’s groups in the 1970s whose main goal was to provide 
women with the emotional, psychological, and social support that the traditional 
family could no longer provide.  In talking about women’s groups Maraini uses the 
metaphor of the “ventre materno” (womb) as if the affective bonds that women 
developed and nurtured within groups were a form of protection reminiscent of the 
symbiotic bond between mother and child.  Yet Maraini also notes that the refuge 
women found within groups, and in the company of other women, was not based on a 
given or spontaneous form of solidarity.  Solidarity needed to be built and the group 
experience was hardly ever harmonious and consolatory: 
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Molte donne chiedono al gruppo o al collettivo in cui militano di farsi “ventre 
materno”, rifugio, grotta.  Ma la grotta in cui ci si ripara risulta in realtà 
animate da fantasmi crudeli.  “La solidarietà è tutta da costruire, non nasce 
bell’e fatta solo perché siamo donne.”  Insomma il gruppo non dà 
consolazione ma scontro, consapevolezza, malessere.  La presa di coscienza è 
spinosa e difficile. (La bionda 86)  
[Many women expect the groups and the collectives in which they are political 
activists to become womb, refuge, shelter.  But the refuge in which women 
find a shelter is eventually filled with cruel phantasms.  “Solidarity must be 
completely built, it is not a given simply because we are women.”  In the end 
the group does not give consolation, but confrontation, awareness and malaise.  
Consciousness-raising is a thorny and difficult issue.]   
This chapter explores the difficulty and ambivalence of women’s bonds in the 
feminist groups as recalled through the personal diary and the theoretical work of 
Carla Lonzi, the leader of a radical feminist group known as Rivolta Femminile.  Her 
narratives are articulated around the theme of the rediscovery of the clitoris as an 
allegory of the rediscovery of sexual pleasure and the creation of an all-feminine 
space of socio-sexual autonomy.  This space reveals itself as a much more complex 
site of negotiation for Lonzi and her comrades and one that led Lonzi to identify the 
limits of the identitarian claimswhat she calls feminine authenticityin the 
formative Italian years of feminism and of female collectives. 
Rediscovering Sexual Autonomy through Women’s Bonds 
One fascinating way 1970s feminists performed a cultural critique of sexuality 
was by reinventing a language of their own which was utterly physical and conveyed 
the urgency of bodily discovery.  They started imagining their bodies from the sites 
where they were negated and they reclaimed sexual organs as a way to express their 
renewed sense of self.  The process of reinventing language and bodies took several 
forms such as journals, manifestos, diaries, pamphlets, novels, theatrical pieces, and 
even song collections.  There exists an online corpus of “canzonieri femministi” 
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(feminist song collections), whose rich and varied repertory reveals the most pressing 
issues for women and feminists at the time.49  Among them are abortion, motherhood, 
mother-daughter relations and even prostitution.  One song, in particular, caught my 
attention: “La leggenda di Clotiride” (The legend of Clotiris).  If one happens to 
misread this title, like I did, it is is probably not coincidental.  It is perhaps one of 
those Freudian slips that make us say inadvertently what we did not mean to or simply 
what we cannot say.  It is not merely a failure of reading, but a failure of 
consciousness that suddenly releases something hidden or veiled within oneself.  Who 
knows if Fufi, the anonymous woman who composed the lyrics had not intentionally 
played with the word, precisely to produce such unforeseen effect?50 
In the 1970s Fufi was part of the Movimento Romano Femminista, a 
movement that, in her view, had been the only one to develop a mature discourse on 
female homosexuality and support the idea that feminist discourse and lesbian 
discourse were intersecting.51  When interviewed by two French feminists, 
Maryvonne Lapouge and Michèle Causse, she preferred not to disclose her identity.  
After I read her story and heard the song I kept thinking of her as the mysterious 
“donna clitoridea,” the woman of the clitoris who, as she herself explains, was 
uncomfortable with speeches.  She nonetheless expressed herself by writing songs 
                                                 
49 Some of the titles and the lyrics can be found online at www.ildeposito.org/archivio/canti.  The 
repertory of lyrics constitutes the feminist soundtrack through which women performed their own 
stories or accompanied their public protests.  A quick glance at some of the titles tells us the nature and 
the extent of women’s engagement with their condition of oppression (“Cara Madre”/”Dear Mother”, 
“Aborto Sacrificio”/ “Abortion Sacrifice,” “Onirica”/ “Oniric,” “Il Complesso”/ “The Complex,” 
“Prostituzione”/ “Prostitution”). 
50 The woman’s story figures in a collection of French interviews conducted by Maryvonne Lapouge 
and Michèle Causse with Italian feminists.  The French feminists put together this collection as they 
felt that voices of Italian feminists or Italian women writers were still unheard and unknown among 
other European women.  Interestingly French women then partially became the vehicle for the cultural 
spread of Italian feminism.        
51 “Nous parlons avec autant d’aisance de l’avortement que de notre homosexualité.  Après tout le 
discours porte sur la sexualité non reproductrice toujours discriminée, mise au pilori” (Lapouge and 
Causse 424). [We talk about abortion as freely as we do about homosexuality.  After all both 
discourses are about non-reproductive sexuality which is always discriminated against and ridiculed.]  
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and becoming the official lyricist of a Roman feminist group.52  Fufi tells the 
interviewers that the song was quite controversial at the time among men and women.  
If it gained the attention of the national press as a song “qui exaspère les hommes” 
[that upsets men (Lapouge and Causse 422),] it also created discomfort among the 
same feminists who felt ashamed.  Why was this song so shameful?  The song tells 
the story of Clotiris, a creature in between a goddess and a flower who lived in the 
woods and used to know bliss and be moved to tears by it.  Suddenly she fell asleep 
and remained in a state of unconsciousness for a long time (“Elle connut un long 
sommeil douloureux/On l’enferma, on interdit la porte à son tendre amour.”/ “She 
went through a long and painful period of sleep/Love was forbidden to her.”)  During 
this time a lot of babies were born, but their lives, bereft of love, ended up spoiling 
Clotiris’s woods.  Until the day in which Clotiris was brought back back to life and 
consciousness by a woman’s blissful kiss that gave her back that pleasure she has 
long forgotten.  
As we read through the lyrics, Clotiris unmistakably represents the clitoris, 
and her story is an allegory of the rediscovery of women’s pleasure through the 
encounter with a woman.53  Interestingly, during the rehearsal of the song, one of the 
                                                 
52 In the interview, the woman confesses that writing and performing songs was a way to break the 
silence, and to deal with her own discomfort with words and speech. 
53Following is the full text of the song of which I am reporting the French translation included in the 
work of Maryvonne Lapouge and Michèle Causse on Italian feminist writers, thinkers and activists:   
La légende de Clotiris raconte [The legend tells that] 
Que la jeune fille était mi-déesse mi-fleur [Clotiris was a young girl half-goddess and half-flower] 
Certains croyaient en elle voir l’orchidée [Some thought that she was an orchid] 
D’autres juraient qu’elle avait la couleur de l’azalée. [Some others swore that she had the colors of an 
azalea.] 
Elle vivait dans un bois au creux d’un buisson [She used to live in a bush in the middle of the woods]  
Entre de morbides parois d’herbe aux chantres [Shletered by soft walls of grass]  
Elle ne buvait que l’eau de l’amour [She used to drink only love water] 
Avec qui savait la lui offrir. [From who could offer it to her.] 
Chaque fois qu’elle s’abandonnait à la joie [Each time she would experience bliss] 
Chaque fois qu’elle fronçait les sourcils [Each time she would frown] 
Perlaient des gouttes de rosée colorées [Pink-colored drops fell like beads] 
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male sound technicians called Fufi up to ask her to repeat the song.  He mistakingly 
called the song “the song of the thyroid,” a fact that Fufi explained with the cultural 
shame surrounding the “clitoris” and any other explicit reference to women’s 
sexuality and bodies.  The question and the quest of pleasure and sexual autonomy 
permeated women’s language at the time.  It transformed the way women talked 
about themselves and their bodies.  The feminist journal Effe which appeared between 
1973 and 1982 often featured women’s popular slogans regarding issues of abortion, 
contraception and sexuality.  The use of body punctuated women’s slogans (written 
and chanted) such as “col dito, orgasmo garantito” [sure pleasure with fingers.]  Body 
language and gestures would also emphasize oral expression.  Some of the slogans 
became controversial, like Fufi’s song on the clitoris and were criticized in national 
newspapers and magazines.  The reason for such controversial responses was that 
slogans were breaking through a traditional association between female sexual organs 
and social taboos and as a consequence they were deeemed vulgar or inappropriate 
even among some women.54  Social and linguistic taboos surrounding sexuality 
                                                                                                                                           
Et l’air résonnait de douces mélodies [And the air was filled with sweet melodies]  
Mais comme dans toutes les fables [But as in every fairy tale] 
Le bonheur aussi, à ce qu’on dit, déserta Clotiris [We are told that Happiness abandoned Clotiris]  
Elle connut un long sommeil douloureux [Who fell into a long painful sleep] 
On l’enferma, on interdit la porte à son tendre amour. [She was improsoned, and her tender love was 
forbidden to see her] 
A l’insu de Clotiris naquirent des millions d’enfants [Clitoris ignored that millions of babies were born  
Qui tous étaient égaux [They were all the same] 
Qui tous manquaient d’amour [All loveless]  
Et poussés par la fureur ils abîmèrent son bois [Filled with anger, they spoiled Clotiris’s wood] 
Mais le doux baiser d’une femme [But the sweet kiss of a woman] 
Venue sûrement de la lune [Coming from the moon]  
Fit fondre en un long abandon sa longue souffrance [caused Clotiris to leave behind her sorrow] 
Et le vent chanta à nouveau l’amour [And Wind whistled the song of love once again] 
Ce baiser, elle s’en souvint à jamais [Clotiris for ever recalled that embrace] 
Et se mirant dans un croissant de lune, [And while looking up at the crescent moon]  
Elle le raconta aux étoiles qui en devinrent plus éclatantes, [she told it to the stars that became brighter] 
Elle le raconta à la vie qui se mit à refleurir. [She told it to Life that began flourshing again.] 
54 In one issue of Effe (3:1975) a contributor raises the question of the discomfort that the use of the 
word “uterus” created.  The contributor stresses that male members of collectives and social 
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interested Italian feminists, right around the time in which the Shere Hite Report 
began to circulate in the United States.55  The Hite Report, like no other work before, 
helped to disentangle some enduring myths about female sexuality while emphasizing 
the existence and the importance of female pleasure, hitherto uncharted territory.  The 
Hite Report, based on survey on sexuality across the US, came as a shocking 
revelation and its success went beyond US borders.  It was translated and edited in 
Italy by major editor Bompiani in 1977.   
Before its appearance in Italy, radical feminist Carla Lonzi had detected the 
problem of understanding women’s pleasure and sexuality in a culture that “mantiene 
ferma l’interdizione del clitoride” [maintains a taboo on the clitoris (Sputiamo 72)].  
This prohibition, explains Lonzi in her Sputiamo su Hegel (1970) is the symbolic act 
of placing a taboo on the clitoris by misrecognizing it as an autonomous sexual organ.  
The clitoral taboo is responsible for producing a cultural denial that hinders women’s 
access to sexual pleasure outside of penetration and therefore outside of reproduction.  
In response to the cultural denial of women’s sexuality some feminists, belonging to 
the radical group Rivolta Femminile led by Carla Lonzi, began calling each other 
“donne clitoridee”  (clitoral women or women of the clitoris).  Naming other women 
by their clitorises sealed a crucial moment of women’s recognition of their commmon 
                                                                                                                                           
movements thought this word should only be used scientifically and saw no link between it and the 
notion of maternity.  The contributor ironically points out that perhaps the same men would have had 
no problem in seeing slogans such as “it’s my penis and I use it as I please” because such affirmation 
would have been self-evident at the time, at least for some.   
55 In 1972, US sociologist Shere Hite shook the world with her report which, for the first time, 
debunked all myths surrounding female sexuality, namely that women orgasm through penetration.  
One of the aims of the report, as Hite highlighted in the 2004 edition, was indeed to show that “it is not 
that women have a problem sexually, but that society has a problem accepting and understanding 
women’s sexuality” (Hite 12).  Hite’s biggest contribution was in presenting sexuality not as 
biological, but as socially and culturally constructed through the proliferation of myths.  Hite had also 
the merit of showing that different performances of sexuality existed besides coitus and that “the 
constant glamourization of the vagina” was nothing but the “a resistance towards a redefinition of sex 
called for by women.” (13)   
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social and sexual oppression and the start of a process of consciousness-raising that 
would empower them as autonomous subjects.  Interestingly, Lonzi defined the 
cultural erasure of women’s sexuality with the term “clitoridectomy.”  The same term 
is used by Dacia Maraini to indicate a denial of women’s autonomy, and the intimate 
link between pleasure and autonomy.  The recognition of the right to pleasure, 
explains Maraini to Ileana Montini “significa sottrazione all’autorità maritale, fraterna 
patriarcale” (118) [it means to withdraw from marital, fraternal and patriarchal 
authority].  The term “clitoridectomy” is, however, too controversial because of the 
implications it has assumed for non-Western feminists in the analysis of actual genital 
excision.56  Suffice it to say that Third World feminists have largely criticized the 
ways Western feminists conceive of clitoridectomy as a concrete practice of genital 
cutting.  In particular, according to some Africanists, Western feminists often casts 
clitoridectomy as a culturally and geographically remote practice that encourage the 
perpetuation of pernicious binaries such as “modern” vs. “traditional.”  
Talking about clitoridectomy is as delicate as it is important in the context of 
1970s Italian feminism.  As Maraini acknowledges, this phenomenon may not be that 
culturally remote, after all, for those Italian feminists; it can help one make sense of 
the cultural context in which a new sexual conciousness emerged.  In this chapter I 
investigate how clitoridectomy was performed at a symbolic level in Italian sexual 
culture.  This symbolic practice, which I am redefining through the term of 
                                                 
56 In the introduction to the anthology called Genital Cutting and Transnational Sisterhood Stanlie 
James and Claire Robertons aim to dispel Western misconceptions surrounding the controversial 
practice of female genital cutting, which has too often resulted in a colonialist construction of the 
practice and its related culture.  The authors warn readers about the variey of practices that the term 
“clitoridectomy” too generically conceals and the different geographical locations in which it is 
performed, including Western countries.  They explain for instance that clitoridectomy is also referred 
to as infulation or excision according to the portion of female genitalia removed.  It can go from the 
tips of the clitoris to include the labia majora and minora.  Such operation is accompanied by different 
cultural motivations.      
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“discursive excision” became the ground for a feminist response to the sexist culture 
of the 1970s and the inscription of a queer feminist identity, the “donna clitoridea” 
which embodies a particular standpoint vis-à-vis heteronormative constructions of 
gender and sexuality.  My chapter is thus divided into two parts: I begin by exploring 
how Lonzi constructs the clitoris and the “donna clitoridea” against a backdrop of 
psychoanalytic views of female sexuality (Freud and Reich).  I maintain that the most 
powerful use that Lonzi makes of the clitoris lies not in its discovery, but in her veiled 
use of the clitoris as a phallus that is as instrument of control within the 
communitarian experience of feminism.  Of course, here the term phallus is 
reminiscent of the much discussed Lacanian phallus, principle of authority, dispenser 
of identity, but it also keeps a distance from it.  The much celebrated clitoris helps 
more shed light on the complex power dynamics that subtended the experience of 
autocoscienza in a particular radical feminist group showing that women’s relations 
were, after all, not exempt from those same power dynamics.  In the second half of 
my chapter, I deal with Lonzi’s refusal of an assimilation of radical feminism into 
lesbianism as the exclusive model for reading women’s sexual autonomy and female 
relationality.  I read such a rejection as a form of feminist closeting that redefines her 
sexual autonomy in terms of a strategic semi-visibility.  Ultimately the clitoris, apart 
from disclosing a new universe of female sexual autonomy, records the struggles and 
the tensions that women, and in particular Lonzi, had in giving voice and representing 
a queer subjectivity.   
Autocoscienza and the Emergence of the donna clitoridea 
The “donna clitoridea” was first and foremost a theoretical product of one 
trend of Italian feminism called autocoscienza.  In spite of its theoretical nature, the 
“donna clitoridea” made its fortune beyond the female collectives.  Young women 
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were spreading this appellation, which can also be found in a cult novel from the 
period, Porci con le ali (1975) [Pigs with Wings].57  The protagonist of this novel 
participates in female collectives where women practiced autocoscienza, a reflective 
practice for which Lonzi and the women of Rivolta Femminile were credited.  
Autocoscienza became a privileged occasion for women to construct a space of sexual 
and social autonomy, a space which they deem more authentic and more faithful to 
their inner self.  Lonzi coined the term autocoscienza to translate the North-American 
practice of consciousness-raising.   
At the time in which women began autocoscienza Italy was equally impacted 
by the persistence of patriarchal values and the impact of Marxist discourses in the 
rising political power of the left.  Those discourses, Lonzi explains, were not less 
traditional or less sexist.  Carla Lonzi’s main work, Sputiamo su Hegel [Let’s Spit on 
Hegel] is an engagement with the implicit sexism of Marxism.  According to Lonzi, 
“far rientrare il problema femminile in una concezione di lotta servo-padrone quale è 
quella classista è un errore storico” (24) [assimilating the women’s question in a 
master-slave narrative such as the classist narrative constitutes an historical error] 
since Marxism only contemplates a masculine organization of society.58  In order to 
avoid such paradox it was necessary for women to envision an alternative 
communitarian space where they could gain a different and empowering awareness of 
themselves outside of traditional family roles.  In Sputiamo su Hegel Lonzi targets the 
family as the main site of women’s oppression. 59  In her personal diary (Taci, anzi 
                                                 
57 In this work, a female teenager Antonia, struggling with hormones and cultural changes, calls herself 
“donna clitoriderea.”  Antonia herself takes part in autocoscienza, a form of consciousness-raising 
which represented at once an expression of political dissent and a moment of self-affirmation through 
self-analysis.   
58 All translations of Lonzi are mine. 
59 Lonzi instead pleads for the abolition of the institutions of marriage and family seen as the 
conclusive moment of women’s captivity within that sexuality: “La donna è sottoposta tutta la vita alla 
dipendenza economica prima della famiglia del padre poi di quella del marito.  Ma la sua liberazione 
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parla) she also points to the family as the cultural perpetrator of a code of 
“riservatezza” (privacy) that constrained women into domestic spaces and prevented 
them from making alliances with other women.  Lonzi’s radical critique of the family 
comes after a decade of debates and struggles during which the cultural and legal 
notion of the family underwent significant changes.60  Autocoscienza made possible a 
cultural transition from family to community that affected women’s social and 
cultural growth, but also contributed to a transformation of the notion and the 
experience of family as well.   
The process of growth that occurred with autocoscienza also entailed some 
social and political limitations that become clear into when considered in the larger 
context of the women’s movements in Italy.  Autocoscienza groups represent the first 
wave of 1970s Italian feminism.61  In the first wave a trend called “femminismo 
autonomo” coincided, in Maria Schiavo’s words, with “un modo di far political 
nuovo, non gerarchico, lontano dalla lotta politica” (Liberazione 4 Feb. 2005). [A new 
mode of making politics, non-hierarchical, removed from institutional political 
struggle.]  Another slogan from the period illustrated the need for a different 
conception of politics which equated separatism, freedom and autonomy: “Siamo 
separatiste per essere autonome.  Siamo autonome per essere libere” (Effe). [We are 
separatist in order to be autonomous.  We are autonomous in order to be free.]  Not all 
feminists fit this model of aggregation.  Some women were at odds with separatist 
                                                                                                                                           
non consiste nel raggiungere l’indipendenza economica, ma nel demolire quell’istituzione che l’ha resa 
più schiava e schiava più a lungo degli schiavi” (45).  [Women’s financial dependence on the father 
and later the husband is a means of perpetuation of the institution that keeps women in a state of 
subjection.  Her liberation does not consist of gaining financial independence, but of demolishing the 
institution that has made her more subject than slavery.] 
60 The changing landscape surrounding the family culminated in the 1975 approval of the “nuovo 
diritto di famiglia.”  A new legislation that established the equality of husband and wife over children 
and family possessions.  The right-wing party (Unione Democratica Italiana) won the battle to have the 
legal reform of the family right was approved (Ribero 269).   
61 I am following Anna Rossi-Doria’s periodization of 1970s feminism.  
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trends as they endorsed the political agenda of governmental leftist groups in issues 
such as abortion.  This militant feminism worked within a specific political frame and 
an existing discourse while “femminismo autonomo” made its own discourse, distinct 
from mainstream political agenda.  “Femminismo autonomo” and within it, Rivolta 
Femminile made use of autocoscienza to reinvent its own political discourse.  De 
Lauretis argues that autocoscienza left feminist thought “in a bind” due to its 
relatively privatized and exclusive nature.  In other words, “if it valorized women’s 
interactions with one another and the sharing of personal experience by conferring 
upon the latter an unprecedented social significance and analytical power,” 
autocoscienza severed an important link with the larger world leaving unfulfilled the 
“need for immediate political effectivity” (Sexual Difference 6-7).  Autocoscienza and 
separatism progressively lost their effectiveneness also because of their exclusionary 
politics.  Dacia Maraini criticized Rivolta Femminile, Lonzi’s radical feminist group 
that she deemed “asocial and mystical” (Lapouge and Causse, 38).62  To judge from 
the arguments of De Lauretis and Maraini, autocoscienza was just not enough to 
provide women with the adequate tools to act in the social and political arena.  The 
discrepancy between the two trends of feminism and some distrust on autocoscienza 
were among the reasons why, by the late seventies, Italian feminists turned to their 
French sisters, in search for conceptual tools as other critics have noted.  Why reject a 
theoretical experience of feminism to then embrace a different one?  One sure thing 
that arises from De Lauretis’ discussion of autocoscienza is that it was a practice that 
had both a theoretical and a political value.  It is therefore important to rediscover its 
                                                 
62 Maraini soon disengaged from it preferring a different form of feminist critique and engagement.  
Maraini saw herself as an activist, and she engaged in feminist protests, in the fight for abortion, 
against domestic exploitation. 
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political, social and theoretical revelance by examing the work that resulted from 
autocoscienza and feminist separatism.     
The most interesting creation of the years of autocoscienza is the “donna 
clitoridea,” a theoretical figure that lies at the intersection of the theoretical, the sexual 
and the social.  As such it seems to reflect all the characteristics of the “pensiero 
autocoscienziale.”63  The theory of the “donna clitoridea” has also been 
underestimated by the same Italian critics who prefer foucising on other aspects of 
early feminism.  For instance, there has been instead increasing attention paid to the 
work of Carla Lonzi, the radical feminist, the very creator of the theory of the clitoris.  
The renewed interest on Lonzi’s work in Italy shows that her ideas are nowadays still 
culturally relevant, and speak to Italian feminists more than ever before.64  An art 
critic, wife, and mother of a son, Lonzi separated from her husband and abandoned 
her career to found the group of Rivolta as she embraced feminism as a cultural 
mission.  Among the leading principles of her theory of feminism there are a few I 
would like to investigate in this chapter: one is Lonzi’s refusal of cultural mediation, 
                                                 
63 Philosopher Maria Luisa Boccia uses the word “pensiero autocoscienziale” in her analysis of Lonzi’s 
“existential” feminism, in the book L’io in rivolta. Pensiero e vissuto di Carla Lonzi (1990).  In the 
introduction Boccia defines the “pensiero autocoscienziale” [autocoscienza thought] as “intreccio tra 
sessualità e cultura” [intersection of sexuality and culture] recognizing in such intersection the potential 
and the power of autocoscienza for women.  That singular ability of “mettere in concetti un vissuto 
personale e singolare” [transform into concepts a singular and personal experience] is the value of 
autocoscienza that “transcende il vissuto senza disancorarsi da esso” [transcends experience without 
disengage from it (8).] 
64 Critical essays on Lonzi in Italy and in the US are still very rare, the exceptions being Non credere 
di avere diritti (1987), the book of the Milan bookstore feminists, and of Maria Luisa Boccia’s 
monography.  The Milanese feminists have made available online a few pieces concerning Lonzi’s 
work, reflections and conversations on Lonzi’s diary and her theoretical pamphlets.  In one of these 
articles, Giovanna Providenti recognizes Lonzi the merit of having looked at the cultural issues of the 
1970s “su un altro piano” [from a different standpoint.]  She stresses specifically the issues of womne’s 
sexual and cultural oppression even within the leftist ideologies, the concern with abortion and with 
women’s sexuality “che va ricercata nella scoperta di una femminilità più completa e non 
complementare all’uomo” (Providenti 1) [to be found in the discovery of a more complete femininity, 
non – complimentary with the man’s.]  In Providenti’s article, the focus is not much on pinpointing a 
theory of self and femininity in Lonzi, but rather to reflect on the process of “liberazione” undertook by 
Lonzi with her diary and the experience of feminism.   
91 
 
expressed in her uncompromising relation with masculine culture; the other is her 
claim to have discovered a feminine authenticity crystallized in the notion of “donna 
clitoridea.”  Lonzi deploys those ideas, and in particular the notion of authenticity, in 
two kinds of work, the theory and the diary.  It is therefore important to understand 
the “donna clitoridea” both as the construction of Lonzi’s theoretical writing and as 
the embodied product of her personal accounts of women’s subjectivity and 
relationality.   
A Fiction of Self: the donna clitoridea between Diary and Theory 
Lonzi’s diary entitled Taci, anzi parla. Diario di una femminista [Be quiet, 
rather speak, a feminist diary] was edited by Rivolta Femminile.  It documents 
Lonzi’s experience of feminism during and after the period of autocoscienza, 
covering a time frame that goes from 1972 to 1977.  In her diary, Lonzi recalls not 
only the relational experience with other women, but also her past years in Catholic 
boarding school, her upbringing, her problematic relationships with her sister and her 
mother, her maternal experience, her abortion, her intellectual and artistic life, and the 
relationships she had with different women and men, above all Simone.  Dreams and 
poems complement the daily accounts accompanying the phases of her work and 
thought, which were prematurely interrupted by Lonzi’s death due to cancer in 1982 
at age 51.  The diary is also interspersed with mentions of Lonzi’s reading.  Among 
them are several references to the writings of the mystic Santa Teresa de Avila and 
the diaries of Anaïs Nin.  Lonzi’s diary is a crucial document as it portrays the 
simultaneous emergence of Lonzi’s consciousness and the multiple and discordant 
voices of the women who participated with her in the making of a female community.  
Lonzi’s diary, as a reflection of the years of autocoscienza, is the converging point of 
women’s experiences and the place where Lonzi’s theoretical ideas could be tested 
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and even performed.  Yet the diary is also the record of Lonzi’s personal effort to 
achieve the feminine authenticity of the “donna clitoridea.”  Therefore it should be 
read as a fiction of self which constantly puts to trial the notion of self authenticity 
that it is meant to offer.  Lonzi’s theoretical work and her diary seem to have an 
intersectional dimension that makes it impossible to investigate the “donna clitoridea” 
without examining the tensions that the two narratives produce.  Lonzi’s “donna 
clitoridea” ultimately materializes in a space where the diary becomes theory and 
theory turns into fiction.        
 It is 1972 when Lonzi begins her diary with the reflection on a revelation of 
women’s similarity, their supposed specularity:  
Un’altra donna, clitoridea, mi ha riconosciuta come donna, clitoridea, intanto 
che io la riconoscevo negli stessi termini.  Questo è accaduto nella primavera 
del 1972.  Adesso so chi sono e posso essere coscientemente me stessa (Taci 
13).  
 
[Another woman, “clitoridea,” has recognized me as “clitoridea” while I was 
recognizing her in the same terms.  This happened in the spring of 1972.  Now 
I know who I am and I can be consciously myself.] 
 
With these words Lonzi marks the beginning of a new era for some women.  It is in 
the sudden intuition (“improvvisa intuizione”) of another self, that a new subjectivity 
is revealed to her and other women of the group.  These women have names in 
Lonzi’s diary: they are Sara, Ester and Marion and they all address each other with 
the epithet “clitoridee” as with a nickname, a recognition code.  With this epithet 
women come to recognize each other as similar and are able to dig into their previous 
experiences and share them with others as to build a different and renewed awareness 
of themselves.  Before this revelation, this mutual recognition, women like Lonzi felt 
isolated, plunged into “la cultura del pene,” a notion Lonzi coins and explains in her 
La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale (1971).  In this essay Lonzi inaugurates a 
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discourse of female sexual autonomy, which other Italian feminists, notably the 
Milanese ones, refer to as sexual difference, to distinguish it from an idea of sexual 
equality that assimilates women into a masculine frame.  But the Milanese feminists 
do not talk about the rediscovery of the clitoris on which Lonzi’s difference is based, 
a rediscovery that is problematic from a theoretical, a sexual and a social point of 
view.   
Why the clitoris?  Because it is a specifically female body part long erased 
from masculine culture, “la cultura del pene,” that furthermore denies women the 
desiring use of the clitoris in the name of reproduction.  Theoretical engagement 
“with” the clitoris becomes at once the site of the critique of the “cultura del pene” 
and the blissful experience of recreating a space, albeit discursive, of female sexuality 
and pleasure.  Dismissing the theoretical aspect of Lonzi’s work may mean 
disavowing the pleasure that theory may have given her as well.  For Lonzi’s essay is 
built on a variety of sources that speak to her knowledge of and curiosity about 
matters of female sexuality.  Her analysis spans psychoanalysis (Freud, Reich) 
anthropology (Kinsey, Masters, Johnson), Marxism (Engels), and zoology (Morris).  
In her essay Lonzi clarifies that the taboo regarding the clitoris is responsible for the 
misrecognition of it as an organ of pleasure tantamount to the penis.  This 
misrecognition serves to produce a “coincidenza imposta” [forced coincidence] 
between male penetrative pleasure and vaginal pleasure. In Lonzi’s terms, when a 
woman thinks and acts as if her vagina was the only site of pleasurewhen in fact it is 
the site of reproductionher thought merely reflects a male-oriented paradigm of 
pleasure, which is the sign of a “forced coincidence.”  As a result of this coincidence, 
a dominant sexual model emerges, coitus, a model of complementarity between the 
sexes; this complementarity works to the detriment of women’s experience of 
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pleasure: “Nell’uno dunque il meccanismo del piacere è strettamente connesso al 
meccanismo della riproduzione, nella donna meccanismo del piacere e meccanismo 
della riproduzione sono comunicanti, ma non coincidono” (77) [For the man the 
mechanism of pleasure is strictly intertwined with reproduction, for the woman the 
mechanism of pleasure and that of reproduction are linked, but they do not coincide.]  
In other words, the emphasis on coitus results in the obliteration of the clitoris as the 
autonomous organ and site of pleasure for women, who therefore find themselves 
constrained into an exclusive model of vaginal sexuality.      
The Feminist Clitoris: Freud, Feminine Authenticity, and Sexual Autonomy 
In La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale Lonzi sets out to break through the 
constructed sexual coincidence between vaginal sexuality and male pleasure by first 
discarding the very idea of “coincidence,” and then by theorizing instead a sexual 
“equivalence” between penis and clitoris.  This rhetorical move is meant, on the one 
hand, to open up for women the possibility of a non-reproductive and pleasurable 
form of sexuality; on the other hand it intends to foreground the social 
constructedness of a sexual model solely based on masculine pleasure.  Thus turning 
from vagina to clitoris enables Lonzi to both emphasize pleasure and critique 
reproduction.  Putting an emphais on pleasure will in other words allow women to 
rescue the clitoris from that “ruolo secondario e transitorio nella sessualità femminile” 
(81) [that secondary and transitory role in female sexuality].  The shift from vagina to 
clitoris should also constitute a return of women to their “nature” since women, Lonzi 
writes, are always already “clitoridee.”  Only by virtue of a psychosocial adaptation 
(“adattamento psicosociale”) are they trapped into the vaginal mode of sexuality.  The 
clitoris becomes then the equivalent of the penis as an autonomous organ of pleasure: 
“Il sesso femminile è la clitoride, il sesso maschile è il pene” [The female sex is the 
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clitoris, the male sex is the penis], writes Lonzi.  Once the woman has rediscovered 
the libidinal autonomy of her organ, she can finally feel liberated from the vaginal 
aim (“finalizzazione vaginale”) which submits her to men.  This liberation is, for 
Lonzi, the premise for women’s sexual and social freedom.  Even though the 
rediscovery of the clitoris represents in Lonzi’s mind a moment of rupture with the 
masculine culture of sexuality, her gesture of liberation, that begins with a declaration 
of sexual equivalence between clitoris and penis, is less a rupture that an alliance with 
a heterosexist understanding of sexuality. 
That the clitoris is the equivalent of the penis was not Lonzi’s original 
invention.  In his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Sigmund Freud points to 
the clitoris as “the leading erotogenic zone in female children,” which he understands 
as being “homologous to the masculine genital zone of the glans penis” (86).  Because 
of this analogy, Freud sees no difference between the young female’s and male’s 
experience of pleasure, at least in the pre-puberal stage.  Freud’s remark on the erotic 
excitability of the clitoris during the pre-pubscent stage has at least a couple of 
consequences for the representation of female sexuality: first of all, it marks a 
distinction between the highly erotic stage prior to puberty and the repressive phase of 
puberty itself in which girls are supposed to renounce clitoridal sexuality in favor of a 
“more mature” vaginal sexuality; second, it justifies girls’ renunciation of clitoral 
pleasure as “a stimulus to the libido in men.”  In neither case is there question of 
whether girls do actually renounce their clitoridal activity or whether the practice of 
vaginal activity must necessarily exclude the other.   
Freud’s treatment of the clitoris and the sexual transition of women from 
clitoris to vagina provoked a backdrop of responses on the part of feminists in the 
1970s.  The interest of these feminist responses lies in their powerful and subversive 
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rereading of psychoanalytic female sexuality.  It is the case of French feminist thinker 
Luce Irigaray who critiques the Freudian equivalence in one of her famous works, 
Spéculum de l’autre femme [Speculum of the Other Woman] (1974).  In the section 
entitled “La tache aveugle d’un vieux rêve de symétrie” [Blind Spot of an Old Dream 
of Symmetry] Irigaray points out that the Freudian construction of the girls’sexuality 
conforms to a masculine paradigm of masturbation.  For Irigaray the sexual 
equivalence between the boy’s little penis and the girl’s penis/clitoris is the ultimate 
Freudian ruse to reaffirm a universal masculine paradigm of pleasure.  As a result of 
inscribing the girl in the masculine onanistic model, according to Irigaray, Freud 
subsumes the girl into a discourse of the same.  Hence Freud’s insistence on the girl’s 
self-pleasuring act is merely functional to the reinforcement of a masculine model of 
sexuality and the further disavowal of specifically feminine sites of female pleasure: 
Tandis que ‘le vagin essentiellement feminine, n’est encore découvert par 
aucun des deux sexes.’ Et pas plus les lèvres d’ailleurs, aucune des lèvres, ni 
la vulve,très accessible pourtant, et dont la sensibilité n’a pas pu ne pas être 
découverte par la fillette.  Par les soins de la mère, par le frottement des langes 
ou des culottes, par la main à la recherché du ‘petit penis’.  Le plaisir obtenu 
par le toucher, la caresse, l’entr’ouverture des lèvres, de la vulve, pour Freud, 
n’existe simplement pas.  (Spéculum 29-30)  
 
[The “truly feminine vagina is still undiscovered by both sexes,” just like the 
lips, and the vulva, though all of these are so perfectly accessible that the little 
girl cannot fail to have discovered their sensitivity.  Whether through her 
mother’s ministrations or through the rubbing of diapers or underpants, or 
when her hand searches for the “little penis.”  The pleasure gained from 
touching, caressing, parting the lips and vulva simply does not exist for Freud. 
(29)] 
 
Freud thus dismisses the multi-facted, multilayered, polymorphous character of that 
female sexuality that, for Irigaray, finds expression in the contact of the woman with 
all parts of her body.  Dismissing other female erotogenic parts is just like giving the 
clitoris a phallic name.  Moreover, Irigaray does not see “why the clitoris should have 
to yield its ‘sensitivity’ and hence its ‘importance’ to the vagina” and she adds tha 
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“the two organs are in no way interchangeable, but rather contribute, along with 
others, and with specific sensitivities, to woman’s sexual pleasure” (30).   
A similar position to women’s sexuality was that of Germaine Greer, who, in 
The Female Eunuch (1970), critiques all radical feminism that sees in the clitoris the 
ultimate liberation of women’s sexuality and libido.  She argues that “if we localize 
female response in the clitoris we impose upon women the same limitation of sex that 
has stunted the male’s response” (43).  Greer is not against a rediscovery and a 
practice of clitoral pleasure as long as it does not preclude other forms of sexuality.  
She writes that “women must struggle to keep alternatives open” (44) and she 
elaborates a sexual paradigm, that of the female eunuch, which stands at the 
crossroads of different preexisting and envisioned representations of sexuality.  
Whereas the word eunuch alludes at a subject with no sexual organ (as women in 
psychoanalysis), the attribute “female” is “the indefinite term… which retains the 
possibility of libido” (69).  What we begin to perceive in the essay of Greer, at least, 
is the discomfort with the emphatic insistence on formalizing women sexuality around 
an anatomy–Irigaray did the same with the labia–and the question of the 
(in)commensurable and non-quantifiable aspects of female pleasure.   
            Although female pleasure is certainly not strictly localized or circumscribed to 
anatomical parts, there certainly seems to be a problem in the link between sexuality 
and clitoris.  This problem may stem from the sexual connotations that Freud gave to 
the clitoris itself.  Not only does Freud ignore the gender specificity of female 
eroticism, but he also goes as far as depicting the girls’ renunciation of pleasure 
during puberty as the repression of “a piece of masculine sexuality” (Freud 87).  He 
thus interprets girls’ erotic drive as a masculine feature.  The masculinization of the 
clitoris is perhaps in part responsible for the association between the clitoris and the 
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lesbian, a link that existed prior to Freud’s analysis of the clitoris, as Valerie Traub 
demonstrates in her essay “The Psychomorphology of the Clitoris.”  “From Anne 
Koedt to Thomas Laqueur,” she writes, “critics have elucidated the strategies whereby 
Freud attempted to reconcile women’s physiology with a heterosexual imperative” 
(Traub 188), but one consequence of Freud’s disavowal of the gender specificity of 
eroticism, argues Traub, has been the re-production of the structural link between 
clitoris and lesbianism (clitoris = penis = lesbianism) that obscures the complexity of 
lesbian erotics.65  Traub urges the feminist reader to see how an easy celebration of 
anatomy reinforces cultural and historical paradigms of sexuality rather than 
challenging them.  For, taking anatomy in order to represent identity, and therefore 
using a logic of metonymy, may only occlude the historical construction of the 
subject that the anatomy purports to describe.66  The alleged link between clitoris and 
lesbian is even more important if we consider that the “donna clitoridea” is 
constructed on the basis of a strategic rejection of lesbianism to which I will later 
return. 
             Freud’s presence in Lonzi’s diary, through anatomical allusion, is somehow 
uncanny as Lonzi herself claimed to have rejected Freudian theory.  Was Lonzi’s 
                                                 
65 Traub procedes to demonstrate how such link has structured lesbianism around a psychomorphology 
of the clitoris; however, only with Freud was such association pathologized “to resecure the direction 
of female desire toward men, toward reproduction” (189).  The important contribution of Traub’s 
article to a queer feminist investigation does not derive, in my opinion, from the critique of Freud’s 
colonzing set of equivalences, but rather, from the critique of some feminist counter-responses (i.e. 
Irigaray, Butler, MacKinnon, and Dworkin) to Freud’s system of sexual analogies: “In the critique of 
Freud that pervades contemporary lesbian scholarship a logic of reversal structures analytic resistance 
to the psychoanalytic narrative; rather than pathologize…the equation between the lesbian and the 
clitoris, many critics and theorists celebrate this analogy as the enabling truth of lesbian existence” 
(190).   
66 Greer had already mildly undertaken that critique in the 1970s except that her critique of radical and 
clitoridal feminism seemed to be directed to the re-evaluation of a heterosexual model especially when 
she says that “the cunt must come into its own” and that “women must humanize the penis, take the 




adoption of the Freudian sexual model a simple endorsement of a psychoanalytic 
construct?  Could it represent instead a critical engagement of it?  If so what 
discursive effects does Lonzi’s adoption of Freudian anatomy produce on the 
articulation of sexual autonomy and feminine authenticity?  One fundamental 
corollary of Lonzi’s sexual equivalence is the construction of the “donna vaginale.”  
The idea of the “donna vaginale” circulated among the feminists of Rivolta.  As we 
learn from Lonzi’s diary, women debated over the two paradgms of “donna vaginale” 
and “donna clitoridea,” taking sides, questioning and testing their validity.  The 
debate over those two identificatory sites caused tensions and disagreements within 
the group and, as I shall demonstrate, resulted in the binary and somehow rigid 
opposition to the “donna vaginale.”   
               Who is the “donna vaginale” and what role does she play in Lonzi’s theory 
and diary?  From a theoretical perspective, the “donna vaginale,” is one important 
target of Lonzi’s critique of the “cultura del pene.”  She is strictly associated with it in 
Lonzi’s argument.  While “la donna vaginale” Lonzi explains, “è considerata quella 
che manifesta una giusta sessualità” (La donna 83) [the vaginal woman is considered 
the one who manifests a correct sexuality], the “clitoirdea” is often depicted as the 
immature, the masculine and even the frigid according to psychoanalysis.  The 
“donna vaginale” is the expression, the embodiment of the “cultura del pene” and 
therefore she is the woman who, through a “giusta sessualità” [proper sexuality] is 
complicit with the rules of patriarchy.  In other words, the “donna vaginale” is the 
traditional model of femininity against which Lonzi opposes a new model, the 
“clitoridea” “che non ha accondisceso alle suggestioni emotive dell’integrazione con 
l’altro, che sono quelle che hanno presa sulla donna passiva, e si è espressa in una 
sessualità non coincidente con il coito” (84) [who has not accommodated the 
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emotional influences of the integration with the other (the man), those influences that 
attain the passive woman. The clitoridea expresses herself through a sexuality that 
does coincide with coitus].  Based on this contrasting definition, the “vaginal” also 
appears to be a passive woman, assimilated into a heterosexual model, the coitus.  In a 
few lines, Lonzi manages to lump together all the features of the “vaginal” in order to 
reject them (passivity, assimilation, integration).  By means of this rhetorical move 
Lonzi may more easily affirm an authentic and new model of femininity away from 
the traditional one, namely the maternal model: “La donna non è la grande-madre, la 
vagina del mondo,” she writes “ma la piccola clitoride per la sua liberazione” (118) 
[The woman is not the big-mother, the vagina of the world, but the little clitoris of her 
own liberation.]  One distinctive feature of the “clitoridea” lies in her “authenticity.”  
The word authenticity and the attribute authentic appear very frequently in the diary 
to describe Lonzi and other women’s ontological status within the group and in 
relation to culture and society.  The Milanese feminists have lingered on the notion of 
“authenticity,” considering it a crucial and productive moment of Lonzi’s “percorso di 
liberazione” [path to liberation] (Providenti).  My sense is that both the Milan 
feminists and Lonzi leave the term unquestioned thus ignoring the problems involved 
in the radical feminists’ effort to occupy that space of authenticity.  Rather, engaging 
the notion of “authenticity” and what it does is important for better elucidating what 
the “percorso di liberazione” was really about.    
One way we may read the meaning of “authentic” with regard to the 
construction of the “clitoridea,” is that the “authenticity” of the “clitoridea” derives 
from the refusal to imitate or accomodate men (the masculine discourse) at the sexual 
or social level: “Autenticamente l’una ha revendicato se stessa: estraniandosi l’altra 
ha simulato sul piano del piacere e ha ambito i traguardi dell’uomo sul piano culturale 
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e sociale” (85) [One has authentically vindicated herself : by othering herself the other 
(the vaginal) has simulated on the level of pleasure and she has attained men’s goals 
on the cultural and social level.]  Between the two identificatory models, there is a 
sexual difference, which is also fundamentally a social and a cultural difference.  This 
difference makes the vaginal woman socially integrated, so to speak, as opposed to 
the autonomous “clitoridea.”  The latter, like Carla Lonzi, dwells in feminism and 
finds in it her raison d’être:  
Con il femminismo, la clitoridea esce dal pozzo e si guarda attorno, vuolefare 
a meno dell’autodifesa, vuole !  Vuole !  Non ne ha più bisogno, anzi tende a 
manifestarsi, a introdurre un’autenticità nel mondo che non sia quella di chi 
collabora ciecamente alla propria schaivitù. (Taci 33)  
 
[With feminism the “clitoridea” comes out of her well and looks around 
herself, she wants to get rid of self-defensive mechanisms, she wants! She 
Wants!  She does not need them anymore, or better she tends to manifest 
herself, to introduce an authenticity in the world which is not that of those who 
blindly cooperate to their own slavery.]  
 
As this quotation reveals, the “clitoridea” is not completely out of the social circuit; 
she instead wants to come out in the world and take part in it operating from a 
different standpoint, that of authenticity.  The “clitoridea” is then the woman who, by 
the very choice of feminism, has entered a dimension of authenticity.  This newly 
discovered authenticity is also the dimension of a woman who refuses to be complicit 
with the masculine world and with categories of oppression.  By withdrawing from 
the system and choosing “authenticity,” the “clitoridea” provokes a crisis, a break into 
that system in order to free both men and women from relations of oppression: “Nella 
crisi della cultura vaginale promossa dalla donna clitoridea, avviene la presa di 
coscienza che libera la donna della sua inferiorità e l’uomo della sua superiorità” (33). 
[In the crisis of the ‘cultura vaginale’ brought about by the “clitoridea,” a 
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consciousness arises that frees the woman from her inferiority and the man from his 
superiority.]   
In order to denounce such power imbalances between men and women (which 
are considered natural), “la clitoridea” also comes to reproduce a disparity between 
herself and “la vaginale,” which translates into terms of power dynamics.  In my 
view, such a dichotomy stems from the way the “clitoridea” uses the notion of 
authenticity to distinguish herself from the “vaginale”: “Il fatto che sia la donna 
clitoridea non deve inferiorizzare la donna vaginale poiché essa trova in questa 
circostanza l’occasione per riconoscere la clitoridea, dunque per fare quell’atto di 
autenticità che la mette alla pari con l’altra” (34) [The fact that it is the “clitoridea” 
must not put the “vaginale” in a position of inferiority since she finds in such 
circumstance the chance  to recognize the “clitoridea,” therefore to perform that act of 
authenticity that puts her on equal terms with the other woman].  If the “clitoridea” is 
the authentic woman, then the clitoris plays as that which signifies the space of 
authenticity that the “clitoridea” occupies and embodies.  The “donna clitoridea” was 
not perhaps intended as the rejection of vaginal femininity, a rejection which Lonzi 
herself deems counterproductive.  Yet, Lonzi’s insistence on the passive vaginal 
absorption of male paradigm of pleasure may have inadvertently contributed to the 
reinforcement of a “passive” vaginality, against Lonzi’s intention to not replicate a 
paradigm she disputed: “Finché l’aut-aut è: identificazione nella vagina o nel rifiuto 
della vagina siamo nella logica della vaginalità, cioè nella logica di un’identificazione 
della donna che sostiene l’identificazione dell’uomo nel fallo” (È gia politica 19). [As 
long as the either or is: identification with the vagina or its refusal we are in the loigc 
of vaginality, that is in the logic of an identification of the woman supports the 
equivalence between man and phallus.]  Authenticity is however a territory full of 
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traps for all women who want to inhabit it as such.  This is one reason why I began to 
think of the clitoris not merely as sexual signifier, but as a possible social signifier 
around which women’s relations were (and could be) structured and organized.  
Better said, I realized that the clitoris may work as an allegory for the female social 
relations within a radical group and also as an allegory of Lonzi’s own complex 
relation with society and culture.  The question is to what extent did the clitoris 
replace the phallus as traditional social signifier and to what extent did it destabilize 
it?      
Inside the Group: The Clitoris as Phallic Signifier 
Leafing through the pages of Lonzi’s diary is like navigating the complex 
space of women’s relations within Rivolta.  In the narrative and relational space of the 
diary, attaining authenticity and embodying the “clitoridea” were a process that 
entailed tensions and disagreements, ruptures and reconciliations.  It also involved 
lying and dissimulation, self-illusion and self-deception.  Lonzi herself sheds doubt on 
her sense of authenticity, which she realizes, cannot quite be reached.  She laments for 
instance that “è proprio la mia pretesa di autenticità a rendermi irrealizzata nel 
mondo” (40) [my pretension of authenticity makes me feel unfulfilled in the world], 
and deems the search of authenticity the cause of her unfulfilling role in society.  
Elsewhere she writes: “Ho fiducia nella mia autenticità a cui è collegato però il mio 
senso di impotenza a esprimerla con gli altri” (123). [I trust my authenticity to which 
is however linked my sense of impotence in expressing it with others.]   “Autenticità” 
goes hand and hand with a vague sense of dissatisfaction and the inability to 
communicate.  The eagerness of the beginning is soon replaced with a growing sense 
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of frustration about the way women relate to each other in the group.67  Lonzi 
confesses that “essere due clitoridee non significa capirsi” (412) [being two 
“clitoridee” does not mean to understand each other].  That idea of “risonanza,” of 
mutual recognition that brought together women is at once the asset and the limit of 
autocoscienza, according to the Milanese feminists.  “L’autenticità era assolutizzata” 
(Libreria delle Donne 27) [Authenticity became an absolute principle] at the expenses 
of the same relations that little by little started to deteriorate.  The embodiment of the 
“clitoridea,” as an authentic form of subjectivity based on the rejection of the 
“vaginale” is not merely a rhetorical strategy; it becomes an exclusionary modality of 
relation within the group.68  In other words, whereas authenticity should have worked 
as a positive value, it turned out to be a detrimental mechanism.  For instance, the 
desire for authenticity is so ingrained in Lonzi and other women that they seem to 
take as impostors all women who cannot be completely and authentically “clitoridee.”  
It is the case of Ida who, after swearing on her clitoris, got pregnant and decided to 
live with a man.  Because of her choice she was criticized and rejected in spite of the 
fact that Lonzi herself, even before feminism, had a man and a son.  What to make of 
this exclusionary practice among women and what does this exclusion have to do with 
Lonzi’s role within the group? 
Lonzi, who was also the leader of the group, writes that she was made to feel 
guilty by other women who saw in her both a mother and an older sister.  Either of 
                                                 
67 The women of the group appear in the diary with pseudonyms.  Interestingly the only woman who 
appears with her real name is Dacia Maraini whose contact with the group is not clear.  Maraini claims 
that she took part in it, but soon detached herself from it.  Lonzi says that the group did not like 
Maraini’s pretension to show up and tell the women what to do.  This last episode is related by Lonzi 
in her diary.  
68 I must nuance my argument clarifying that the “donna clitoridea” was not perhaps intended as the 
rejection of vaginal femininity.  Lonzi’s insistence on the passive vaginal absorption of the male 
paradigm of pleasure may have inadvertently contributed to the reinforcement of a “passive” 




these roles that Carla embodies before them are experienced as the expression of a 
dominating and stifling authority.  Elsewhere Lonzi notes that the real tragedy of the 
relationships among women is the relationship mother-daughter.  She furthermore 
stresses the dramatic aspect of seeing those relationships reflected in the 
groups’dynamics.  Her relationship with Sara, in particular, is depicted as being that 
of a daughter in need of a mother: “La mia condizione è proprio quella della madre 
con la figlia: non vuole dipendere da me, ma ricorre sempre a me” (410) [My status is 
really that of a mother with her daughter: she does not want to depend on me, but she 
always runs to me.]  She elsewhere laments the perceptions that other women had of 
her as a mother or older sister:  “Ero incompresa nel mito che le altre si facevano di 
me” (23). [I was misunderstood because of the myth that other women created around 
me.]  Little by little, throughout the pages of the diary feminism turns into a 
battlefield: “Le donne si distruggono tra loro, si tolgono forza, si accusano, si rivelano 
nemiche” (624)  [Women destroy each other, take away each other’s strength, accuse 
each other, end up being enemies], while denouncing a state of mutual dependence 
that stifles women’s sense of autonomy and ability to emancipate from culturally 
imposed roles: “Nella relazione affettiva la dipendenza è reciproca e a tutti e due è 
difficile trovare la propria autonomia” (427). [In the emotional relationship 
dependence is mutual and it is difficult to find one’s own autonomy.]  Lonzi bitterly 
reflects on the nature of women’s bonds speaking to the drama of sisterhood: “Vedo 
un meccanismo a catena, una gigantesca consequenzialità di suggestione-mito-
liberazione, bisogno-adescamento-rigetto che tremo dalla paura letteralmente” (607) 
[I see a mechanism, effecting a sequence of influence-myth-liberation, need-
approach-rejection.  I tremble with fear.]  To make things more complex is women’s 
ambivalent positioning towards Lonzi and Lonzi’s ambivalence vis-à-vis her group 
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comrades.  Women seek her out in search of support.  This supportive role flatters the 
woman when she can see herself as the mediator of women’s raising consciousness: 
A me piace molto essere lo strumento della liberazione di un’altra e mi 
commuove saperlo mentre lei ancora non lo sa.  Sentire questo passaggio che 
si compie in lei, potere essere testimone e diligente esecutrice… voglio essere 
quell’eccezione che le può permettere di avere un senso di sé più consono a 
come l’avrebbe avuto se altri non l’avessero avvilita…questa funzione di 
tramite è dove io mi riconosco. (551) 
 
[I really liked being the instrument of another’s woman liberation, and I am 
moved to know of it while she still ignores it.  I feel this transition that takes 
place within her, I am the witness and the diligent executioner of it…I want to 
be that exceptional being that allows her to have a more adequate sense of 
herself that she would have had she not been diminished…I recognize myself 
in the very function of mediator.]  
        
In her effort to be “testimone e diligente esecutrice” [witness and diligent 
executioner] Lonzi grants herself the right to invade the private territory of other 
women while still preserving hers.  Lonzi offers as an example and episode in which 
she expresses her desire to read other women’s diaries, but she is reluctant to sharing 
her own.  She even takes notes of a dream in which she prevents a woman from 
looking at her diary.  She also describes her own diary as “una specie di rapporto 
segreto”[a kind of secret report] which may be reminiscent of a practice during her 
years at a Catholic boarding school that sometimes Lonzi recalls in the diary.  Lonzi 
is like any other teenager in boarding schools who were accustomed to the practice of 
writing a diary, but given the regime of control in which such schools hled students it 
is not surprising that the sense of privacy and secrecy would become stronger.  The 
sense of secrecy is so acute that Lonzi wonders how much of her diary can be 
released for publication.  At the same time, she is intrusive with regard to other 
women’s diaries and uses her knowledge of the diary to get to know what others think 
of her and the group.  What are women’s responses to Lonzi’s attitude?  
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At times they fear her because they consider her “in gamba nel mondo 
maschile” (167) [capable in the masculine world.]  Or they flat out reject her as the 
masculine dominating element of the group.  Ester for instance accuses Lonzi of 
assuming a dominating role within the group, to which Lonzi responds:  
Il mio sfacelo con un tipo di amiche non è finito.  Con Ester posso solo tacere: 
ce l’ha con se stessa e non lo sopporta, scarica la sua rabbia e la sua impotenza 
su di me.  Adesso dice quello che non ha mai detto, che era impensabile: e 
cioè che nel rapporto con lei io ero l’uomo e lei la donna.  Così ritorna 
l’accusa della vaginale alla clitoridea, non finirà mai nemmeno con il 
femminismo. (267) 
  
[My disaster with a certain kind of friend is not over.  With Ester I can only be 
quiet: she is mad at herself and she cannot take it, she blames her rage and her 
impotence on me. Now she says what she never said, what was unthinkable: 
that in my relationship to her I was the man and she was the woman.  This is 
how the accusation of the’ vaginale’ to the ‘clitoridea’ returns and not even 
feminism will put an end to it.]   
 
Interestingly the dichotomy “vaginale”/”clitoridea” returns here to signify the 
presumed masculinity of Lonzi, a masculinity that is rather phallic and understood in 
terms of inequality among women!  It is precisely in the dichotomy between 
“vaginale” and “clitoridea” that Ester finds a way to reveal Lonzi’s own oppressive 
use of sexual categories.  Those categories are even extended to the relationships 
among women where one is perceived as the superior (the man) and the other the 
inferior (the woman).  Trapped in this pernicious dichotomy, in a perpetual dialectic 
between herself and other women, Lonzi comes to a different understanding of 
feminism and women’s liberation:  “Quando dicevamo ‘liberazione’ non sapevo che 
anch’io ero un ingombro/così sono stata respinta/proprio da quelle che amavo” (544). 
[when we said ‘liberation’ I did not know that I was myself encumbersome/so I was 
rejected/precisely by those women I loved.]  Noticing that “il femminismo è sfociato 
in una bolgia di rivalità” (871) [feminism has resulted in a bunch of rivalries], Lonzi 
concludes that women’s relationships are not necessarily exempt from a logic of 
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power and competition, a logic to which she somehow willingly or unwillingly 
contributes.   
The episode I am about to relate may help explain the atmosphere of 
competion among women.  In Lonzi’s interview with Michèle Causse, Lonzi was 
asked whether she felt that the experience of the group was castrating.69  Causse is 
perhaps more aware than Lonzi of the rhetorical nature of her own question.  Why 
would she hint at castration had she not thought that castration described, at least in 
part, the dynamics of the group?  Lonzi eluded the question, and ignored the 
possibility that her feminism could be read in terms of domination.  Or she simply 
wanted to prevent people from drawing conclusions about the complexity of female 
relationality.  Evading the question about castration, Lonzi emphasizes instead the 
transitory nature of the communitarian relations and then jumps into voicing her 
disillusion with the experience.  It began as “une oasis où je croyais en avoir fini de 
souffrir” [a oasis where I thought all my suffering could end] and transformed into 
“tourbillons de souffrances” (372) [spirals of pain].  How that painful change became 
possible remains unexplained.  Is it perhaps due to the castrating experience of the 
group?  Is it because the autocoscienza experience was somehow itself a form of 
female amputation, a symbolic castration?  Earlier I mentioned that Lonzi qualified 
“clitoridectomy” as a culture that denies women access to sexual pleasure and 
autonomy.  Interestingly, Lonzi maintains that the clitoral taboo is comparable, on a 
symbolic level, to the clitoral excision suffered by girls in some African countries, a 
parallel that she sketches in La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale.  The analogy 
with African cultures was intended to translate into Italian culture the patriarchal 
wound inflicted by a colonizing gesture.  Yet, this analogy does not work well, 
                                                 
69 “Le groupe ne serait-il pas un peu castrateur”? (Lapouge and Causse, 371) [Isn’t the group a little 




precisely because in her attempt to symbolize a literal practice, Lonzi fails to ground 
her analogy into a more coherent cultural discussion.  Lonzi pushes her analogy a step 
further by quoting the translation of a song of an African woman performing excision 
on girls, with no reference to specific sources and no discussion of the practice:     
Una volta eravamo camerate, 
Ma ora vi dò ordini 
Perché sono un uomo–vedete 
E ho in mano il coltello 
E vi opero. 
La vostra clitoride che custodite sì gelosamente, 
Io la strapperò, la getterò a terra, 
Perché sono uomo oggi. (La donna 78) 
 
[Once upon the time we were female mates 
But now I give you commands 
Because I am a man–you see 
With a knife in my hand 
I operate on you 
Your clitoris that you guard so jealously 
I will rip it off, and throw it on the ground 
Because I am a man today.]  
 
The reason Lonzi gives for such a quotation is to establish a parallel between the 
violence of the rite and the constructed symmetry between male orgasm and vaginal 
sexuality [forced coincidence], a coincidence that “non ha riscontro in nessun altro 
tipo di colonizzazione” (77-78) [does not find any equivalent in any other type of 
colonization].  Yet to me, the decontextualized voice of the female exciser does not so 
much bring attention to the question of female pleasure, but to the position of the 
excisor vis-à-vis the excised girls.  Who really is the woman who, brandishing her 
knife to operate on the girls, can feel like a man?  Is there any relation between the 
anonymous and remote woman seizing a castrating weapon and Lonzi symbolically 
getting ahold of women’s clitorides (diaries) in the group?  After I read Lonzi’s diary 
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the analogy between the two women struck me as somehow plausible.70  Lonzi’s 
reappropriation of a decontextualized image may be simply, in my view, a site of 
phallic identification and desire for Lonzi.  If that were true, we might read the 
experience of radical feminism with the pervasive dichotomy clitoridea/vaginale 
(reinforced by forms of exclusions and intrusions) as a form of symbolic excision (or 
of female castration) which does but reaffirm an idea of female relations as always 
already being phallic.   
Perhaps also, this experience of feminism as eminently phallocentric also lies 
in Lonzi’s own understanding of “cultura del pene.”  The “cultura del pene” is what 
nowadays we may call phallocentrism or the organization of culture around fixed 
identity categories.  The fact that Lonzi uses the term penis to indicate the phallus 
may suggests that for her the penis and the phallus are synonymous.  In Italian the two 
terms can be used interchangeably to talk about the male sexual organ.  The 
conflation of the terms however provokes a confusion through superimposition of a 
symbolic term (phallus) and a material term (penis).  Lonzi’s conflation of the two 
terms, which is already a linguistic and cultural fact, is not without theoretical 
consequences.  One consequence is that Lonzi inadvertently reproduces the 
ambivalent slippage between phallus and penis, which Lacan, according to Judith 
Butler, creates to construct the signification of the phallus as symbolically linked with 
the penis and, therefore with masculinity.  The relation that phallus and penis 
entertain is purely symbolic, explain Butler in Bodies That Matter, since “the phallus 
symbolizes the penis, and insofar as it symbolizes the penis, retains the penis as that 
                                                 
70 With regard to clitoridectomy it would be helpful to remember that in certain cultures clitoridectomy 
was performed as an initiating ritual of empowerment for girls and the creation of secret societies.  
Conversely its disappearance signaled a lessening of women’s power within these cultures and the 
transition to “more democratic forms of women’s power” (Stanley and Robertson 12).   
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which it symbolizes; it is not the penis” (83).  Lacan is responsible for establishing a 
symbolic relation of necessity between penis and phallus because “the phallus is 
fundamentally dependent upon the penis to symbolize it” (83).  However, given the 
discursive and semantic conflation of penis and phallus in Lonzi’s theory, the penis 
already appears as phallus and thus as as a masculine signifier.  It is not merely that 
which symbolizes it.  It is the phallus with all the powerful discursive implications 
that may assume.  If in Lonzi’s theory the clitoris is equal to the penis and the penis 
symbolizes the phallus, then we may ask whether the clitoris, by virtue of this 
equality, does not come to symbolize the phallus, thus replacing the penis, in its 
symbolizing power.  By recognizing that the penis is not the phallus, Lacan also 
creates, in Butler’s view, the possibility for the detachability of the phallus that is the 
possibility that the phallus be invested symbolically onto parts other than the penis.  
Lonzi may be seen as performing the detachability of the phallus linking it to the 
clitoris rather than the penis, thus divesting the penis of its own symbolic power.  In 
Lonzi’s view, the clitoris produces a new culture of sexuality where the penis no 
longer coincides with the phallus as the following quote suggests:  
La donna clitoridea, affermando una sessualità in proprio il cui funzionamento 
non coincide con la stimolazione del pene, abbandona il pene a se stesso. 
Tutto ciò che riguarda il pene non viene più a coincidere con l’espressione del 
dominio. (La donna 111-112) 
 
[The clitoridean woman relinquishes the penis by affirming her own sexuality 
whose functioning does not coincide with penis stimulation.  Everything that 
pertains to the penis does not come to coincide with the expression of 
domination.] 
  
Lonzi seems to think that embracing a sexuality that can do away with the penis is 
sufficient to eliminate the supposedly oopressive nature of the link penis/phallus.  Yet 
by merely detaching the phallus from the penis and attaching it to the clitoris does not 
help Lonzi to see the dangerous implications of the phallic use of her clitoris.  In fact, 
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in light of the tense female dynamics of the group we can use the equivalence clitoris 
= phallus to understand how the clitoris might have indeed worked in a phallic way 
within the context of women’s relationships.  When I say that the clitoris can work in 
phallic ways I am referring both to the way Lonzi may have used the “clitoris” as a 
tool of control and domination over other women.  She thus embodied a masculine 
model of sociablity that her theory was meant to discard.  In the interview with 
Michèle Causse, Lonzi insists on women’s necessity to move away from all cultural 
influences, thus rejecting all those authorities “da cui si può essere tentati di trarre la 
propria identità” (È già politica 105) [upon which one can be tempted to base her own 
identity].  Although Lonzi claimed no ideological influence, the ambivalent logic of 
the discovery and containment of the clitoris, which pervades the diary, may reveal 
the ideological connotation of the clitoris.  Lonzi’s masculine identification, which I 
mention above, may simply represent a position that a woman, grown up in the 
“cultura del pene,” can embody even in her relationship with other women.  I do not 
want, however, to oversimplify the nature of the female bonds in radical groups, but I 
would like to understand Lonzi’s role also in terms of her complex relation with the 
cultural reception of female sexual autonomy and feminist separatism. 
The donna clitoridea between Semi-visibility and the Rejection of Lesbianism 
In Butler’s essay “The Lesbian Phallus,” the detachability of the phallus has 
important consequences for the ways in which women relate to psychoanalytic 
constructions of gender embodiment since 
to argue that certain body parts or body-like things other than the penis are 
symbolized as ‘having’ the phallus is to call into question the mutually 
exclusive trajectories of castration anxiety and penis envy.  Insofar as women 
might be said to ‘have’ the phallus and fear its loss.  They may be driven by 




Insofar as Lonzi might be seen to have a clitoris/phallus she may be not merely the 
symbolic castrator within the group, but also be the subject of castration anxiety.  It is 
not irrelevant that Lonzi could play a powerful and dominating role within the group 
that was somehow faltering her outside the group.  Lonzi made some radical choices 
for women at the time, even for middle-class women like herself.  She was married 
and had a son.  She also had an established career as art critic, which she then 
relinquished, along with motherhood, to embrace feminism as a cultural mission.71  
Numerous are the passages in which the woman wonders whether she has been a bad 
mother to her son.  The choice of feminism came as a new course of life for a woman 
that was determined to break away from cultural conventions and culturally-
prescribed roles.   
Somehow that radical choice caused insecurities regarding her social 
visibility.  On October 31, 1975 she feels discomfort in seeing her major work 
Sputiamo su Hegel on display at a women’s bookstore in Rome.  She thus comments, 
“La dimensione pubblica non è per me” (1148) [the public sphere is not for me].  
Later, in a letter to a friend (Matilde in the diary) she reinforces the same idea of fear 
of visibility:  
Io mi trovo bene dove sono: questa semi-clandestinità mi è molto congeniale e 
anche questa fase di femminismo…e ho proprio il dubbio che tutti i vantaggi 
di cui mi trovo a godere siano in diretta relazione con questo stato di 
misconoscimento di cui non posso dire che bene. (1152) 
 
[I am comfortable where I am: this semi-clandestine state suits me as well as 
this phase of feminism…I am almost sure that all advantages I am benefiting 
from are are linked with this state of misrecognition that I cannot but praise.]  
 
                                                 
71 Lonzi’s choice is reminiscent of choice of the protagonist of an Italian feminist pioneering text of the 
beginning of the 20th century, Una donna.  In it a middle-class woman unhappy with her marriage 
decides to leave her husband and  son to forge a career as a writer and live by her own means.  The 
differene is that Lonzi never really managed to live on her own means but benefited from the support 
of her lover.    
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Lonzi thus privileges a state of semi-clandestinity as the most beneficial for her.  This 
semi-clandestinity may be seen as an expression of a feminist disengagement with 
culture, the very trait of Lonzi’s radical feminism.  Lonzi and other women’s 
disengagement did not go without problems even within the group.  Lonzi’s desire for 
privacy seems to have raised tensions among the women of her group surrounding the 
creation of an Italian women’s press on the model of the French Éditions des 
femmes.72  Eventually a few women from Rivolta created the “casa editrice fantasma” 
(ghostly press) in order to remain faithful to their “active cultural absence.”  Among 
the mission statements of the women’s press were the “insofferenza a inserirsi nel 
meccanismo distributivo” (È gia politica 95-96) [discomfort with mechanism of 
distribution] and “insofferenza per gli inevitabili contatti diplomatici con esponenti 
della cultura” (95-96) [discomfort towards inevitable official contacts with members 
of the official culture].  Due to this discomfort with cultural assimilation, the women 
reserved themselves the right to use this ghostly editorial space to respond to cultural 
attacks from the press and “stampare anche libri di cui sia rimasto unicamente un 
titolo, una pagina, un rigo, una parola” (95-96) [to put into print books of which only 
a title, a page, a line, a word remained].  In light of the case of the feminine press, I 
have come to understand Lonzi’s praise of semi-clandestinity not merely as a defense 
of privacy, but as a particular discomfort with the assimilation of radical feminism 
into a mainstream cultural discourse: “Adesso c’è una smania di consacrazione del 
femminismo, anzi un atteggiamento promozionale da parte della società” (103) 
[Nowadays there is an urge to consecrate feminism, even a promotional attitude on 
the paart of society.]  This social urge to assimilate feminism is not paired with a deep 
understanding of its reasons, its implications and its effects: “La società ha cominciato 
                                                 
72 This women’s press should have had the name of “Compiuta Donzella” after a Renaissance female 
poet whose work was ignored. 
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ad accettare le premesse del femminismo senza coglierne l’evoluzione da cui quelle 
premesse risultano chiarite” (32).  [Society has begun to accept the premises of 
feminism without understanding the evolution from which such premises are 
clarified.] 
    Lonzi’s dissatisfaction with the social acceptance of feminism stems from the 
conviction that society dismisses the critical role that feminism plays for women 
while casting off a considerable part of it.  In a letter to Julia Kristeva, Lonzi speaks 
of “l’altro femminismo, quello di cui non si parla, di cui non si può parlare perché 
parla da sé, e che vive nei focolai del riconoscimento fra donne ” (1107) [the other 
feminism, the one which is not talked about, cannot be talked about, because it speaks 
for itself, the ones that carves a private space out of women’s mutual recognition].  
Invoking this “other” feminism as hers, Lonzi also accuses those “volenterose che 
intendono renderli competitivi, percio’ visibili, mentre è l’occhio altrui che deve 
cambiare” (1107) [laborious women that would like to make feminism competitive 
and visible, whereas it is the perspective of society towards it that must change].  
Among those “laborious women” against whom Lonzi points her finger are well 
established female writers such as Natalia Ginzburg and Dacia Maraini.73  She also 
                                                 
73 On December 3 1975, Lonzi writes that Dacia Maraini’s Donna in Guerra has been published and 
defined “romanzo compiutamente femminista.”  But Lonzi does not agree with such definition 
precisely because the novel has been published by “l’editore severo Einaudi “Dacia non è mai stata di 
Rivolta.  Non ha partecipato neppure al Manifesto che ha raccolto il primo nucleo, ancora eterogeneo 
di Rivolta.  Al contrario siamo state noi a respingerla in un’assemblea alla casa della cultura di Roma 
quando aveva cercato la nostra adesione su un trattatello di regole per conseguire l’emancipazione, che 
iniziava, se ben ricordo “Donne è Bello”, e proseguiva elencando tutto cio’ che avremmo dovuto 
imparare per essere alla pari con gli uomini, dal fare gli affari al fare la guerra.  Cercava di capeggiare 
la situazione approfittando del caos e adesso cerca di approfittare dello stesso caos per cambiare le 
carte in tavola” (Taci 1175). [Dacia has never been part of Rivolta.  She never even took part in the 
making of the Manifesto around which the first heterogeneous nucleus of Rivolta gathered.  On the 
contrary, we rejected her during a meeting at the House of Culture in Rome when she sought us out to 
sign a small treaty for women’s emancipation.  This treaty, if I recall correctly, started off with 
“Woman is Beautiful,” and proceeded with a list of all things we should have learned in order to be 
equals with men, including businness and war.  She tried to become a leader taking advantager of the 
chaos and now she is trying to profit of the same chaos in order to lay one’s cards on the table.]  
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attacks Elvira Banotti, another feminist who founded a group bearing the same name 
as Lonzi’s group (Vanda in the diary).  Banotti apparently sold to the Italian press the 
idea that Rivolta Femminile was calling for a theory of lesbianism.  Lonzi and the 
women of her group blamed this woman for having come out to  publicize the story 
on sex and encouraged the Italian press to define Rivolta Femminile as a group of 
lesbians.  On this occasion (April 1975) Lonzi reports on her diary that Vanda has 
taken to the extreme consequences the “teoria clitoridea” only to have the work of the 
group discredited by the press.  Lonzi and the other women used their writings to 
publish their reactions to the woman who misrepresented Rivolta and their theory in 
public.  In response to the Italian press misrepresentation of Rivolta, the group 
expressed the following point: 
Rivolta Femminile, come gruppo, non ha fatto scelte ideologiche che 
vincolino l’autenticità individuale, quindi non ha teorizzato il lesbismo come 
“nuovo strumento di guerriglia,” né come come “arma di liberazione.” (114) 
 
[Rivolta Femminile, as a group, did not make ideological choices that could 
constrain the individual expression of authenticity, therefore we have not 
theorized lesbianism as a”new instrument of guerrilla” or as a “weapon for 
liberation.”] 
  
Lonzi and the women in Rivolta see lesbianism as an ideological trap, a cultural 
choice that would constrain rather than liberate women: “Dopo aver scritto la donna 
clitoridea e la donna vaginale sono rimasta confusa nel constatare che veniva preso sia 
nel senso di una normativa sessuale sia nel senso dell’omosessualità programmatica” 
(È già politica 23).  [After having written the “donna clitoridea” and the “donna 
vaginale” I was perplex about founding out that my essay was taken either in the 
sense of a proposed  sexual model or of a programmatic homosexuality.]  Lonzi’s 
uttered reservation about “coming out” seems to depend largely on a fear that her 




ideas may be misconstrued at the expense of the value of their personal experience: 
“Non posso sopportare di essere stata presa come una teorica” (Taci 1234).  [I cannot 
stand stand to be mistaken as a theorist.] 
Lonzi’s resistance to imposed categories here seems quite in contradiction 
with her own categorical distinctions between “clitoridea” and “vaginale.”  Lonzi is at 
once resistant and subject to the use of rhetorical categories for defending an identity 
or warding off the risk of being labeled.  The result of this contradiction, which also 
informs the narrative structure of the diary, is a constant oscillation between a desire 
for clandestinity and a sudden urge for visibility which can ascertain Lonzi’s 
existence as woman and as feminist: “Ho desiderio di diventare cosciente della mia 
presenza e di uscire dalla tentazione di stare fisicamente in un angolo…nasce ex-novo 
il mio bisogno di diventare visibile e di accertarmi che lo sono” (1231).  [I wish to 
become conscious of my presence and of relinquishing the temptation to be physically 
in a corner…there returns my need to become visible and to ascertain my visibility.]  
In this respect, the diary’s narrative delineates the identity of the “donna clitoridea” or 
the radical feminist as an apparitional figure which lingers at the threshold of 
visibility, but one that is never really and completely visible and thus culturally 
intelligible.  Interestingly, Lonzi’s ambivalence towards self visibility manifests in 
repeated and failed attempts to reach and find her own clitoris.  Lonzi reports several 
dreams in which she seems to struggle to identify this body part:  
A un tratto sono senza risorse e vado alla ventura: in un vicolo coperto da 
volte antiche, chiedo a una donna se mi vuole come domestica. Acconsente, 
vado con lei.  Saliamo su una scala esterna e sul pianerottolo all’aperto lei si 
sdraia mollemente e si tira su i vestiti: appare un sesso maschile, grassottello 
come di un ragazzino non ancora sviluppato. Io però cerco di raggiungere la 
clitoride, forse nascosta lì sotto, ma non trovo niente e comunque non mi viene 
bene, mi stanco. C’è Ester, insieme a altre.  Io sto sulle mie, lei mi guarda, alla 
fine qualcosa provoca il mio buon umore e comincio a ridere.  Ester ne 




[Suddenly I am short of resources and I venture out: in a narrow street covered 
with ancient arches I ask a woman if she wants me as her maid.  She agrees 
and I go with her.  We go up an external stair and on the floor she lies down in 
open air lifting up her clothes: a male sexual organ appears, chubby like that 
of a young boy.  I nonetheless try to reach her clitoris, perhaps hidden 
underneath it, but I cannot find anything and I am not good at it anyway, I get 
tired.  Ester is there with the other women.  I keep to myself, she looks at me, 
in the end something stirs a good feeling in me and I start laughing.  Ester 
takes advantage of it to put her finger in my mouth confidentially.]74 
       
The clitoris is still veiled, hidden behind the presence of an encumbering penis that 
prevents Lonzi from finding it.  Lonzi’s recognition that “she’s not good at it” might 
be a symptom of her own internal struggle for visibility and her inability to come to 
terms with her own identity.  It is precisely in the oscillation between clandestinity 
and visibility that the “donna clitoridea” may be culturally interesting.  I am also 
wondering to what extent Lonzi’s inability to reach her own clitoris and her 
ambivalent desire to remain “closeted” may be connected with her open rejection of 
lesbianism and her desire to keep the “donna clitoridea” and the lesbian as distinct 
subjects.  Thus her uttered difficulty in handling the clitoris may as well represent her 
attempt to find in the clitoris a symbolic space of articulation of a queer subjectivity 
that is not necessarily lesbian. 
 Between 1974 and 1975 Lonzi devotes parts of her diary to a reflection on her 
sexual orientations that reveal the woman’s ambivalent positioning vis-à-vis surfacing 
homoerotic feelings.  The diary thus turns into a confessional narrative, or at least into 
an exploration of emotions that create discomfort.  In rereading parts of her diary 
Lonzi thinks back at the nature of her relationship with Sara, one of her dearest 
comrades in Rivolta.  This reflection leads Lonzi and the reader to an unforeseen 
dimension of women’s collective life.  In the years of autocoscienza, Sara and Carla 
                                                 
74 The question mark after the pronoun her indicates the linguistic ambiguity of the passage where it 
seems that Carla Lonzi may also be talking about her own clitoris given the fact that in Italian no 
possessive is used, but a definite article to indicate the possessor of the body part.      
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had a very close relationship, which Lonzi describes, at times, like that of a daughter 
to a mother.  I recount above the mixed feelings that Lonzi had when she discovered 
that women’s bonds were often reproducing familial relations in a destructive manner.  
For this reason I wonder whether interpreting women’s emotional bonds as a 
repetition of the mother-daugther dyad is at all productive as it can negatively affect 
the development and the expression of those ties in ways that depart from that original 
relationship.  The link daughter = mother may be a pernicious mode of reading female 
to female relationality.75   
It is not coincidental that Lonzi assimilates the clitoris to the daughter’s little 
truth, thus equating the clitoris with the daughter and the vagina with the mother.  Her 
investment in the clitoris binds her to an eternal dialectic between herself (the 
daughter) and the vaginal woman (the mother) or between herself (the women’s group 
mother) and the daughters (Sara and others).  In parts of her diary, then, Lonzi 
perceives mother-daugther bond as the structuring bond among women with the 
disastruous effects earlier recalled; in other parts, Lonzi can also retrace the 
complicity among women with a different emotional quality, a queer quality: 
“Rileggo il mio diario qua e là e ho questa impressione: che il calore delle mie 
                                                 
75 In her essay on the psychomorpholgy of the clitoris, Traub demonstrates that the refusal of the girl to 
relinquish her affective bond with the mother is another important corollary to Freudian theory of 
clitoridian sexuality so that “lesbians fail to follow the dictates of culture, narcissistically remaining 
attached to anatomy and mother” (189).  What Traub brilliantly uncovers behind the pair 
clitoris/lesbian is the presence of another pernicious pair, mother/daughter, which the construction of 
clitoridian sexuality à la Freud reproduces. From the 1970s on, Italian feminists have been quite 
invested theoretically in the mother-daughter relationship, a bond that has even structured the relations 
among the women of the Diotima group (through the practice of entrustment) and has represented the 
founding model for Italian feminism (see Luisa Muraro’s L’ordine simbolico della madre).  It is not the 
scope of my chapter to investigate the feminist and heterosexist implications of the reproduction of a 
maternal model within feminism; but I would like to highlight that one possible danger has been that of 
obscuring lesbianism as an emotional, social and political bond among women  that has nothing to do 




giornate era la presenza di Sara dentro di me” (983). [I am rereading my diary here 
and there and I have the following impression: the presence of Sara in me warmed up 
my days.]  This warm sensation becomes more acute in a dream in which Lonzi 
speaks of her attachement to Sara in homoerotic terms: “Siamo molto amiche, c’è 
un’intesa quasi omosessuale tra noi, viene fuori con una dolcezza prima sconosciuta” 
(1028).  [We are close freinds, there is a bond that is almost homosexual between us, 
it comes out with tenderness thus far unknown.]  Obviously the emotional quality of 
the bond, which the group internal struggles suffocated in the first part of the diary, 
re-emerges here to redefine Carla’s relationship to Sara from a different perspective.  
Lonzi’s involvement in the relation surfaces as a feeling that is almost homosexual, 
but not quite.  There is a provocatively queer connection to be made between Lonzi’s 
programmatic rejection of lesbianism and the almost acknowledgement of her own 
homosexual feelings.  This connection foregrounds a palpable tension already noticed 
between visibility and secrecy.  On the one hand, Lonzi takes pride in declaring that 
“nel femminismo è scoppiata l’omosessualità ma non nel nostro gruppo” (820) 
[homosexuality has broken into feminism except in our group].  On the other hand, 
she finds herself dreaming about her homoerotic complicity with Sara, and even more 
explicitly, about making love with a woman: “Faccio l’amore con una ragazza, 
prendo l’iniziativa, sono arrivata al suo sesso, era tutto molto eccitante e naturale.  
Penso ‘è questo, dunque, ho spiccato il salto’ provo un moto di liberazione” (842). [I 
am making love with a girl, I am taking the initiative, I reached her sex, everything 
was so natural and exciting.  I think ‘this is it, I took a leap’ I feel liberated.]  The 




Lonzi projects the emergence of queer feelings onto other people as in the 
following dream: “Abbraccio un tale con amore, una tenerezza inspiegabili, 
dolcissimi” (973). [I hug a man with inexplicable love and sweet feelings of 
tenderness.]  This oniric vision, for instance, is followed by a reflection on the man’s 
homosexuality, “una parte di me che ritrovo dopo tanto tempo, pena e fatica” (973) [a 
part of me that I recover with difficulty after a long time].  Lonzi also acknowledges 
the presence of a homoerotic desire that subtends some of the bonds among women.  
The diary, as the place of homosociality, is also functional to the inscription of 
emerging homoerotic feelings and Lonzi’s struggle to understand them.  Although 
Lonzi rejects the lesbian label she nonetheless engages in reflections on how to 
become homosexual: “Per diventare omosessuale occorrono due condizioni: una 
disponibilità interiore completa e poi non ricordo bene, ma doveva essere 
l’abbandono al piacere, no, più che l’abbandono è la coscienza non tacerselo più” 
(961).  [To become homosexual two conditions are needed: a complete willingness 
and then. I can’t recall well, but it must have been yielding to pleasure, or rather, to 
consciousness, in other words not to hide it to oneself.]  This passage skillfully mixes 
notions that are dear to Lonzi’s articulation of “donna clitoridea”: pleasure, 
consciousness, and dissimulation.  The three come together here to signify Lonzi’s 
complex relation to sexuality, and her resistence to labelling desire into definite 
categories.  Avoidance becomes therefore strategic in her approach:    
Mi accorgo quanta parte del mio pensiero e del mio comportamento era 
adibita a schivare o a mimetizzare l’espressione diretta di me: anche nel 
femminismo e negli scritti femministi mi mantenevo in incognito. (13) 
 
[I realize how much of my thought and my behavior were meant to avoid or 
hide the direct expression of myself to the extent that in my approach to 




Lonzi felt that feminism and her feminist writings were the place of self-avoidance, 
the space where the self does not properly express itself, but lingers in incognito: 
Non ho più paura dell’omosessualità perché non rischio più la perdita 
d’identità, la soggezione, la dipendenza da un’altra simile a me.  Posso 
cogliere la differenza nella somiglianza e non temere la differenza.  (963) 
 
[I do no longer fear homosexuality because I do not risk losing my identity, I 
do not risk being subjected to someone else, being dependent on someone 
similar to me.  I can see the difference in the similarity and no longer fear that 
difference.] 
  
In Lonzi’s understanding of homosexuality there was an assumption that women may 
live, under the banner of homosexuality, bonds of subjection and dependence.  In 
other words, women would just replicate the heterosexist relations they had 
experienced within the family.  We can understand Lonzi’s rejection of lesbianism as 
a fear that lesbianism may be subsumed into a heterosexist frame (relation of 
dependence) and thus result in a further loss of identity for those women who desire 
women. 
There is yet another intriguing aspect about Lonzi’s articulation of queer 
sexuality or female queerness.  I am referring to her double fascination with 
masculinity and with male homosexuality.  It is not a coincidence that, at one point, 
Lonzi states that being a feminist fulfills a need for reconciliation with the masculine 
side of oneself (“bisogno di riconciliazione con l’aspetto maschile in sé” [930]).  
Without going into further detail here I should just anticipate that from this 
ambivalent site of masculine identification Lonzi interpellates Pier Paolo Pasolini, 
speaking to him like a brother to a brother: “Pasolini è il fratello interdetto, il 
maschile che la donna può sentire parte di sé” (93). [Pasolini is the proscribed brother, 
the masculine that the woman can feel as part of her own self.]  What is that strange 
sense of solidarity and brotherhood that Lonzi feels towards Pasolini?  This is a 
question I want to pursue in the next chapter dedicated to the queer connections 
123 
 
between gay theorists and feminists in the 1970s.  This investigation will also 
complicate my present discussion of Lonzi’s rejection of lesbian denomination and 
her readings of gender.  My next chapter will engage Lonzi’s failed attempt to reach 
out to Pasolini’s own queerness.  I will analyze a few letters contained in Lonzi’s 
diary and addressed to Pasolini as they reprent the space for Lonzi’s inscription of her 
own feminist and queer masculinity.  I conceive of this envisioned but failed 
correspondence as an unforeseen queer relationship.   
I started this chapter with a song, “La leggenda di Clotiride” that portrays the 
sudden discovery of female homoeroticism and sexual autonomy as part of the socio-
symbolic practice of autocosciemza.  The sudden and unforeseen appearance of 
Clitoris behind Clotiris was the object of social discomfort in the masculine culture of 
the 1970s, in which women experienced their sexual emancipation with feelings of 
unease and shame: “La femme a rapidement accès au discourse révolutionnaire, 
théorique mais elle a la plus grosse difficulté à mettre en pratique son désir et à le 
communiquer” (Lapouge and Causse 425).  [Women have rapid access to the 
theoretical revolutionary discourse, but they have the most difficulty in putting into 
practice their desire and in communicating it.]  The discovery of the clitoris signals 
the creation of a culture of sexual autonomy that represents an alternative response to 
the “cultura del pene” and its disavowal of women’s sexuality as a discursive 
excision. While the clitoris signified a site of a new consciousnees, it furthermore 
pointed to the tensions, the desires, the contradictions, the endeavors and the limits of 
a separatist discourse of feminism and female relationality.  Lonzi’s theoretical work 
and her diary powerfully condense all these dynamic aspects of the culture of radical 
feminism.  To the extent to which the “donna clitoridea” embodies this heterogeneous 
reality, it is far from being a unified and stable identity label.  Lonzi’s diary as the 
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narrative inscription of the “donna clitoridea” can thus be read in multiple ways: as a 
fiction of a self struggling and ultimately deconstructing the presumed authenticity it 
was meant to embody; as a testimonial of the power dynamics that structured the life 
of a female group; c. as the creation of a queer feminist subject based on the 
simultaneous rejection and rereading of a sexual narrative that links the clitoris to 
lesbianism.  Perhaps the unforeseen queer component of the “donna clitoridea” (the 
“soggetto imprevisto” as Lonzi calls her) lies in the liminal space of semi-visibility 
that distinguishes her at once from the “donna vaginale” and the lesbian.  It was from 
that liminal space that the “donna clitoridea” engaged and broke off (to use Monique 














Revolutionary Embraces: Queer Excisions and Erotic Communism in the 1970s 
 
 
Guy Hocquenghem’s 1970s motto that, seen from behind, everybody is equal 
is witty and provoking.  Just as provocative is his revolutionary theory in favor of a 
libidinal investment in the anus as the newly rediscovered space, physical and 
symbolic, of free-flowing undifferentiated desire.  In his motto and his theory, which 
the late gay French thinker laid out in his major work Le désir homosexuel (1972), 
Hocquenghem envisioned an alternative way of experiencing sexuality and sociality 
that he called “communisme érotique.”76  To those familiar with queer theory and its 
French influences Hocquenghem’s name is perhaps not new.  A translation of Le 
désir homosexuel began to circulate in the US with an enthusiastic preface by queer 
author Jeffrey Weeks and Michael Moon who considered Hocquenghem one of the 
pre-cursors of queer studies US-style.  Perhaps also the similarity between 
Hocqueghem and US queer theory derives from a common Foucaultian heritage.  
Hocquenghem’s text is chronologically anterior to the publication of La volonté de 
savoir (History of Sexuality vol.1) and anticipated some of Foucault’s main concerns.  
Hocquenghem’s theoretical sources are wide and diversified and encompass Freud 
and post-Freudian theorists Deleuze and Guattari among the others.  Hocquenghem 
                                                 
76 A few years later in Italy Mario Mieli reappropriated this term and notion to theorize his own 
peculiar version of “comunismo erotico.”   I will deal with his work later in the chapter. 
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has been object of critical attention, namely on the part of gay male critics, including 
Bill Marshall and Larry Schehr.77  Feminist critics have, however, largely ignored his 
work.  I intend to fill this gap left by feminist and queer criticism by offering a queer 
feminist reading of Le Désir Homosexuel.  My reading of Hocquenghem’s work 
provides me with a theoretical frame within which to engage the discursive tensions 
that surrounded definitions of sexuality and gender identity in the Italian and French 
gay and feminist movements of the 1970s.  The practices and discourses that 
originated within these movements constituted a body of texts and of theories that 
used body parts as a place for theorizing.  The theories that derive from such an 
engagement with the body are the objects of investigation and critique of this chapter.   
By drawing connections and contrasting with the feminist creation of a 
gender-specific dimension of sexuality and desire and the gay theoretical stance on 
the gender undifferentiated character of desire, I emphasize the implicit heterosexism 
of some 1970s gay and feminist theory.  The first part of this chapter is devoted to a 
feminist queer critique of Guy Hocqueghem’s construction of a universal 
undifferentiated mode of desire located in the anus; it continues into a contrastive 
reading of Luce Irigaray’s female homoerotic utopia focused the labia and of 
Hocqueghem’s sexual utopia around the anus.  The second part of the chapter 
expands on the previous chapter’s discussion of Carla Lonzi’s notion of symbolic 
clitoridectomy with Mario Mieli’s “educastrazione” (educastration) in order to 
interrogate the inscription of female queerness through the modes of male queerness.  
I characterize this gay and feminist discursive mode in terms of queer discursive 
excision and I expand on the theoretical construction of the “donna clitoridea” (ch. 2) 
                                                 
77 A collection of essays titled Désir Hocquenghem appeared in 2009 in France. 
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by engaging Lonzi’s reading of her own queerness through a failed correspondence 
(literal and metaphorical) with Pier Paolo Pasolini’s homosexuality. 
Hocquenghem’s Desire and Sexual Difference 
   In Le désir homosexuel Hocquenghem argues that there cannot be such a thing 
as a homosexual desire since desire cannot be categorized.  Desire simply exists 
regardless of categories of sexuality: “Désir homosexual: ces termes ne vont pas de 
soi.  Il n’y a pas de subdivision du désir entre homosexualité et hétérosexualité.  Il n’y 
a pas plus au sens propre de désir homosexuel que de désir hétérosexuel” 
(Hocquenghem 24). [Homosexual desire: the expression is meaningless.  There is no 
subdivision of desire into homosexuality and heterosexuality.  Properly speaking, 
desire is no more homosexual than heterosexual (50).]  Hocqueghem considers the 
distinction between homosexual and heterosexual desire an “arbitrarily frozen frame” 
(50) [“découpage arbitraire” (24)] “a manufactured product of the normal world” (50) 
[“une fabrication du monde normal” (26)].  More importantly, anticipating Foucault, 
he conceives of desire as the production of a repressive mechanism (a mechanism that 
operates equally in the State’s institutions and within the family) which seeks to 
isolate and determine proper and improper manifestations of desire.  The result is a 
constant persecution of the public manifestation and practice of homosexual desire, of 
which, according to Hocquenghem, all regulatory institutions are suffused:  
On trouvera la plus grande charge d’homosexualité dans les machines sociales 
particulièrement anti-homosexuelles: l’armée, l’école, l’Église, le sport, etc.  
Au niveau collectif, la sublimation en question constitue le moyen de 
transformer le désir en désir de répression. (58) 
 
[We find the greatest charge of latent homosexuality in those social machines 
which are particularly anti-homosexual the army, the school, the church, 
sport, etc.  At the collective level, this sublimation is a means of transforming 




It is the desire for repression that engenders the categorization of desire.  
Hocquenghem holds the post-freudian theorists responsible for the simultaneous 
discovery of desire and its control.  However, Freud himself was the first one to have 
envisioned desire, in his theory of sexuality, in a way that extends beyond sexual 
difference (the polymorphous perverse).  By claiming that “le désir ignore les 
decoupages scientifiques” (64) [desire ignores scientific divisions (75)], 
Hocquenghem sets out to demonstrate how desire escapes categorization by its very 
nature.  He does so by returning to that bodily place where the discharge of libido is 
most controlled in society: the anus.  In phallic terms, the anus is the “siège d’une 
production mystérieuse et personnelle, la production excrémentielle” (98) [site of a 
mysterious and private kind of production: that is, excremental production (98)].  It is 
therefore proper that men should keep their anuses under control.  In fact the control 
of the functions of the anus ensures a correct sociability and a normative sexuality, 
organized around the phallus, the only dispenser of pleasure and desire.  
 By recognizing the anus as the major site of the repression of desire and of 
social organization, a repression he calls “anal sublimation,” Hocquenghem urges the 
subversion of the phallic construction of desire precisely by “de-sublimating the 
anus.”  De-sublimating the anus means extngend universally its use to a libidinal one, 
which is, for the theorist, contemplated only by male homosexuals.  The anus should 
thus go from being a secretive site of shameful discharge to the public site of the free-
flowing desire, which prefigures in turn, a return to a polymorphous perverse model 
of sexuality.  If, as he says, seen from behind everybody is equal, everybody should 
consider the erotic importance of the anus in destabilizing the phallic constraint over 
sexual categories and the experience of desire.  Is anal de-sublimation and the 
extended libidinal use of the anus enough to get rid of categories of desire?  Is 
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Hocquenghem’s anus really so indiscriminate and equal as he sets it out to be?  My 
suspicion is that by universalizing the anus and claiming the undifferentiated nature of 
desire Hocquenghem fails to recognize that desire does not pre-exist its cultural and 
discursive constitution and is not exempt from sexual and social differentiation.  
Hocquenghem’s claim that desire knows no difference lies precisely on 
Hocqueghem’s insistence that desire can transcend categories when in fact desire and 
its categorization, as his book paradoxically shows are simultaneously constituted.  
However, by acting as if desire were not to be impacted by social and sexual 
difference, Hocquenghem produces some interesting theorizing points at least from a 
feminist standpoint.    
Since the beginning of his work, Hocquenghem himself categorizes desire, 
and thus excludes some people from the experience of it: 
On partira ici de ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler ‘l’homosexualité masculine’.  
Non que la différence des sexes aille de soi: elle sera finalement mise en 
cause.  Mais l’organisation du désir que nous subissons est fondée sur la 
domination masculine, et c’est d’abord la construction imaginaire œdipienne 
de l’homosexualité masculine qu’on désigne sous le terme de 
“homosexualité.” (23) 
 
[We shall start with what is commonly known as ‘male homosexuality.’  This 
does not mean that the difference in the sexes goes without saying; on the 
contrary, it must in the end be questioned.  But the organisation of desire to 
which we submit is based on male domination, and the term ‘homosexuality” 
refers first and foremost to the imaginary Oedipal construction of male 
homosexuality. (49)]  
  
The subjects excluded are the women who do not participate in the economy of desire 
so strictly linked with the construction of male homosexuality, in Hocquenghem’s 
view.  Why then set up the goal to demonstrate and construct an idea of 
undifferentiated desire if some categories are excluded?  Isn’t a quick dismissal of 
female desire an implicit way to recognize (without knowing it) that desire can and 
should be differentiated?  Or is simply the reiteration of a misogynist view that denies 
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women access to desire and pleasure?  The simple dismissal of women from the 
economy of desire is in contradiction with the theorists’ claims. 
Hocquenghem’s dismissal of female desire is not coincidental.  It is rooted in 
the cultural dynamics of FHAR (Front Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire) and in 
the discourse of sexualization of desire post 1968.  Fresh from the events of May `68, 
Hocquenghem became the charismatic leader of FHAR.  This radical movement of 
both female and male homosexuals attempted to create a new language to convey its 
chief goal: a social revolution through the sexualization of society.  Members of 
FHAR viewed the Oedipal structure of society and the control of sexual relations 
imposed by capitalism as obstacles to the free-flowing expression of desire.  The 
FHAR, which French sociologist Frédéric Martel qualifies as a “cocktail de paradoxes 
et d’eccentricité” (36), produced in its short life (1971-1974) two manifestos: Rapport 
contre la normalité and Trois milliards de pervers, both appearing in the journal 
Recherche.  According to the same Martel, despite the initial fervor of FHAR 
members, the impact of the movement on the history of the period is hard to 
determine.  With time FHAR became more of a “backroom en pleine lumière” in 
which sex took over political and social aims.  But that FHAR remains in the cultural 
memory of many in France and Europe is a significant fact.  On the one hand, the 
movement represented a confessional phenomenon, according to Martel, the site of 
“la parole multiple” (37).  On the other hand, it successfully achieved the entrance of 
the personal into the political: making homosexuality a public matter, FHAR created a 
public space where sex and language collided to convey a form of cultural opposition 
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to frozen heterosexual identities.78  It was in this effervescent climate of cultural, 
social, and sexual exchange that Hocquenghem wrote Le désir homosexuel.   
The climate of exchange within FHAR did not come without its tensions.  
FHAR included both male and female homosexuals, but their coexistence was far 
from harmonious.  The lesbians of FHAR were concerned with the different rhetorical 
and social use that some male homosexuals at FHAR made of desire, which 
reinforced rather than questioned female oppression.  Lesbians accused their male 
comrades of focusing exclusively on male desire.79  Tensions eventually led to a split 
within FHAR, along the lines of sexual difference and the experience of sexuality: 
“Guy Hocqueghem reconnaît que la dérive libidineuse du FHAR a été une source de 
désaccord.  Certaines lesbiennes accusent précisément l’homosexualité masculine 
d’être un concentré de machisme” (Martel 57).  [Guy Hocquenghem recognizes that 
the libidinal drift of the FHAR has been a source of disagreement...certain lesbians 
accuse male homosexuals of being overt misogynists.]  A couple of facts are at stake 
here: on the one hand there was the unwillingness of male homosexuals to conceive 
of women as desiring subjects; on the other hand there may have been a dismissal of 
the feminine component of gay subjectivity which I will later explore through Mieli’s 
notion of “educastrazione.”  Both of these phenomena accounted for the persistence 
of phallogocentrism, even among gay men like Hocquenghem who claimed to exist 
and theorize beyond sexual difference. 
                                                 
78 “Ni identitaire, ni réformateur, ni antidiscriminatoire, le FHAR a choisi un mode révolutionnaire 
refusant l’assignation des homosexuels à une identité: ton que ne sera pas toujours conserver le 
mouvement homosexuel en France” (Martel 39) [FHAR is neither identitarian, nor reformist, nor 
antidiscriminatory and has chosen a revolutionary mode that refuses to inscribe homosexuals into 
identity : the French homosexual movement will not always be able to preserve such a mode.]  
79 They even went as far as attacking the Gazolines–a group of effeminate men–for performing what 
the lesbians thought were essentialized feminine roles. 
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Ho(m)mosexuality and the Hatred of Woman 
I mention above that Hocquenghem excludes women’s desire from his own 
work on the premise that the capitalist economy is concerned with the repression of 
male homoerotic desire.  One can surely recognize in this argument Luce Irigaray’s 
notion of ho(m)mo-sexualité–formulated after her readings of Lévi-Strauss–that she 
used to explain the lack of cultural representations of women’s desire.  In Ce sexe qui 
n’en est pas un (1977) Irigaray coins the term to describe heterosexuality as the 
circulation of repressed male homoerotic desire in which men exchange women and 
women are only the commodities of this sublimated exchange.  Feminists scholars 
have criticized hom(m)osexuality for its implicit heterosexism, but a more pointed 
criticism, it seems to me, is not so much that the idea that the desiring economy is 
male-oriented, but that the all-female economy that Irigaray envisions for women, a 
rediscovery of their own multiple libidinal dimension, is no less hegemonic or 
phallogocentric than the ho(m)mosexual exchange network.80   
Since for Irigaray women are unrepresentable in the phallic economy, she sets 
out to imagine a different and alternative economy of desire and pleasure in which 
women become at once subjects and objects of the exchange.  The figure that Irigary 
uses to signify and identify this alternative all-female dimension is the vaginal lips, 
impenetrable locus of female jouissance, and site of women’s perpetual contact with 
themselves and their own bodies (as the physiognomy of the labia suggests).  Critics’ 
                                                 
80 In Lesbian Utopics Annemarie Jagose critiques Irigaray’s extradiscursive construction of a female 
homosexual symbolic as opposed to the phallocentric all-masculine economy of the same which she 
calls hom (m)o-sexuality.  Targeting Irigaray’s attempt to reimagine a notion of true and authentic 
femininity using a body part, the vaginal lips, strategically positioned as an outside, and her presumed 
project to undermine the logic of sameness and difference on which traditional notion of the masculine 
and the feminine are constructed, Jagose shows that Irigaray in fact ends up reproducing the same logic 




positions differ with regard to how Irigaray’s discursive strategies work towards 
essentializing femininity.  For example queer scholar Annemarie Jagose takes the 
labia as an instance of the representation of female homosexuality.  However she 
considers problematic the association between the latter and a bodily surface, the lips 
since such an association implicitly casts the lesbian outside of language and 
representation.  In Jagose’s view, Irigaray’s discursive move contributes to recreating 
the binary between a male homosexuality (as identity, an inside) and a female one (as 
non identity, an outside).  Irigaray collapses, Jagose contends, the notions of 
homosexuality and hom(m)osexuality showing that female homosexual is merely a 
female reversal of a phallic economy of the same.  Less radical are the critiques of 
Naomi Schor, Judith Butler, and Rosi Braidotti.  These three insist on seeing 
Irigaray’s construction of a particular feminine and her “parler-femme” not merely as 
an imperialist reappropriation of the logic of sameness, but a subversive mimicry (or 
mimesis) of it.  For Schor, the strength of Irigaray’s work is in its demonstration that 
women always already speak within a masculine and misogynist language.  Yet they 
simply do it from a specific particular standpoint.  The rhetorical construction of the 
labia has never been prediscursive or extradiscursive, but a smart and subversive 
manipulation of the phallus.  While agreeing with this last interpretation of Irigaray’s 
work, my concern is not to dispute the construction of a specifically feminine 
dimension in Irigaray, but rather to put it into contact with another theoretical 
elaboration of language and desire that should allow me to deconstruct the presumed 
universalist and heterosexist construction of Hocqunghem’s anus.  Feminist and queer 
approaches will help me in my three main goals: first to expose the misogynist 
construction of the anus, second to demonstrate the theoretical specularity of the two 
organs, labia and anus, and third to reterritorialize the anus as a possible queer 
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feminist site of opposition to a heteronormative construction of gender and sexuality.  
I will argue that all these parts are intimately embedded in a common discourse of 
opposition to a model of sexuality and desire that is based on reproduction. 
  For Hocquenghem, the anus is still a prohibited site of desire and pleasure for 
many, even among homosexuals.  He contends that the desiring use of the anus, if not 
exclusive to male homosexuals, is at least central to male homosexuality: [“S’il n’est 
exclusif, l’usage désirant que fait l’homosexualité de l’anus est du moins principal” 
(98-99).]  “Les homosexuels,” he continues, “sont seuls à faire un usage libidinal 
constant de cette zone” (98) [Only homosexuals make such constant libidinal use of 
this zone (98).]  Given Hocqueghem’s own definition of homosexuality as exclusively 
male, he also restricts the desiring use of the anus to gay men.  This discursive 
strategy becomes evident in his association between anal desire and homosexuality 
(99).  Yet this association between male homosexuality and the anus is also 
responsible for a certain phallic construction of the homosexual as a femme manquée, 
a construction that Hocquenghem disputes in his work.   
Within the phallogocentric system, explains the theorist, the phallus dispenses 
the identity that homosexuals are considered to lack.  More specifically, what 
homosexuals lack is “woman,” the sexual object that makes heterosexuality the 
normal and complete sexuality:    
L’homosexualité sera donc définie par son manque.  Elle ne constituera plus 
l’une des spécifications hasardeuses d’un désir polyvoque, mais sera posée 
comme haine de la femme en tant que seul objet sexuel social.  
L’hétérosexualité est “pleine” face à une homosexualité qui manque l’objet 
essentiel du désir. (67) 
 
[Homosexuality is thus defined by its lack. It is no longer one of the accidental 
specifications of a polyvocal desire, but is assumed to signify hatred of 
woman, who is the only social sexual object.  Heterosexuality is “full,” as 




In relation to heterosexuality, “woman” is the only desirable object, socially accepted; 
therefore in relation to homosexuality, “woman” is a missing object.  In relation to the 
“woman,” instead, homosexuals are devoid of an object or else, “l’accès de la femme 
est fermé à l’homosexuel du fait de son histoire familiale” (68) [the homosexual is 
denied access to woman because of his family history (78)].   This lack of “woman” 
explains why homosexuals develop a sadistic posture towards women (“haine de la 
femme”) as they fear the sense of lack that women recall and the homosexuals’ 
inability to access or to penetrate women (impotence).  Yet such inability can also 
correspond to the homosexuals’ refusal to comply with an order of heterosexual 
reproduction that women may evoke.  Within this order, being in relation to the 
Phallus means to be either object or subject, Woman or Man.  Where to place 
homosexuals?  Homosexuals are constantly reduced to the status of objects, continues 
Hocqueghem.  They are, in a sense, feminized.  This reduction of the homosexual into 
an object also results in the perception of homosexuals as “fake women” as the 
following passage exemplifies:  
La soudure entre les comportements et le choix se traduit ici par la 
transformation de l’homosexuel en substitut de femme, puisqu’il tente de se 
constituer en objet du désir hétérosexuel alors qu’il en est le sujet “naturel”.  
Qu’un homme efféminé ne soit pas nécessairement une “femme” dans l’acte 
sexuel ne change rien à cette construction arbitraire mais solide.  
L’homosexuel est un “leurre” de femme, une image d’image, puisque la 
femme n’est elle-même constituée en seul objet sexuel que par le jeu de 
l’imaginaire. (134)   
 
[The soldering together of behavior and choice is expressed in this case by the 
transformation of the homosexual into a substitute woman, through his attempt 
to constitute himself as an object of heterosexual desire when he is actually its 
‘natural’ subject. The homosexual is an artificial woman, the image of an 
image, since the woman herself is constituted as the sole sexual object only 
through the play of the imaginary. (120)] 
 
Here Hocquenghem invokes women to explain how the homosexual passes as a 
counterfeited woman, the image of an image, “un leurre de femme,” an idea that 
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seems to anticipate more recent notions of gender identity.  However, what 
Hocquenghem rejects is the idea that a homosexual may simply be a substitute for a 
woman, or an object, specifying that an effeminate man is not necessarily a woman in 
the sexual act.  What may Hocquenghem have meant by that statement?  In my 
understanding Hocqueghem means that a homosexual, precisely because of a lack of 
better representation, cannot simply be taken as the passive recipient, the vaginal man, 
the sexual object.  But such a categorization occurs because everything needs to be 
redeployed in terms of subjects vs. objects, within the schema of an Oedipal sexuality.  
As a consequence, the homosexual man is essentialized and ends up being defined as 
the woman he is not, as the woman-object he does not have.  Because of this 
supposed lack, the gay man is supposed to become, always in phallic terms, a woman-
hater.  Yet, I don’t think Hocquenghem is the woman-hater that phallic representation 
would want him to be.  He is less annoyed by women than by their objectification, 
which also burdens definitions of gay identity.   
This is where the anus comes into play.  Hocquenghem proposes its desiring 
use in an effort to circumvent the reproduction of normative sexual categories and the 
essentialization of homosexuality.  Building simultaneously on Freud, Deleuze, and 
Guattari, he aims to overthrow the exclusionary construction of Oedipal sexuality 
(based on object choice and indirect experience of pleasure) and replace it with anal 
pre-oedipal sexuality (based on the direct and non-exclusive connections of organs).  
The rhetorical strategies he sets in place are quite interesting, but questionable.  While 
discussing the process of desublimation and the active function of the anus, 
Hocquenghem warns his readers not to confuse the vagina with the anus.  He clearly 
states, “L’anus n’est pas le substitut du vagin: les femmes en bénéficient aussi bien 
que les hommes” (106-107).  [The anus is not a substitute for the vagina: women have 
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one as well as men (103).]  However, this reasoning is built on an impossible sexual 
analogy between mismatched and contradictory elements: it puts together an internal 
element, traditionally conceived as site of penetration (the vagina) with a surface 
element (the anus).  The latter, although it may be penetrated, is also somewhat 
resistant to it.  Moreover, the combination between an outside and an inside 
reproduces a dichotomy that Hocquenghem is actually attacking, the one between 
public and private.  Wouldn’t the rectum be the equivalent of the vagina?  Are not the 
labia the equivalent of the anus?  Why should Hocquenghem establish such an odd 
analogy only to later reject it?  From a strictly feminist point of view, the analogy 
with the vagina has the unpleasant consequence of considering only one type of 
female sexuality, namely the vaginal and reproductive one, although the gay theorist 
acknowledges that women are not sexually unfamiliar with the anus.  By focusing on 
the vagina, Hocquenghem neglects a form of sexuality and desire that finds its 
expression in the vulva, a non-penetrative and non-reproductive site of female desire 
and pleasure.  We may say that the theorist’s dismissal of a vulvo-morphic dimension 
of female sexuality corresponds to a denial of one particular, but not exclusive mode 
of lesbian desire and sexuality.  This dismissal might be due to Hocqueghem’s 
exclusive focus on the anus to construct desire beyond categories of gender and 
sexuality as he himself reiterates: “La rencontre avec le désir est d’abord l’oubli de la 
différence sexuelle” (149).  [To encounter desire is first of all to forget the difference 
in the sexes (130).]  As a consequence, his theory of desire remains blind to its 
obliterating and exclusionary effects.  Perhaps Hocqueghem’s neglect of the female 
vulvomorphic libidinal dimension may also hint at his own inability to envision 
sexuality outside penetration, which goes against Hocqueghem’s own idea of a 
polymorphous or polyvocal sexuality and desire.  What would it mean to restore 
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sexual difference into Hocqueghem’s theory of desire?  How would Hocquenghem’s 
queer approach dialogue with a feminist one? 
When the Anus Meets the Lips or Phallus Resistance 
Looking back at Hocquenghem’s own confusion, what Hocquenghem actually 
confuses is vagina and vulva, the other sexual “outsider” upon which Irigaray builds 
her all-female economy of desire.  Hocquenghem’s confusion has a couple of 
productive discursive effects: one is that it constructs the anus, unlike the vagina, not 
as a site of penetration, but as one that can resist penetration and thus rejects the 
possibility of reproduction.  What if the anus were to be put, so to speak, side by side 
with the vulva and the vaginal lips?  The fact that Hocquenghem did not consider the 
physical proximity between anus and vulva may be further evidence that his corporeal 
paradigm is male-centered.   
In Irigaray’s essay “Quand nos lèvres se parlent” [“When Our Lips Speak 
Together”] the labia/lips evoke both an all-feminine eroticism and an alternative 
discourse of femininity.  The lips/labia are a vehicle not so much of words, but of 
desire.  Irigaray is suspicious of the language that represents phallic enunciation by 
means of separating, categorizing and quantifying.  The word (“le mot”)–which we 
may think of as Word–is “oubli des lèvres” (Ce sexe 208), while the lips represent the 
resistance to speaking someone else’s word–the masculine word.  Irigaray thus 
envisions a space of desire configured through the image of labial embraces that, by 
virtue of a shared materiality, convey a language of undivided female love and shared 
desire [“je t’aime: corps partagé” (206)] [I love you: body shared, undivided (206)].  
Lips, as they touch, become inseparable and create a barrier that resists the 
penetrating power of the word and makes them mute to it: 
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Tu/je ne sommes ni ouvertes ni fermées.  Ne nous séparant jamais, 
simplement: un seul mot ne peut être prononcé.  Être produit, sorti de nos 
bouches.  Entre tes/mes lèvres plusieurs chants, plusieurs dires, toujours se 
répondent.  Sans que l’un, l’une, soit jamais séparable de l’autre. (208-09).  
  
[We you/I are neither open nor closed.  We never separate simply: a single 
word  cannot be pronounced, produced, uttered by our mouths.  Between our 
lips, yours and mine, several voices, several ways of speaking resound 
endlessly, back and forth.  One is never separable from the other (209).]  
      
Between them barriers do not exist, but a constant movement of closure and 
disclosure, of free exchange.  Lips are no longer there to delimit a threshold between 
inside and outside; they do not represent a feminine cast off; they simply make 
borders meaningless, creating the unbound space of extension:    
Embrasse-moi. Deux lèvres embrassant deux lèvres: l’ouvert nous est rendu.  
Notre “monde”.  Et le passage du dedans au dehors, du dehors au dedans, 
entre nous est sans limites.  Sans fin.  Échanges qu’aucune boucle, aucune 
bouche, n’arrête jamais.  Entre nous, la maison n’a plus de mur, la clarrière de 
cloture, le langage de circularité.  Tu m’embrasses le monde est si grand qu’il 
en perd tout horizon. (209) 
 
[Kiss me.  Two lips kissing two lips: openness is ours again.  Our “world.”  
And the passage from the inside out, from the outside in, the passage between 
us, is limitless.  Without end.  No knot or loop, no mouth ever stops our 
exchanges.  Between us the house has not wall, the clearing no enclosure, 
language non circularity.  When you kiss me, the world grows so large that the 
horizon itself disappears. (210)] 
     
The limitless space is the overextended space that the labial embrace produces.  The 
embrace thus becomes the site of exchange between inside and outside, in which 
“l’érection, ce n’est pas notre affaire” (212) [erection is no business of ours (213)]. 
Therefore penetration may not be required or desired.                                            
           Penetration is not there to define a kind of womanhood and create a rupture, so 
to speak, between virginity and non-virginity.  “Il n’y a pas, entre nous, de rupture 
entre vierge et non vierge” (210) [Between us, there’s no rupture between virginal and 
nonvirginal (211)] continues Irigaray, “pas d’événement qui nous rendrait femme” 
(210) [no event that makes us women (211)].  There is only a language of desire 
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devised and experienced “pour sortir de leurs cloisonnements, quadrillages, 
distinctions, oppositions: vierge/déflorée, pure/impure, innocente/avertie” (211) [to 
escape from their compartments, their schemas, their distinctions, and oppositions: 
virginal/deflowered, pure/impure, innocent/experienced (212)].  Moreover, embracing 
lips and labial contacts suggest to Irigaray a movement not of sudden thrusts, and 
violent incorporations of women, “enviolé[es] dans leur (des hommes) langage”  
(214) [absorbed once again in their violating language (215)] but of perpetual 
exchanges, “sans limites ni bords, que ceux de nos corps mouvants” (216) [without 
limits or borders except those of our moving bodies (217)].   
          Only within a phallic language of desire are dichotomies (virgin/impure, 
subject/object, etc.) kept in place.  Those are the same dichotomies that by use of his 
desiring anus, Hocquenghem would like to efface as well.  We may thus realize that 
lips and anus have more in common than meets the eye.  We may thus remedy 
Hocquenghem’s confusion about the analogy between the anus and the vagina by 
seeing the anus as more like the lips, that is, not much as the site of penetration, but as 
one resisting penetration or in which “penetrative” categories do not make sense.  By 
limiting desire to the surface of the male body, Hocqueghem rejects a possibility of 
penetration much in the way Irigaray denies access to the female body through the 
paradigm of the lips.  This unexpected analogy may help us see behind the anus and 
the homosexual male desire not so much a hatred for the woman, but rather a 
rejection of the category of the feminine as penetrable and exchangeable object 
(imposed both on the gay man and the woman).   
          By means of sexual opposition to penetration, anus and lips can touch, 
producing an unexpected queer contact.  Metaphorically speaking, a queer embrace 
between the anus and the lips allows us to see a few things: first of all that anus and 
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lips are sexually and theoretically specular insofar as they both constitute an 
alternative language to the discourse of penetration, which we may call embrace.  The 
embrace describes a discourse of bodily surfaces that meet without recurring to 
penetration.  This language of the embrace is a language that, making insignificant the 
articulation between inside and outside, multiplies the possibility of connections and 
intensifies desire.  Third, the paradigm of the anus-lips embrace also eliminates both 
the idea of “access,” originated in a dichotomy inside/outside, penetrated/penetrator, 
and the idea that there is a “woman” (as objectified category) to access in order to 
reproduce.  This point leads to the second part of my argument that explores the 
rejection of a discourse of reproduction. 
             In Le désir homosexuel Hocqueghem notes that there exists an anal orgasm 
that does not involve ejaculation (99), a sexual factor traditionally linked with the 
possibility of reproduction.  Oedipal sexuality is postulated on the necessity of 
penetration and ejaculation, factors leading to reproduction.  The vaginal 
representation of womanhood implicit in the phallic model that Hocquenghem 
reproduces is responsible for both the objectification of women and the construction 
of homosexuality as failed reproduction.     
Ainsi “la femme” qui n’a, par ailleurs, en tant que telle aucune place dans la 
société, désignée comme le seul objet sexuel social, est aussi le manque 
attribué à la relation homosexuelle.  Celle-ci…[est] la relation qui a manqué la 
reproduction. (Hocquenghem 68) 
 
[Thus “woman,” who otherwise, as such, has no place in society, who is 
referred to as the only social and sexual object, is also the absence attributed to 
the homosexual relationship...in which reproduction is absent. (78)] 
 
In the Œdipal construction, as we may see, the homosexual relation is threatened by 
the lack of woman as agent of reproduction.  The homosexual relation is meaningless 
by virtue of its non-reproducibility: “Le désir homosexuel est l’inengendrant-
inengendré, la terreur des familles en ce qu’il se produit sans se reproduire” (113). 
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[Homosexual desire is the ungenerating-ungenerated terror of the family because it 
produces itself without reproducing (107).]  Lack, if lack there is, is the failed 
reproduction of the family and of the Oedipal structure.  Again, the inability of the 
homosexual to access woman is not so much a sign of impotence, as it is a rejection 
of reproduction that gets circumscribed through the anus, which does not even need to 
ejaculate in order to come!  That the lips closing on each other may suggest a similar 
anti-reproductive move is evident.  However, I would like to look at how the anus 
itself, and not the lips, may play into the construction of a feminine and feminist 
rejection of reproduction.  The feminist anus will thus read as a queer instance of 
opposition to a compulsory reproductive model.   I will demonstrate this opposition 
through a closer reading of Freud’s so-called anal phase.  When looked at in a queer 
embrace, Hocquenghem’s and Freud’s anuses produce quite different narratives of 
sexuality and gender identity.   
Anal Retention: A Queer Feminist Issue  
 Le désir homosexuel contains an in-depth description and argument regarding 
the emergence of gay selfhood as a shameful moment of identity loss of self-
forgetfulness.  Hocqueghem compares this moment to the one at which the child 
accidentally defecates in his pants because of a lack of control of his bodily functions.  
The control over bodily functions is important in phallic terms, explains 
Hocquenghem, insofar as it prefigures and even symbolizes the individual’s ability to 
maintain a “proper” social status.  “Savoir ‘se retenir’” clarifies the theorist, “ou au 
contraire donner les excréments est le moment nécessaire de la constitution du soi-
même” (Hocquenghem 101).  [The ability to hold back or to evacuate the faeces is the 
necessary moment of the constitution of the self (99).]  By contrast, the inability or 
the refusal to retain one’s bodily excretions, which in French gets translated with 
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“s’oublier” [to forget oneself], “c’est risquer de joindre au travers du flux des 
excréments l’indifférentiation du désir” (101) [is to risk joining up, through the flux 
of excrement, with the non-differentiation of desire (99)].  If retention is then 
associated with identity, non-retention is paired with non-identity, with the possibility 
of free-flowing desire.  This explanation reflects Hocqueghem’s own particular 
reading of Freud’s episode of anal retention.  How does Freud himself frame such 
occurrence?   
 In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud contends that feces 
retention is a crucial moment in children’s development.  It is also a pleasurable one 
due to the effects of the muscular contractions brought about by the stimulation of the 
mucous membrane of the anus.  Whereas Hocquenghem’s account of the retentive 
phase is interpreted as a moment of subjection to rules of self-discipline and self-
formation, Freud’s tale of retention contains elements of conflict, opposition and self-
affirmation.  According to Freud, by retaining the feces, the infant is “naturally not 
concerned with dirtying the bed, he is only anxious not to miss the subsidiary pleasure 
attached to defecating.”  However, pleasure is not simply derived from the 
physiological effects of retention, but also from the child’s opposition the social 
environment’s expectations:   
The contents of the bowels have other important meanings for the infant.  
They are clearly treated as a part of the infant’s own body and represent his 
first “gift”: by producing them he can express his active compliance with his 
environment, and, by withholding them, his disobedience. (Freud 52) 
 
As it appears from the statement above, the relation of the individual to retention or 
production is exactly the opposite of what Hocqueghem describes to us.  Withholding 
is not an act of propriety, but an affirmation of one’s disobedience in defence of 
personal property.  Hence what is pleasurable here is indeed the possibility of 
opposition that the act of retention carries as well as the preliminary sense of 
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subjectivity involved in the protection of self-production.  The opposition expressed 
through retention is, I argue, the condition of self-consciousness in contrast and not in 
compliance with the parental and familial environment of the child.  When talking of 
the infant, Freud attributes a male gender to his infant subject and so does 
Hocquenghem, assuming that anal retention is a male question.  Is the anus 
misogynist?  Not exactly.  In fact if one looks even more closely at Freud’s male 
gendered anus, one can already perceive that this anus does not ignore sexual 
differences.  According to Freud, bowel contents are a “gift,” the child’s own creation 
that the child may decide to give away (to the parents, supposedly) or to keep.  Yet, 
“from being a gift,” continues Freud, “they [the feces] later come to acquire the 
meaning of baby–for babies, according to one of the narratives of childbirth are 
acquired by eating and are born through bowels” (52).  This strategic interpretation of 
baby feces enables Freud to gender the process of retention in terms of a female 
process of reproduction.  Hence one can read feces retention also as an allegory of 
reproduction.  If retention, as Freud argues, is disobedience, what the girl disobeys 
through anal retention is the social expectation that she will eventually deliver those 
baby-feces and thus that she will reproduce.  In other words, by retaining her feces, 
the girl constructs a sense of self in opposition to maternal expectations (not merely to 
her own mother, but to the idea of being a mother).  I may go as far as saying that the 
girl, by withholding, questions the female natural duty of re-producing.  More 
generally then, this feminist reading of the anus has queer implications in that it 
enables us to see in the Freudian construction of the anal phase the preliminary 
resistance to normative construction of femininity.                          
 My scepticism with regard to Hocquenghem’s idea of liberating desire from 
the constraint of sexual categories stems precisely from the fact that there is a need to 
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understand how categories have been used to shape desire and to show differences in 
the way one desires.  What is questionable is the way in which the notion of desire is 
used and manipulated to force, enforce and reproduce normative representations of it.  
As Hocquenghem acknowledges in his book, it was after Freud that representations of 
desire reinforced normative and reproductive notions of it: “Ce retour à la sexualité 
comme essentiellement reproductrice, épisodique chez Freud, devient systématique. 
Au désir comme production est substituée la sexualité comme reproduction, la 
famille” (Hocquenghem 67-68).  [This return to an essentially reproductive sexuality, 
which is merely épisodique in Freud, becomes systematic.  Sexuality as reproduction 
(the family) takes over from desire as production (77).]  The discourse on desire was 
replaced by a discourse on the control of desire in the name of sexual reproduction.  
What the Freudian account of female retention evidences is that the control of 
reproduction starts theoretically at the anal phase with the discipline of the female 
body through the control of her excretions.  The girl, however, escapes such a control 
by means of retention.  If not purely pleasurable or erotic, the anal desire of the girl 
finds its expression in her ability to decide when and how she will give or retain the 
faeces.  The importance of considering categories of sexual and gender difference in 
the discussion of desire speaks to the fact that desire is always already morphed into a 
specific body, the gay male body of Hocqueghem or the lesbian body of Irigaray or 
the Freudian body of retention.  Desire as a discursive product does not escape phallic 
discourses, but coexists within it in productive and subversive ways.  Desire is not 
amorphous; it is constantly reshaped and reformulated into one category or another.81  
                                                 
81 This notion illustrated in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Œdipe: “Le désir ne manque de rien, il ne 
manque pas de son objet.  C’est plutôt le sujet qui manque au désir ou le désir qui manque de sujet fixe; 
il n’y a pas de sujet fixe que par la répression” (34) [Desire does not lack anything, it does not lack its 
object.  Rather desire does not have a subject, it lacks a fixed subject; only repression produces fixed 
146 
 
What the sexual and theoretical articulations of Irigaray and Hocquenghem warn us 
against are the dangers of freezing desire into a universalizing mode that is unaware 
of its exclusionary implications.  Seeing the possible connections about the desiring 
economies of feminists and queers allows me to see at a distance how the attempt to 
produce alternative forms of desire was already evidence of the polymorphous or 
rather multifarious nature of it [“Le désir émerge sous une forme multiple” 
[Hocqueghem (24)] [Desire emerges in a multiple form (50).]  However, when using 
the term polymorphous, I am reminded of the limits that the uncritical use of the 
Freudian theory of the polymorphous perverse may have had in the 1970s.  
Hocquenghem took the polymorphous phase of pre-Œdipal sexuality as one that could 
pre-exist a normative expression of sexuality, thus reinforcing the dichotomous view 
of sexuality.  Hocquenghem’s appropriation of the polymorphous perverse risks 
reconfirming the hegemony of heterosexuality rather than discarding it.  It is 
nonetheless important to acknowledge that whereas desire does not pre-exist 
discourse it actually contributes, in the 1970s, to a substantial theorization of desire 
that proliferates its discursive forms.  Only in that sense can we talk about a sexual 
and social polymorphism, a theoretical polymorphism of desire that did not go 
beyond, but was carved out of the discursive manipulations of phallic categories.   
 Irigaray and Hocquenghem theorized sexual bodies according to a non-
penetrative and non-reproductive model.  The anal and the vulvic models of sexuality 
emphasize an idea of surface pleasure.  Like Irigaray Carla Lonzi was interested in the 
construction of a theoretical and a sexual non-reproductive body which she 
envisioned through her “donna clitoridea.”  However in Lonzi’s theoretical model the 
                                                                                                                                           
subjects.] (Translation is mine).  For Deleuze desire is not articulated in terms of lack, but its repression 
is.   
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non-reproductive sexual subject of the “donna clitoridea” stems from clitoridectomy 
and is embedded through lack.  The construction of the “donna clitoridea” is 
dependent upon what I call a discourse of excision that is both a rejection and a re-
reading of the psychoanalytic model which constructs femininity and sexuality 
through absence.  Discursive excision seems to be the common ground of some of the 
Italian feminist and gay discourse of the 1970s.             
Queer Excisions and Failed Correspondences: Mieli, Pasolini and Lonzi 
While the gays and the lesbians of FHAR were disputing over sexual matters 
and lesbians were addressing gay with accusations of misogyny, in the 1970s Italian 
gay thinker Mario Mieli (1953-1982) promoted his “gaia proposta” [gay proposal]82 
in the Italian gay movement: “Non fate più all’amore con i maschi, fate all’amore tra 
donne, facciamo l’amore tra noi.” (198) [Stop making love with men, let women 
make love with one another, and with us (191).]  This slogan, which Mieli recites in a 
chapter of his book Elementi di critica omosessuale titled “Women and Queens” was 
an invitation for all women and feminists to overcome the tensions that divided gay 
men and feminists (lesbians and straight alike) in the 1970s sexual movements.  Mieli 
sought new alliances, new friendships among gays and women, friendships that could 
rehabilitate the repressed feminine component in every man, whether gay or straight.  
A gay friendship had for Mieli the potential of helping men to uncover their inner and 
repressed femininity and enable women to actually manifest their sexuality outside of 
a heterosexual frame.  That a gay man with a taste for transvestism might be attracted 
to femininity is not surprising; that a queer feminist could actually be drawn to 
masculinity does not come as a surprise nowadays, especially after the marvelous 
                                                 




contributions of Judith Butler on the lesbian phallus and of Judith Halberstam on 
female masculinity.  But that a radical Italian feminist from the 1970s may be 
fascinated with queer masculinity is perhaps still difficult to understand in the gender 
segregated context of Italian radical feminism and in the absence of a cultural 
paradigm for queer sexuality.  Yet, when a radical feminist such as Carla Lonzi, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, gets out of her feminine enclave to connect with 
Pier Paolo Pasolini’s most intimate self, it is worth interrogating what that contact 
may produce for feminist thought.  This is precisely my task in the second half of this 
chapter. 
One important element that shaped Lonzi’s feminism was the notion of 
symbolic clitoridectomy.  I would like to return to this notion and refer to it as the 
discursive excision of a woman’s queer sexual dimension that is subject to the double 
erasure of homophobia and misogyny.  Lonzi’s diary Taci anzi parla once again can 
help us elucidate what such discursive excision paradoxically contributed to the 
construction of the “donna clitoridea” as a theoretical embodiment of female 
queerness.  As I pointed out in my second chapter, the diary, which represented a 
lively document of the years of autocoscienza, was, for Lonzi, not merely a 
confessional tool or a vehicle of self-analysis.  It also described Lonzi’s ambivalent 
relationship with the public and a tension between public disclosure and a desire for 
clandestinity.  Hence Lonzi’s queer dimension, as the expression of a different 
sexuality, is also impacted by her complex relationship with public exposure.  
Queerness remains crypted in Lonzi’s diary with no other discursive access than a 
failed correspondence with Pasolini’s queerness.  The point, however, is not so much 
to acknowledge the double standard of the repression of female sexuality, but rather 
to understand the kind of queer dimension this symbolic castration produced in light 
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of the fact that Lonzi rejected the label of lesbian as discursively and sexually 
constraining (see chapter 2).  I argue that Lonzi’s attempt to make a connection with 
Pasolini’s homosexuality is a queer move that is grounded in the common space 
created by the intersection between Lonzi’s clitoridectomy and Mieli’s 
“educastrazione.”  These two instances of discursive excisions are both the product of 
the 1970s discourse of sexual liberation that bridged gays and feminists in spite of 
their apparent contrasts.   
In 2002, major editor Feltrinelli reissued Mieli’s ground-breaking theoretical 
work, Elementi di critica omosessuale, which was originally an undergraduate thesis.  
The recent edition features important critical contributions by Italian, French, and 
American intellectuals including Teresa De Lauretis who praises the queerness of the 
work.83  Mario Mieli was a militant intellectual who took up an active role in the 
1970s gay and lesbian movement FUORI (Fronte Unitario Omosessuale 
Rivoluzionario Italiano).  The flamboyant side of Mieli’s homosexuality and his taste 
for drag and transvestism did not go unnoticed in intellectual circles.  His book, which 
analyzes the discursive construction of homosexuality in twentieth-century culture, 
has more than one aspect in common with Hocquenghem’s Le désir homosexuel.  The 
most striking commonality is the idea of the universality of desire and the anus as a 
symbolic locus of sexual liberation.  However, whereas Hocquenghem is critical of 
the use of the term “homosexual” as reminiscent of a binary and heteronormative 
construction of homosexuality, Mieli appropriates the term “homosexual” to found his 
theory of gay emancipation.  Mieli’s work, witty and irreverent, departs from 
Hocquenghem’s in a few culturally significant aspects: the critique of the position of 
                                                 
83 Mario Mieli’s is becoming better known in the Anglo-American world thanks to a translation of 
Elementi di critica omosessuale titled Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique and 
some critical pieces by Bill Marshall and Derek Duncan.  Mieli is also author of queer fiction.   
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the Catholic Church vis-à-vis homosexuals,84 his original theories of “transessualità” 
and “educastrazione,” and his attention to women as important agents in the making 
of “comunismo erotico.”  Mieli also pays particular attention to the role of both gay 
and women’s movements in the 1970s that fight “affinché la diffusione 
dell’omoerotismo cambi qualitativamente l’esistenza e la trasformi da sopravvivenza 
in vita” (Mieli 30) [because the diffusion of homoeroticism will qualitatively change 
our existence and transform mere survival into life (37)].85  The intersection between 
the two movements finds a cultural justification in that some Italian homosexuals like 
Mieli engaged in an analysis of their personal experiences inspired by the feminist 
groups of autocoscienza.  As Gianni Rossi Barilli evidences, gay groups appropriated 
the feminist theoretical practice of autocoscienza and developed a gay theory from the 
re-elaboration of the personal (Mieli 304).   Of all those elements I shall retain two 
that are discursively and theoretically intertwined: the theoretical project of a 
“comunismo erotico” and the idea of educastration.   
Unlike Hocquenghem, who excluded the question of women’s desire at the 
onset of his work, Mieli is persuaded instead that the homosexual question is “un 
mare magnum [che] sconfina senz’altro in quell’oceano della questione femminile” 
(Mieli 7) [a great sea that overfloods the ocean of the woman question].86 He thus 
acknowledges the intersectional dimension of feminism and queerness and the 
common aim of the making of a new sexual alliance that he calls erotic communism: 
Ho sottolineato l’importanza della liberazione dell’omosessualità nel quadro 
dell’emancipazione umana : infatti, per la creazione del comunismo, è 
condition sine qua non, fra le altre, la completa disinibizione delle tendenze 
                                                 
84 Let’s not forget that the Catholic Church has always played an important role in the repression of 
overt forms of queer sexuality and in the regulation of sexuality. 
85 I am using the English translation of Mieli’s work by David Fernbach. 
86 This passage as well as the last is contained in the “Premessa,” an introductory part by Mario Mieli 
that was not included in the English translation by David Fernbach (1980).  I therefore give my own 
translation of this passage. 
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omoerotiche, che solamente libere possono garantire il conseguimento di una 
comunicazione totalizzante tra esseri umani, indipendentemente dal loro sesso. 
(8) 
    
[I emphasized the importance of the liberation of homosexuality within the 
frame of human emancipation: as a matter of fact, for the creation of 
communism, one necessary condition among the others is the complete release 
of the homoerotic tendencies, that once liberated can guarantee that a 
totalizing communication among human beings can be achieved regardless of 
their sex.]87 
 
Mieli’s erotic communism presupposes the universal existence of a natural 
homoerotic tendency which can only manifest itself if every individual is emancipated 
from the cultural repression of the inner homoerotic drive.  For Mieli each person 
loves, regardless of gender divisions, and has therefore a great erotic capacity towards 
same sex people. This capacity, which Mieli names “transessualità,” has nothing to do 
with surgical reassignement.  It is germane to bisexuality as it describes a subjectivity 
based on the coexistence of elements of both sexes and the possibility of navigating a 
spectrum of gender identifications: 
In questo libro io chiamerò transessualità la disposizione erotica polimorfa e 
“indifferenziata” infantile, che la società reprime e che, nella vita adulta, ogni 
essere umano reca in sé allo stato di latenza oppure confinata negli abissi 
dell’inconscio sotto il giogo della rimozione.  Il termine “transessualità” mi 
sembra il più adatto a esprimere a un tempo, la pluralità delle tendenze 
dell’Eros e l’ermafoditismo originario e profondo di ogni individuo. (19)88 
  
[I shall use the term trans-sexuality throughout this book to refer to the 
infantile polymorphous and undifferentiated erotic disposition, which society 
suppresses and which, in adult life, every human being carries within him 
either in a latent state, or else confined in the depths of the unconscious under 
the yoke of repression.  Trans-sexuality seems to me the best word for 
expressing, at one and the same time, both the plurality of the erotic 
tendencies and the original and deep hermaphroditism of every individual. 
(25-26)] 
 
The problem for Mieli is that, since childhood, each individual has been subjected to 
an erotic mutilation [“mutilazione dell’Eros”], educastration, practiced in the family 
                                                 
87 Ibidem. 
88 Mieli’s italics. 
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and in society to encourage an exclusive practice of sexuality and love.  This cultural 
castration has contributed to the denial of a psychic hermaphroditism and the 
homoerotic tendencies that characterize the deepest sexual tendencies of each 
individual.89  More important, the enforcement of a monosexuality is concomitant 
with the disavowal of the intrinsic femininity that is natural to each man, whether gay 
or straight.  Mieli defines this disavowal in a couple of ways: “misconoscimento della 
donna in sé,” that is, the disavowal of the biological woman, and “misconoscimento 
della donna in sé,” that is the rejection of the “woman” that inhabits every man.90  
Both forms of disavowal create a condition of estrangement vis-à-vis femininity that 
is responsible, in Mieli’s view, for men’s sexism and the renunciation of gay desire.  
As a result, educastration works in a couple of different ways: towards the mutilation 
of “transessualità” as the potential to live fully one’s own sexual inclinations and 
towards the mutilation of male femininity.   
The cultural type that “educastrazione” produces, according to Mieli, is the 
“criptochecca” [cryptofag], a straight man whose virility conceals an inner and 
repressed feminine component.  The intriguing aspect of educastration from a 
feminist point of view, is the complete invisibility of women and women’s sexuality.  
Or rather, women do appear, but through the attire of a male transvestite who 
performs his femininity, it seems.  Quoting the words of an Italian feminist Mieli 
writes: “La femminilità sarà così un uomo travestito, dopo di che una donna può far 
ritorno per un effetto di raddoppiamento di questo travestito e imitare il pederasta che 
ha imitato la femminilità.  Donna, continua a non essercene” (27).  [Femininity will 
be a male transvestite.  Afterwards a woman can return as the double of a transvestite 
                                                 
89 Mieli seems to use “hermaphroditism” as synonym of bisexuality.   
90 At some point, in an argument that resonates with Butler analysis of gender identification through 
the psychic dynamics of mourning and melancholia, he even hints at the fact that hyper-virility may be 
the very sign of the extent of the homoerotic repression. 
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and imitate the pederast who imitated femininity.  A woman is still non-existent.]  
Quoting a feminist essay from the journal L’Erba Voglio (26, 1976), Mieli 
understands femininity in terms of male transvestism.  Hence male transvestism 
becomes the only way through which women can inhabit and reclaim their own 
feminine identity.91  The question of womanhood or of female sexuality is displaced 
by a variety of terms such as “femininity” and “transvestim” that prefigure more 
recent notions of gender construction and performance and are obscured by an even 
more obscure reference to pederasty as the site of sexual imitation.  All these terms, 
charged with a complex and individual critical history, also have the effect of 
reducing the question of women’s sexuality to a nowhere or assimilating it to a 
transvestite’s performance of gender and sexuality.  This fact, along with Mieli’s 
citation of feminist work may be crucial for a queer feminist reading of Mieli’s work.   
Mieli’s citation of feminist theories is an important rhetorical move that 
indicates that “transessualità” was performed by Mieli even at a theoretical level.  In 
other words, Mieli was performing the feminine part of himself by appropriating 
feminist speech, a move which made his queerness a very feminist construction.  The 
English translation of Elementi di critica omosessuale omits the part of Mieli’s 
quotation that describes how women’s gender identity is merely re-appropriation of 
femininity in drag.  David Fernbach’s omission of Mieli’s feminist citation is an 
unjustified rhetorical excision that does a disservice to Mieli’s theory of 
“transessualità.”  It also inadvertently reinforces what Mieli critiques through his 
notion of educastration, that is the castration of the feminine component in every man.  
                                                 
91 This translation is mine because the English edition omitted this part of Mieli’s quotation of the 




The importance of Mieli’s feminist citations is stressed by feminist scholar Simonetta 
Spinelli who recognizes how much Mieli’s theory is indebted to feminism: 
Mieli conosceva le teorizzazioni femministe.  Citava in continuo gli scritti 
delle femministe milanesi che apparivano sul periodico “L’Erba Voglio”.  Le 
sue analisi sul collegamento tra subordinazione femminile, finalizzazione della 
sessualità alla riproduzione, oggettualizzazione della donna, e l’impotenza 
camuffata da virilismo violento…ricalcava molte analisi dei collettivi 
femministi. (Spinelli 314)  
    
[Mieli knew feminist theories.  He would always quote the articles of the 
Milanese  feminists that appeared in the journal “L’Erba Voglio”.  His 
analyses on the connection between women’s subordination, reproductive 
sexuality, women’s objectification and male impotence masked through 
violent virility…reiterated many of the analyses done by the feminist 
collectives.] 
   
Unlike Hocquenghem’s work, which reduces the question of desire to the gay men’s 
anus, Mieli’s theory speaks, instead, to a feminist audience because Mieli spoke 
through feminist words.   In this sense Mieli may be said to perform a sort of queer 
feminist theory in drag or a lip-sinking of feminist theories.  For instance Mieli called 
upon women for he considered them precious allies and companions in his theory of 
erotic emancipation: “Ma a me preme ricordare come il conseguimento della 
transessualità passi necessariamente attraverso il movimento delle donne e la 
liberazione completa dell’omoerotismo” (Mieli 20).  [I must add that the achievement 
of trans-sexuality can only follow from the work of women’s movement and the 
complete liberation of homoeroticism (38).]  Mieli cannot conceive of any erotic 
emancipation, any change to the discourse of gender and sexuality, without women.  
Their cultural and historical appearance also depends on their specific sexual 
contribution to the movement, which Mieli acknowledges once again through the 
words of a feminist: “Storicamente le donne non esistono ancora e scopo del 
movimento è farle apparire, storicamente come luogo differenziato” (28).  [Women, 
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historically, do not yet exist, and the goal of the women’s movement is to give women 
a specific historical reality (35).] 
The gay activist interestingly attributes the social misrecognition of women’s 
sexual autonomy to the double mechanism of misogyny and homophobia that 
operates to repress gay desire and “transessualità” even among gay men.92  More 
acutely, Mieli establishes a striking analogy between his educastration and the 
“occultamento della clitoride” in the attempt to provide a theoretical common ground 
between his gay theory and feminism:  
L’educastrazione consiste, oltre che nell’occultamento della clitoride, nella 
repression del desiderio omosessuale e della transessualità, della dimensione 
erotico-esistenziale intera della donna.  Bisogna che la (trans) sessualità 
femminile sia violentemente repressa perché la donna possa apparire 
femminile, atta alla sottomissione al maschio e ai soprusi della sessualità che è 
l’‘unica vera’.  In base alla Norma, la sessualità femminile non deve esistere 
se non in quanto sottomessa.  (231)  
  
[Educastration consist not only in the concealment of the clitoris, but also in 
the repression of homosexual desire and trans-sexuality, of woman’s whole 
erotic existence.  Female (trans)-sexuality has to be violently repressed so that 
the woman can appear ‘feminine’, can be subjected to the male and to the 
insults inflicted on her by his sexuality, the ‘only true sexuality.’  On the basis 
of the Norm, female sexuality cannot exist except as something subordinate. 
(221)] 
  
Mieli understands the “Norma” as the rigid distinction between the active masculine 
and the passive feminine, and thus sees clitoridectomy as the erasure of an active 
female sexuality which he refers to as “transessualità femminile.”  His notion of 
“transessualità femminile,” in connection with clitoridectomy, echoes Carla Lonzi’s 
theory adding some nuances to it.  Educastration and clitoridectomy can work for all 
those “transessuali” who are “perseguitati dalla società che non ammette confusione 
                                                 
92 “La donna, dunque, è doppiamente soggetta al maschio: poiché l’uomo le impone la propria virilità 
(quale condensato di desiderio omosessuale alienato) e la propria femminilità” (27) [the woman, then, 
is subject to male in two ways: the man forces on her both his masculinity (a condensation of alienated 




tra i sessi” [persecuted by a society that cannot accept any confusion between the 
sexes] and “tendono a ridurre la propria effettiva transessualità a monosessualità 
apparente” (20) [tend to reduce their effective trans-sexuality to an apparent mono-
sexuality (27)].  As a result, according to Mieli, the female “transessuale” will chose 
virility and feel like a man and the male “transessuale” feels like a woman by virtue 
of choosing femininity.93  Mieli claims that such mechanisms are at work even among 
the feminists who harbor prejudices vis-à-vis gay men and their effeminacy (201).  In 
particular Mieli seems to be skeptical about the spread of the “nuova omosessualità” 
among feminists since “essa ostenta una maschera ‘omo,’ che serve in realtà a 
(s)velare l’autentico desiderio gay latente e soprattutto il desiderio eterosessuale 
cosciente che la sottende” (204) [it boasts a ‘homo’ mask, but this actually serves to 
(un)veil the genuinely latent gay desire, and above all the conscious heterosexual 
desire that wears the mask (197)].  While Mieli accuses feminists of veiled 
homophobia he also detects in that homophobia the feminists’ inability to reconcile 
with their “transsexual” bent.   
Mieli’s arguments reiterate the oppositions that governed the uneasy alliance 
between feminists and gays in 1970s Italy.  This desired alliance, which was destined 
to fail or at least to create ruptures within the movements, is the problematic terrain 
on which I would like to read Lonzi’s attempt to reach out to Pasolini in order to 
define her own queerness.  We may look at this connection as a “transsexual” alliance 
                                                 
93 Those forms of male and female transgenderism are not to be confused with homosexuality since 
transgenderism does not coincide, in Mieli’s view, with a homosexual orientation of the transgender 
individual.  However, this distinction seems to contradict Mieli’s idea that “educastrazione” is at once a 
gender and a sexual castration.  In other words there is no castration of the opposite gender inside of 





à la Mieli that enabled Lonzi to queer her own feminism while queering Pasolini’s 
gayness.  In a way, had Lonzi written her letters to Mieli instead of Pasolini, she 
would have perhaps been able to fill a need for a queer communication, or better said, 
a queer correspondence, which instead remained unfulfilled.  Conversely, the fact that 
Lonzi was not responsive to Mieli’s call to feminists contributed to a mutual sense of 
misrecognition.  This fact only emphasizes the idea that both feminists and gays 
participated in the discursive excision that shaped their experience of queerness.  
Imagining what that correspondence would have been like and answering those 
unanswered letters would allow me to restore a symbolic connection among queers.     
Envisioning a Queer Feminist Correspondence 
Carla Lonzi’s interest in Pasolini’s sexual identity is proven by a number of 
letters– included in the diarythat Lonzi wrote to Pasolini between July 1974 and the 
moment of his death on November 1975.  Lonzi is attracted to his “richiamo alla 
diversità” [call to diversity (736)], a diversity that Lonzi deems authentic.   She also 
feels that, like her, Pasolini has been misunderstood by society and has not found his 
fit : “Anche noi,” she says referring to her group “siamo vittime di nient’altro che di 
un’impossibilità a trovare rispondenza al nostro modo di ‘nominare le cose’ e di farle 
accettare come presa di coscienza” (Lonzi, Taci anzi parla 745).  [We also have been 
victims of an impossibility of finding a correspondence between our way of naming 
things and have such things accepted as signs of a new consciousness.]  I will linger 
on a few instances in which Lonzi attempts to establish a communication with the gay 
intellectual, which may be described both in terms of a miscommunication and a 
missed communication.  Pasolini apparently never answered Lonzi’s letters, thus 
precluding the possibility of a communication between the queer and the feminist.  
Moreover, we are unsure of whether Lonzi sent these letters or whether the letters 
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were simply the product of her musings. Why would a radical feminist, who defends 
the existence of an authentic feminine subjectivity, turn to a gay man in search for an 
alliance on the basis of a new consciousness?  I would like therefore to repeat here 
what I did with Irigaray and Hocquenghem and create a space of contact between two 
intellectuals on the basis of an emerging queer consciousness.  What makes Lonzi’s 
experience of feminism intriguing to me is her veiled fascination with masculinity 
and, more specifically, with queer masculinity.     
Throughout the years of autocoscienza, and even afterwards, Lonzi entertains 
a very intimate relation with Simone (art critic Piero Consagra in reality).   References 
to and influences of this relationship are all over the place in Lonzi’s diary, attesting 
to the importance of that connection at several levels, especially at the emotional 
level.  Lonzi relates in great details the sexual encounters of this relationship, in 
which she experiments her sexuality in various forms that often do away with 
penetration.  In some cases, the eroticism of the couple is expressed in terms of 
mutual masturbation.  In general, Simone seems to respond to some of Lonzi’s erotic 
preferences and even be a mediator of her sexual discovery.  For instance, it is 
Simone who suggests to Lonzi that she may be attracted to both men and women, 
disclosing a homoerotic disposition to which Lonzi does not easily concede.   While 
advancing the possibility that Lonzi may be attracted to women and making a case for 
it, Simone comments on a presumed gender duality in Lonzi’s mind, a tension 
between her masculinity and her femininity:  “Simone dice invece che la donna con il 
pene è una mia proiezione, la mia paura di essere maschile” (816).  [Simone says 
instead that the woman with a penis is a projection of mine, my fear of being 
masculine.]  Simone reads Lonzi’s homoerotic feelings through the inscription of a 
form of female masculinity represented by the “donna col pene” [a woman with a 
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penis, a phallic woman], an image that threatens Carla.  The woman’s tensions find 
some sort of release through her dreams: “A me è capitato di sognare che la ricerca di 
un’intesa con una donna si interrompeva nella scoperta di un sesso maschile sotto le 
sue vesti.  La mia sensazione era di paura, di disagio” (816).  [I happened to dream 
that I was seeking an intimate connection with a woman; but the sight of a masculine 
sex underneath her dress interrupted this contact.  I felt fear and discomfort.]  The 
dream, apart from releasing a tension, is a vehicle of Lonzi’s own sexual queerness.  
The dream ostensibly displays Lonzi’s fear of knowing that another woman may have 
and use a penis in their relationship.  This fact also alerts us to Lonzi’s reluctance to 
being penetrated not merely by a man, but by another woman, which in more 
contemporary terms, could describe the attitude of the untouchable and impenetrable 
stone butch.  The stone butch is, according to Judith Halberstam, the transgendered 
woman who likes pleasing her partner, even through penetration, but does not want to 
be touched.  That Lonzi rejects penetration is obvious.  Less obvious is whether she 
wants to penetrate or even please another woman.  As a matter of fact, at one point 
Lonzi even admits to herself: “Ho paura di scoprirmi una donna con il pene…una 
paura mortale” (910) [I am dreading to discover myself as a woman with a penis…a 
mortal fear.]  Lonzi’s penis phobia seems to be in contradiction with her idea of 
sexual equivalence (already explored in the previous chapter) by which the clitoris, 
according to a Freudian analogy, is identified with the woman’s penis and the clitoris 
describes woman’s self-pleasuring activity.  This penis phobia may translate Lonzi’s 
uneasiness with embodying a penetrative position.  Yet, fear being the “natural” ally 
of desire, I am tempted to see behind the fear, the expression of an actual desire to be 
a penetrator.  When this fear is paired with Lonzi’s difficulty in displaying her own 
clitoris–a difficulty acknowledged in the previous chapter–it would be safe to argue 
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that Carla Lonzi’s fear may signify her reluctance to recognize her inner masculinity 
or to identify the clitoris as a masculine attribute.  Lonzi’s ambivalent positioning vis-
à-vis her masculinity creates a tension that is at the heart of the articulation of her 
feminism, a feminism that resists the association with lesbianism–as seen in the 
previous chapter.  Hence what kind of queer sexual dimension does this penis phobia 
tease out of the feminist in the light of a rejected lesbianism?  This is where I find it 
useful to reconnect Lonzi with Pasolini using the oniric imagery that Lonzi’s diary 
contains.  In one of her recurring dreams Lonzi imagines seducing Pasolini out of his 
timidity:   
Sono con Pasolini, so che è omosessuale, mi appare timido . Ma io trovo degli 
argomenti che lo sciolgono poco a poco, faccio la calza e sono molto calma.  
A un certo punto mi aiuta a passare un gomitolo tra di fili di lana, cosa che mi 
sembra un gesto d’intesa fra me e lui.  Dopo di che diventa addirittura 
euforico, parla e parla. Provo un estremo bisogno di conquistarlo e sono certa 
di riuscirci. (918) 
  
[I am with Pasolini, I know he is a homosexual, he appears timid.  I engage 
him in some topics that gradually put him at ease, I am knitting, and I am very 
calm.  At one point he helps me weave a bundle into the wool threads which 
appears to me a gesture of complicity between me and him.   Afterwards he 
even becomes euphoric, he keeps talking.  I really feel an urge to conquer him 
and I am certain that I will succeed in it.] 
      
The woman’s seduction of Pasolini translates for me into an attempt to get him out of 
his timidity which is also, in the above passage, strictly linked with Pasolini’s 
homosexuality.   In order to seduce Pasolini, Lonzi uses some mysterious “argomenti” 
[topics] that make him feel at ease with a woman, while involving him into a 
traditionally feminine task (knitting).    What intrigues me, even more, is Lonzi’s 
desire to seduce Pasolini in a markedly feminine realm (weaving, knitting) thus 
outing, so to speak, his feminine side.  It is precisely in the seduction of the feminine 
Pasolini that Lonzi may succeed in inscribing her own queerness that is by appealing, 
as a woman, to the misrecognized part of femininity that is kept at bay in the gay man.  
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In other words, the attraction of Lonzi towards Pasolini is exquisitely queer in that it 
connects the woman’s femininity with the gay man’s femininity.  In this sense we 
may look at this connection as a lesbian connection.     
Behind Lonzi’s seduction of Pasolini is also the desire to break through 
Pasolini’s “sfiducia della donna” [distrust of women]94 and the disavowed sexist 
component of the gay man: “Con Pasolini ho questo in comune: che lui come uomo 
ha cercato di affermare il suo diritto erotico a essere penetrato, io come donna a non 
esserlo” (942).  [With Pasolini I have in common the fact that as a man he has sought 
to affirm his erotic right to be penetrated, I as a woman I have claimed  the right to 
not be penetrated.]  The effort to establish a connection with Pasolini results in an 
interesting stereotypical construction of gay and lesbian identity around the question 
of accessibility and penetration.  Lonzi interprets male homosexuality in terms of a 
feminized desire to be penetrated.  This is of course an assumption on the part of 
Lonzi who can only guess at Pasolini’s sexual preferences.  This deliberate reading of 
male homosexuality as the affirmation of the right to be penetrated has, in my view, a 
specific purpose.  This purpose is that of signifying a model of impenetrable 
femininity, one that is much closer to either the masculine allure of the stone butch 
portrayed by Halberstam, or to the impenetrable masculinity of Hocquenghem’s queer 
anus.  At this point I am wondering if it would have been more fruitful for Lonzi to 
attract Pasolini’s attention not by appealing to his closeted femininity, but to his 
anally resistant masculinity.  This is what Lonzi does when she imagines speaking to 
Pasolini like a brother to a brother except that she recognizes that it is “rischioso per 
un uomo essere chiamato fratello da una donna”  (1164) [risky for a man to be called 
brother by a woman], perhaps because fraternity is an affair between men.  Pasolini 
                                                 
94 I understand “sfiducia” as another way to define Pasolini’s mysogynist bent (see chapter 1). 
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reveals himself to be unprepared to recognize the brotherhood with a woman [“sei 
anche impreparato al mio riconoscimento” (957)].  Ultimately what Pasolini 
misrecognizes, according to Lonzi, is Lonzi’s proximity as a queer woman to his 
queer masculinity or his male queerness.  It is plausible to argue that this 
misrecognition may be the result of what Lonzi considers Pasolini’s sexism, a sexism 
that contributes to the further dismissal of female sexuality.  However, we should not 
forget that Lonzi and Pasolini’s connection was the product of Lonzi’s fantasy and 
Lonzi’s dreams, and therefore should be treated as a narrative fiction.  In other words, 
Lonzi’s identification with Pasolini and his inner femininity can be seen as a queer 
reading strategy, through which Lonzi reads her own queerness, and her own 
feminine and feminist diversity.  It is also impossible to determine whether Lonzi’s 
failed correspondence was indeed real or whether it was fruit of Lonzi’s own narrative 
construction.  Yet this narrative construction, through the diary, seemed to represent 
for Lonzi one way to inscribe her own queerness at a time in which there was no such 
a term to define the sexually different other than lesbianism, an identity label that 
Lonzi openly rejected.  We may look at Lonzi’s construction as a fake dialogue with 
the other, a discursive modality through which Lonzi refused to engage in a real 
conversation, preferring a state of semi-clandestinity or invisibility that characterized 
her radical feminism through her diary practice (as I discussed in my previous 
chapter).  In this perspective the failed correspondence can translate not so much a 
state of isolation, but a different tactic for the inscription of the queer.      
Queerness was, it seems, a matter of missed communications in 1970s 
discursive exchanges between feminists and gay men.  What those missed exchanges 
failed to highlight was the fact that queerness came to be constructed as and through 
discursive excisions whether we talk of clitoridectomy or of educastration.  It is 
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precisely in the missing correspondence between the “donna clitoridea” and the 
“transessuale” that we find a ground for understanding how both figures emerged 
against a cultural landscape that was at once sexist and homophobic.  Symbolic 
clitoridectomy and educastration are the intertwining dimensions of a larger cultural 
phenomenon, discursive excisions that points to the intersectional dimension not only 
of categories of gender and sexuality, but also of queer and feminist approaches.  In 
particular, the notion of discursive excision translates Lonzi’s and Mieli’s difficulty of 
containing their specific embodiments of gender identity within the conventional 
frame of masculinity and femininity.  More importantly, Mieli’s insistence that 
“woman” does not exist, and that women merely reappropriate the gender of 
transvestites is a preliminary indication of the fact that gender does not belong to 
biology, but lies firmly on its constructed-ness.   
Whereas Mieli’s and Lonzi’s queer theories may find a common ground in the 
theories of clitoridectomy and educastration, Mieli and Lonzi remain different 
pertaining issues of visibility and the public embodiment of their theories.  For Mieli 
embodying “transessualità” means being able to display the “other” within, the 
repressed feminine; queerness must therefore become evident and visible through 
transvestism.  For the sense of community, like a famous slogan circulating in the 
1970s recited “El pueblo unido è meglio travestido” [el pueblo unido is better when it 
is transvestite] can only be created when gay people also dress up according to their 
inner sexual inclinations, their erotic dispositions.  Whereas the mode of the 
“transessuale” is that of ostentation and visibility, the tactic of the “donna clitoridea” 
is one of invisibility and clandestinity.  But it seems, instead, that Lonzi radicalized 
the association between femininity and privacy, hid tactically into an invisible space 
and thus inadvertently contributing to the missed communication between gays and 
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feminists in the era of erotic communisms.  And yet the gay and the feminist worlds 
come into contact at the very moment in which Mieli theoretically embodies his 
“trans-sexual” queer mimicking the words of a feminist and Lonzi identifies with 
queer Pasolini through the semi-clandestine pages of her diary.  By opening up to gay 
theories of “transessualità,” a queer feminist such as Lonzi could frame her queerness 
within a broader context that would combine her radical feminism with the gay 
proposal of Mario Mieli.  Perhaps Mieli’s Elementi was a call for feminists to come 
out and share the political space and language of “transessualità” as the emerging 
dimension of 1970s queerness.  For this is what “transessualità” is ultimately about, as 
Teresa De Lauretis also states: “L’esperienza di un corpo o di un desiderio non 
conforme alla norma socialmente prescritta [che] cerca un linguaggio per dirsi, scava 
lo scibile per capirsi, foggia parole nuove per nominarsi” (Mieli 262).  Tthe 
experience of a body or a desire that does not conform to the prescribed social norm 
and searches for a language of self-expression, dig into the body of knowledge to get 
to know itself, forges new terms of self-definition.]   
I would like to see “transessualità” as the revolutionary language of embraces, 
which my title recalls and my chapter reconstitutes through the weaving of theories 
that have been disconnected, but had so much in common.  The embraces I create 
between Irigaray and Hocquenghem or Mieli and Lonzi are the material and symbolic 
contacts that body parts, such as the anus, the clitoris and the labia, produce when the 
feminist and gay theories of the 1970s connect in order forge a discourse of erotic 
communism.  The “transsexual” embracesI am using transsexual in Mieli’s 
senseare envisioned spaces of sexual alliance, the theorizing spaces from where 
gays and feminists elaborated a socio-symbolic dimension of the queer starting from a 
provocative re-reading of the sexual bodies of psychoanalysis.  Whereas the Italian 
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trans-sexual alliance is postulated on a discourse of excision, the French trans-sexual 
connection between Irigaray and Hocquehgem is based on a common resistance to a 
discourse of penetration and of reproduction.  Both these trans-sexual alliances speak 
to the intersectional component not only of feminist and gay theories, but also of 
issues of gender and sexuality.   
In this chapter I deal with the productive tensions that characterized the 
practices and discourses of the feminist and the gay movements, some of which were 
reflected in the theoretical work of Irigaray and Hocquenghem, Lonzi and Mieli.  Yet 
the French feminist movement known as the MLF, like the Italian one, was far from 
cohesive.  Disagreements and splits with regard to notions of sexuality and gender 
existed among the members of the MLF which shaped not only their experience as a 
group, but also their theoretical and their fictional work.  The following chapter is 
partly devoted to the encounter between the fictional work of Hélène Cixous and 
Monique Wittig and the material and symbolic dimension from which Wittig’s 
lesbian emerged to question a construction of subjectivity through the sexualized and 












The Laugh of the Lesbian: Fictive Gender and Emotional Materiality in 
Monique Wittig’s Fiction 
 
Il n’y a pas de place pour elle si elle n’est pas un il?  Si elle est elle-elle, ce n’est qu’à tout casser, à 
mettre en pièces les bâtis des institutions, à faire sauter la loi, à tordre “vérité” de rire. 
 [There’s no room for her if she’s not a he.  If she’s a her-she, it’s in order to smash everything to 
shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the law, to break up the “truth” with laughter.] 
      – Hélène Cixous, Le Rire de la Méduse (1975) 
 
“Elles disent que les vulves sont désormais en mouvement.  Elles disent 
qu’elles inventent une nouvelle dynamique” (Guérillères 180).  [They say that the 
vulvas are henceforth in movement.  They say that they are inventing a new dynamic 
(126).]  The exhilarating image of the marching vulvas immortalizes for me Monique 
Wittig’s novel Les guérillères (1969).  Wittig’s fiction offers a vision of what the 
world would look like if women were to overthrow the language of phallogocentrism 
and society were to be liberated once and for all from the categories of sex.  Written 
in the aftermath of May ’68, amidst the enthusiastic emergence of the Mouvement de 
Libération des Femmes (also known as MLF), Les guérillères not only predates the 
visionary experience of 1970s feminism, but emphasizes the need to get rid of old 
narrative forms and calls for radical invention.  Numerous critics have seen in this 
work the fictional materialization of some of the ideas that Wittig later developed as a 
theorist in the collection of essays, The Straight Mind.  As Linda Zerilli puts it, “the 
amazing achievement of Les guérillères is not to demonstrate (with concepts or 
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arguments) but to lead before the eyes (with images and metaphors) the radical 
reformulation of the heterosexual contract” (Shaktini 80).  Wittig’s fiction is not so 
much a reformulation of the heterosexual contract, but a fictional invention based on 
the undoing of masculine discourse.  This double move of undoing and reinvention is 
the greatest achievement of the war of the guérillères whose main target is a system 
of representation in which women are naturalized in eternal difference through the 
perpetuation of the category of sex.  Reinventing a new discourse through fiction is 
one of the ways in which Wittig attempts to make “the category of sex obsolete,” that 
is to envision a space in which words such as sex or heterosexuality or 
male/masculine or female/feminine would be transformed and redeployed 
symbolically and semantically.    
Monique Wittig and Sexual Difference 
The inventive and visionary nature of Les guérillères rests on Wittig’s ability 
to work and rework the structures of language in depth and disentangle their 
ideological implications.  This linguistic work was a feature that Wittig had in 
common with other French feminists in the 1970s such as Hélène Cixous or Luce 
Irigaray.  Later their names came to be associated among American scholars with 
theories of sexual difference and of “écriture feminine.”  Although Wittig was an 
active member of the MLF, and contributed to its history and its development–for 
instance she collaborated with Colette Guillaumin and Christine Delphy in the 
development of a materialist feminist approach that can be traced back to Simone de 
Beauvoir–she always vehemently opposed both the notion of sexual difference and 
that of “écriture feminine.”  Wittig believed that the idea of a feminine specificity, of 
a feminine difference in discourse is a product of masculine discourse and it is 
dangerously complicit with a heterosexual view that should be questioned and not 
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promoted.95  Difference can be found at the very heart of discourse as one of its 
functioning mechanisms as “les guérillères” cry out, “Ils t’ont tenue à distance, ils 
t’ont maintenue, ils t’ont érigée, constituée dans une différence essentielle” 
(Guérillères 146) [The men have kept you at a distance, they have supported you, 
they have put you on a pedestal, constructed with an essential difference (102).]  The 
problem for Wittig is that difference, as the cry of “les guérillères” implies, is an 
essential feature that reproduces the dominant masculine discourse instead of 
questioning it.  Wittig’s conviction finds evidence in her implicit link between the 
image of erection (“ils t’ont érigée”) and the masculine representation of feminine 
difference as an oppressive product of phallic discourse.  Wittig responds to the 
pernicious association between sexual difference and masculine discourse in a couple 
of different ways.  In The Straight Mind she literally calls for a destruction of 
sex/gender on the part of women: “This is why we must destroy it and start thinking 
beyond it if we want to start thinking at all, as we must destroy the sexes as a 
sociological reality if we want to start to exist” (8).  Women, who are the sole sexual 
category [“only they are sex, the sex” (8)], are also those who can affect the 
destruction of sex/gender by “breaking off” the heterosexual contract that perpetuates 
itself on the existence of such category: 
Now when I say, let us break off the heterosexual contract per se, I designate 
the group ‘women’.  But I did not mean that we must break off the social 
contract per se, because that would be absurd.  For me we must break it off as 
heterosexual. (35)  
 
One ought to understand the meaning of “breaking off” not so much in 
terms of a literal destruction, of a symbolic move that questions the 
                                                 
95 In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler maintains that what distinguishes Wittig from Irigaray is that 
Wittig’s idea of the category of sex is only feminine and that such a category is used to justify 
oppression and a system of reproduction.     
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heterosexist nature of such a contract and reinvents discourse at the same time.96  This 
move coincides with a moment of  discursive destabilization that I think of in terms of  
an undoing.  Such a move gestures at the creation of a new language for thinking  
subjectivity and bodies while exposing the pernicious functioning of sex/gender in  
discourse.  In The Straight Mind Wittig also identifies the space beyond sexual  
categories with the lesbian, an highly conceptual, but also a material category that is  
strongly embedded in the historical and cultural context of Wittig’s critique of  
Marxism as I will later explore: “Lesbian,” she writes “is the only concept I know of  
which is beyond the categories of sex” (20).97 The postulation of a lesbian ontology“  
beyond” the categories of sex has encountered the resistance of some scholars who  
see in the extra-discursive status of the lesbian an essentialist, ahistorical and even  
utopian product (Fuss; Jagose).98  De Lauretis is among the scholars who have re- 
                                                 
96Inspired by Rousseau’s social contract, Wittig adds that “if there is something real in the ideas of 
Rousseau, it is that we can form ‘voluntary associations’ here and now, and here and now reformulate 
the social contract as a new one” (45).  Of course, Wittig addresses women with her “we,” urging them 
to break away from that ungraspable reality of heterosexuality, by making more tangible connections, 
more adequate associations. 
97 It is worth quoting the full passage: “Lesbian is the only concept I know of which is beyond the 
categories of sex, because the designated subject is not a woman, either economically, or politically, or 
ideologically.  For what makes a woman is a specific social relation to a man, a relation that we have 
previously called servitude, a relation which implies personal and physical obligation as well as 
economic obligation (‘forced residence,’ domestic corvee, conjugal duties, unlimited production of 
children etc.) a relation which lesbians escape by refusing to become or to stay heterosexual.”  Wittig 
borrows the concept of servitude from Colette Guillaumin’s “sexage”, a blending of “sexe et 
esclavage” which foregrounds the social contract through which “men as a class appropriate women 
physically” (Griffin-Crowder 492). 
98 In her essay “Monique Wittig’s Anti-essentialist Materialism,” Diana Fuss takes a stance against the 
pitfalls of Wittig’s constructionist and anti-essentialist construction of the lesbian subject.  She exposes 
Wittig’s anti-essentialism as a dangerous position in which the “lesbian” as “cultural construction” is in 
contradiction with the “lesbian” as a “harmonious category,” as it is presented by Wittig.  Her lesbian, 
specifies Fuss, is both ahistorical and amaterial as it erases the “the real material and ideological 
differences between lesbians” adding that “what Wittig ought to be talking about is not lesbian culture, 
but lesbian cultures, not the ‘lesbian body’ but lesbian bodies, not lesbian sexuality but lesbian 
sexualities” (43).  In a recent article that appeared in a special issue of GLQ devoted to Monique 
Wittig, Brad Epps and Jonathan Katz responds to Fuss’s essay by pointing out that Wittig’s 
essentialism is totally of Fuss’s making.  In the same issue, Diane Griffin Crowder attributes queer 
theorists’ accusation of Wittig’s essentialism to a basic misunderstanding of Wittig’s materialism and 
her notion of sex-gender system.   
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evaluated Wittig’s “lesbian,” emphasizing instead its political and cognitive value.99   
Expanding on De Lauretis’ understanding of the lesbian, I set out to interrogate the  
relation between Wittig’s making of the lesbian as a discursive category and the  
undoing of the sex/gender system, a relation which I define figuratively through the  
laugh of the lesbian.100 This expression is a deliberate allusion to Le rire de la Méduse  
(1975), an irreverent essay by Hélène Cixous, often considered a manifesto of 
“écriture feminine.”  In it Cixous urges women to find a place in writing and  
discourse and to use their femininity and their material experience as source of 
creation.  Unlike Cixous Wittig finds the exercise of sex/gender harmful to women in  
discourse, a reason why she opts for its discursive overthrow.   
The theoretical opposition between Wittig and Cixous has a history of its own 
that is rooted in the debates concerning the proper objects and the proper subjects of  
feminism.  In other words, French feminists were divided on issues such as who 
was and was not entitled to speak as feminist in the feminist movement.  In an essay  
entitled “Wittig la politique,” Marie Hélène Bourcier writes that those quarrels had to  
do with “the intellectual rupture of lesbian politics from French hetero-feminist  
thought” (Shaktini 191).  Bourcier further recalls a shouting match between the  
two that took place in New York at the Modern Languages Convention in 1978, and  
ended with Wittig’s famous assertion “Lesbians are not women”: “During the  
                                                 
99 In “Eccentric Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness,” De Lauretis acknowledges 
the necessity of the lesbian denomination for reimagining a different social construct that alone can 
question the violence and the enforcement of the gender category.  As such, it is a category beyond or 
outside discourse, but one that is very much implicated in the making of social discourse and 
that contributed to refueling the feminist debate.     
100 I am aware that “undoing gender” is a citation of an existing theoretical terminology and the title of 
a book in which Judith Butler reconsiders her positions on gender vis-à-vis the theoretical and social 
uses of the term “sexual difference.”  In particular she suggests that sexual difference, a longtime  
contested term, often associated with European trends of feminism, may become a more fluid,  
productive and inclusive term that it has ever been.  Since Wittig has been one of the most strenuous  
opponent of the term, her lesbian may surprisingly play as the figure that revitalizes the discourse of  




conference, Hélène Cixous declared that French women who like women do not use  
the word lesbian because it bears negative connotations.  Wittig cried out, “Which  
France?  This is a scandal!” (189). The episode appears to be emblematic of the  
uneasy position of lesbians in the MLF during the 1970s.  The feminist quarrels  
eventually resulted in a “delocalization” of lesbian politics that brought  
Wittig to the US.101  As long as lesbianism was reduced to a private question and its 
Political value was misrecognized, there could be no political place for lesbians.  Such 
was Wittig’s answer to French feminists, after which ended the “political love story” 
between the French feminists and Wittig (193).  
It is not my intention to reanimate such debate here, but merely to complicate 
the terms of this historic opposition to initiate a dialogue between Wittig and Cixou  
and their fictions of gender and sexuality.  This dialogue will help me interrogate the  
relation between Wittig’s lesbian and the discourse of sexual difference and thus  
elucidate the critical importance of Wittig’s lesbian.  My word play with the title of  
Cixous’ famous essay “The Laugh of the Medusa” is meant to establish a queer  
parallel between Cixous’s feminism and the theory and fiction of Wittig who who was  
utterly at odds with the term feminist, for its proximity with the word woman,  
problematized over and over by Wittig.  Such a parallel will work as a pretext for  
me to argue that the emergence of the lesbian in Wittig’s fiction and theory does not  
exclude, but rather entails a radical reformulation of a discourse of sex/gender in spite  
of her famous rejection of the category of woman; on the other hand, the parallel will  
enable me to queer, so to speak, the feminist positions of Cixous, who brushed the  
                                                 
101 Bourcier further recalls an episode that took place in New York at the MLA in 1978, and ended with 
Wittig’s famous assertion “Lesbians are not women”: “During the conference, Hélène Cixous declared 
that French women who like women do not use the word lesbian because it bears negative 
connotations.  Wittig cried out, “Which France?  This is a scandal!” (189). The episode appears to be 
emblematic of the uneasy position of lesbians who wanted to make politics in France with a lesbian 
denomination.   
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“lesbian” aside in the name of feminism.  The point is to understand and perhaps  
imagine how Cixous/Medusa and Wittig/Lesbian could have met and embraced each 
other’s views at some point, and how that encounter could have produced an  
unforeseen queer dimension.   
This embrace between the Medusa and the Lesbian shall be the occasion to re- 
read the political love story between Wittig and French feminism and between the  
lesbian body and sexual difference as the ground for rethinking bodies and materiality  
in ways other than difference and sex/gender.  My chapter will be divided into three  
parts: in the first part I will explore and engage Cixous’s fiction of “écriture feminine”  
as the textually performed metamorphosis of “écriture feminine” into what I name  
“butch écriture;” in the second I will analyze Les guérillères as an instance of  
“écriture feminine” and the feminizing of Wittig’s fiction in spite of her rejection of  
the category of “woman;” finally, I will re-read Le corps lesbien as a textually  
performed disintegration of sexual materiality gesturing towards a a lesbian  
materiality not through sex/gender but through emotions.  Among the 
questions I am pursuing in the chapter are the following: what does it mean to think  
the body outside categories of gender?  How does the lesbian body relate to those  
categories?  If it is not possible to read the lesbian body within the categories of  
gender, are there suitable parameters or perspectives through which it is worth  
reconsidering lesbian materiality and what are they?  
Cixous/Medusa Comes to Writing: Écriture Féminine as Écriture Butch 
Le rire de la Méduse is a creative piece that mingles theory and poetic 
narration.  It is perhaps as experimental as Wittig’s fiction.  Some critics have taken it 
as a manifesto of “écriture feminine” (feminine writing) despite Cixous’s own 
assertion that it is impossible “to define a feminine practice of writing” (Laugh 883) 
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[“il est impossible de définir une pratique feminine de l’écriture” (45)].  Cixous insists 
nonetheless on the necessity for women to write, and talks of the inscription of a 
woman’s style (44/882), attacking critics and writers “disposing of sexual difference” 
(883) [“évacuant ainsi la difference sexuelle” (45)].  To theorists such as Wittig, who 
claim that writing is a neutral place Cixous responds by deliberately sexualizing 
fiction and even claiming for it some effects of irreducible femininity: “Il y a, il y aura 
de plus en plus fort, et vite maintenant une fiction qui produira des effets de féminité 
irréductibles” (45) [There is, there will be more and more rapidly pervasive now, a 
fiction that produces irreducible effects of femininity (883).]  What are then those 
irreducible effects that Cixous claims for herself and all women who write?  What 
kind of women, what kind of femininity does writing produce?  
One of Cixous’s main ideas is that writing for women is maternal or filial, in 
the sense that it is embedded into women’s special and primordial connection with 
their mothers, their mothers’ touch and tongue: 
Dans la parole féminine comme dans l’écriture ne cesse jamais de résonner ce 
qui de nous avoir jadis traversé, touché imperceptiblement, profondément, 
garde le pouvoir de nous affecter, le chant, la première musique, celle de la 
première voix d’amour, que toute femme préserve vivante. (44) 
 
[In women’s speech, as in their writing, that element which never stops 
resonating, which, once we’ve been permeated by it, profoundly and 
imperceptibly touched by it, retains the power of moving us–that element is 
the song: first music from the first voice of love which is alive in every 
woman. (881)] 
  
As writing is deeply connected with the mother and the rhythms that connection 
generates, writing also constantly renews the feeling of that connection.  Although 
this association can easily crystallize women’s writing around the image of the 
mother-daughter bond and link femininity to maternity uncritically, I believe it also 
resists and disturbs such an uncomplicated association.  For, the “mother” Cixous 
presents is not the mother figure socially codified:          
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La femme n’est jamais loin de la “mère” (que j’entends hors-rôle, la “mère” 
comme non-nom, et comme source des biens).  Toujours en elle subsiste au 
moins un peu du bon lait-de-mère.  Elle écrit à l’encre blanche. (44) 
 
[A woman is never far from “mother” (I mean outside of her role functions: 
the “mother” as nonname and as source of goods).  There is always within her 
at least a little of that good mother’s milk.  She writes in white ink. (881)] 
 
Cixous’s “mother” is not a name, meaning that it is not a role, a figure, a social 
category; Cixous’s “mother” is a metaphor as she herself puts it (44); as a metaphor it 
is already something else; “mother” is “othered” in something like the nurture and the 
inspiration (“sources de biens”) that pours out like milk and turns into ink for writing.  
Wittig would perhaps derogatively note that Cixous’s use of the “maternal” exploits 
certain female biological features (like maternity and breast-feeding) only to fit and 
promote the idea that “woman is wonderful.”102  However, Cixous’s re-appropriation 
of the “maternal” has an interesting discursive effect: as Cixous’s “maternal” is not 
quite the “mother,” that “not quite” transforms the way we think of the “maternal”  In 
this respect the “maternal” is a re-reading of the “mother,” but I should clarify how 
Cixous’s maternal rereading works.   
In Le rire Cixous urges women to seize language and discourse and write 
themselves with it and into it.  Language appears not so much as the discourse into 
which women are passively woven, but the tool with which they can conquer a place 
in history and culture.  While describing what writing should and must do for women, 
Cixous also does something intriguing with her own writing: 
Il faut que la femme s’écrive : que la femme écrive de la femme et fasse venir 
les femmes à l’écriture, dont elles ont été éloignées aussi violemment qu’elles 
l’ont été de leurs corps.  Il faut que la femme se mette au texte–comme au 
monde, et à l’histoire–de son propre mouvement. (39) 
 
                                                 
102 In Wittig’s view, Cixous appropriation of the image of the mother and of maternal feeding would 
perhaps fit into the feminist motto “woman is wonderful” which “retains for defining women the best 
features (best according to whom?) which oppression has granted us” (Straight 13).   
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[Woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women to 
writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from their 
bodies.  Woman must put herself into the text–as into the world and into 
history–by her own movement. (875)]103  
 
Cixous depicts women’s writing as an active and creative movement.  The sexual 
allure of the passage is noteworthy.  Cixous translates the woman’s urge to write with 
the image of a woman (the writer) who approaches the female text through the act of 
writing (“il faut que la femme écrive de la femme”).  The act of writing therefore 
turns into a textual intercourse between two women who come to writing and “come” 
through writing (“que la femme écrive de la femme et fasse venir les femmes à 
l’écriture”).  Cixous’s invitation to writing contains a sexual allusion that is already 
queer in that it pictures the act of writing not merely as a female act, but as the 
female-to female embrace that takes place through writing.  In other words “écriture 
feminine” is the place of a lesbian embrace.104  In this perspective what do we make 
of the white ink that flows through the pages of women’s textual intercourse?  Is it not 
the pleasurable effect of women’s embrace?  If so, women’s coming literally and 
metaphorically overwrites the mother’s milk to become source of goods, and of 
nurture.  But since the coming is an effect of a queer embrace, then nurture is always 
already queer, but of a queerness that is embedded into the “maternal” and that can 
produce a new text.   
Cixous herself was not stranger to queerness when she talked of women’s 
relation to writing, even prior to the invention of the critical term “queer.”  When she 
co-authored La jeune née with Catherine Clément (a collaborative writing in which 
                                                 
103 I am using translation of Le rire de la Méduse by Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen appeared in a 1976 
issue of “Signs.” 
104 The queer embrace in Cixous’s essay has an allure similar to the queer “maternal” embrace in 




two women literally come to writing) Cixous identified fiction and creative invention 
with homosexuality: 
Mais qu’il n’est pas d’invention d’autres Je, pas de poésie, pas de fiction sans 
qu’une certaine homosexualité (jeu donc de la bisexualité) fasse en moi œuvre 
de cristallisation de mes ultrasubjectivités.  Je est cette matière personnelle, 
exubérante, gaie masculine, féminine ou autre en laquelle Je enchante et 
m’angoisse. (154) 
  
[There is no invention of any other I, no poetry, no fiction without a certain 
homosexuality (the I/play of bisexuality) acting as a crystallization of my 
ultrasubjectivities.  I is the exuberant, gay, personal matter, masculine, 
feminine or other where I enchants, I organizes me. (84)] 
 
What Cixous meant by homosexuality is very different from the identity category we 
may think of nowadays.  Here homosexuality is more like the playful effect of the 
writing subject.  It is the discursive product of the performative fictional “I” that 
switches back and forth between gendered positions.  Cixous’s queer bent is in her 
recognition that writing is a performative process in which a subject, intent in the 
process of creation, can embrace different gendered and even sexual positions.  When 
Cixous writes that there is no invention without homosexuality she perhaps means 
that creation entails a certain amount of queering and that gender performances are 
part of this queering.     
Cixous does not simply theorize a queer fiction.  She also performs it in the 
eye of the reader of Le rire.  If on the one hand she queers maternal nurture by writing 
(through) a lesbian embrace, on the other hand she dislodges the all-female and 
feminine nature of the encounter.  She does so precisely by playing with the genders 
of the writer and the text.  The gender performative effects thus produced are worth 
discussing.  As I argued above, the act of writing, as presented and performed by 
Cixous’s text, is a motion that evokes the active move of putting oneself into a text.  
The lesbian/textual intercourse that opens Le rire can thus be read as a text in which 
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one woman (the active subject/the writer/the masculine) plays the butch and the other 
plays the femme (the text written/being forged/ the feminine).  I am tempted to think 
of her creation in terms of a butch creation, an image that would defeat the notion of a 
feminine writing.  It would defeat it in the sense that writing would no longer be 
associated with the woman’s biological body, but with her performative body, which 
can be masculine, as I have shown earlier.   
The active side of Cixous’s sexual performance is not the only performative 
effect of her writing.  Later in the essay, Cixous fancies an attack on language as a 
blow-up scene which blends a “blow-job” with a penetration: 
Il est temps qu’elle disloque ce ‘dans’, qu’elle l’explose, le retourne et s’en 
saisisse, qu’elle le fasse sien, le comprenant, le prenant dans sa bouche à elle, 
que de ses dents à elle, elle lui morde la langue, qu’elle s’invente une langue 
pour lui rentrer dedans.  Et avec quelle aisance, tu verras, elle peut depuis ce 
‘dans’ où elle était tapie somnolente, sourdre aux lèvres qu’elle va déborder de 
ses écumes. (49) 
 
[It is time for her to dislocate this “within,” to explode it, turn it around, and 
seize it; to make it hers, containing it, taking it in her own mouth, biting that 
tongue with her very own teeth to invent for herself a language to get inside 
of.  And you’ll see with what ease she will spring forth from that “within”– 
the “within” where once she so drowsily crouched–to overflow at the lips she 
will cover the foam. (887)] 
  
In this sexually charged passage, language is the masculine tool which Cixous 
performs a blow-job (“le prenant dans sa bouche”) that is shortly followed by 
penetration (“lui rentre dedans”).  Similar to the initial passage that describes a female 
homotextual intercourse in which the writer is butch and text is femme, this passage 
positions once again the writer in the penetrative position, but this time what changes 
is the gender of the text, which is no longer feminine but masculine.  As a 
consequence, Cixous may be said to embody a queer masculine position before a 
masculine text.  Wouldn’t that process produce a male homo-textual intercourse?  The 
writer, woman-penetrator who can produce at once a feminine and a masculine text 
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butches up so to speak the woman who comes to writing, forcing her to assume a 
masculine position vis-à-vis her own writing.  In the introduction to the English 
edition of La jeune née, Sandra M. Gilbert translates this performative process as 
follows “Woman may come to writing, constructing an erotic aesthetic rooted in a 
bisexuality that is a delight in difference, in multiplicity, in continuous awareness of 
‘the other’ within the self” (xv).  Calling for a bisexuality of writing, Cixous 
understands fiction as the coming together of “self” and “other,” of “feminine” and 
“masculine,” the making of a bisexual or even a transgendered dimension.   
 Given the highly performative nature of this “écriture,” I wonder what is 
feminine about it after all if the female writer behind the text constantly comes 
undone through the fictional and sexual performances of a woman writer?  What has 
emblematically become over the years the manifesto of “écriture feminine” is in fact a 
form of “butch écriture” that lends itself more to gender performativity than to a 
particular representation or rendition of femininity.  The myth of the Medusa that lies 
behind the text thus acquires distinctive queer traits.  According to the legend, 
Medusa, guardian of the goddess Athena (a queer relationship per se) would turn all 
men who dared gazing at her into stone.  This myth can be interpreted as a queer one 
in that Medusa strikes whoever attempts to penetrate her with his gaze.  The irony 
involved by Cixous/Medusa, however, is not only that Medusa makes herself 
impenetrable to men, but that she turns penetration back upon its head and becomes 
the penetrator herself, like the woman-writer of Le rire.      
 In the history of the debate between partisans and non-partisans of sexual 
difference, Wittig was, as I recalled above, the one who stood up against Cixous, and 
confronted her concerning definitions and uses of categories of gender and sexuality.  
In a way, Wittig was the one who dared to gaze at Cixous/Medusa like those men who 
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turned into stone. 105 What I want to do here is to reinvent a scene in which Wittig’s 
“marching vulvae” in Les guérillères parade in front of Medusa’s gaze, and brave a 
gaze that, I argue, is queer.  How would that queer gaze affect the meaning of Les 
guérillères and their fictional struggle to transform discourse?   
Wittig and the Social Contract 
 Les guérillères (1969) is a work of fantasy whose experimental urge echoes 
the transformative impetus and the revolutionary accents of the French feminist 
movement.  The revolutionary aspects of the novel are apparent in the fictional 
structure that shatters all parameters of linear narration.  Les guérillères unfurls 
through a series of fragments divided into three parts, each one marked by a circle at 
the center of a blank page, or a list of names belonging to heroines, goddesses, and 
female legendary figures from the present and the past.  The text is conceived of and 
put together backwards so that the beginning, which corresponds to the emergence of 
a new order, is actually the result of the war led by elles against masculine discourse, 
which appears only at the very end.  Such structure already forces us to pay attention 
to the process of discursive re-invention that subtends the fiction whose utopian 
endeavors have at times been misread by critics. In their brilliant article “Monique 
Wittig’s Materialist Utopia and Radical Critique,” Jonathan Katz and Brad Epps hold 
some queer and feminists scholars, such as Diana Fuss, responsible for producing 
Wittig’s utopianism.  According to Katz and Epps Wittig’s utopianism derives from a 
misunderstanding of Wittig’s theory of social reality and transformation.  
 The relevance and the originality of Wittig’s work lie in a call for a radical re-
invention of society and subjectivity that has affinities with Marxist thought and its 
                                                 
105 While rejecting the category of “woman” for lesbians Wittig does not embrace that of “man” either, 
precisely as a result of her refusal to wed the notion of sexual difference. 
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reformulation among theorists of the Frankfurt school such as Theodor Adorno, 
Herbert Marcuse and Mark Hokheimer.  In this respect I find it useful to provide the 
synthetic yet accurate account that Epps and Katz provides of those affinities:  
Wittig’s insistence on materialist analysis; her attention to economic and 
political as well as linguistic and discursive forms of domination; her back-and 
forth engagement of the particular and the universal; her deployment of a 
negative and positive hermeneutics of ideology and utopia; her defense of 
concrete subjectivity (albeit without the psychologistic vocabulary of 
Marcuse); her suspicion of pragmatism, empiricism, evidence, and “common 
sense”; her refusal of resignation in the face of a profoundly “unhappy” social 
reality (more stalwart, though, that that of Adorno); her “yearning for 
[another] normative totality” against and out of the oppressive normative 
totality of the here and now; her creative reworking of myth as a mnemonic or, 
better yet, an anamnestic device against the naturalized myths of the status 
quo; and, last but not least, her repeated critical invocation of Marx and 
Engels: all suggest, ever so subtly, the possibility of viewing the Frankfurt 
School critique of Marxism as offering a historically intermediate “bridge” 
between Marx and Engels and a materialist thinker like Wittig. (436-37) 
      
Theorizing within the historical frame offered by the Frankfurt school, Wittig retains 
of Marx and Engels the idea that social reality and social categories are not a natural 
given, but an “imaginary formation.”  For Butler, Wittig is “a classist idealist for 
whom nature is understood as mental representation” (Gender 159) and for whom the 
split between the material and representation does not make sense or appears as a 
product of the straight mind.  Indebted to post-Marxist thought, Wittig also embraces 
subjectivity as a valuable category that Marx and Engels deride as bourgeois and 
individualist, and she plays it against Marxism itself.  I shall provide here a few of 
Wittig’s points of contention with the Marxist theories of social contract and 
oppression in order to later explore how Wittig’s fiction intervenes both  as an 
exposure of the discursive mechanisms of oppression implicit in the reproduction of 
sexual categories, and as a powerful device through which to perform discursive 
transformations.    
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In her famous collection of essays The Straight Mind Wittig engages a Marxist 
understanding and construction of the social contract.  For Wittig, the social contract 
has been constituted as strictly heterosexual, that is to say, based on the assumption 
that the social division of individuals into sexual categories is natural; accordingly 
women are a “natural” group so defined by their material specificity (namely the 
capacity of giving birth).  As a target of Wittig’s theory and fiction, heterosexuality 
designates not so much a private relation between men and women as it is both a 
deeply rooted political institution and an ideological formation.  In Wittig’s view, 
heterosexuality has been collapsed with the notion of social contract to the point that 
the former has become a “goes without saying” whereas in fact it is merely “an 
ideological form which cannot be grasped in reality” (40).  The unquestioned 
heterosexual nature of the social contract has resulted in a naturalization of material 
traits: 
What we believe to be a direct and physical perception is but a mythic and 
sophisticated construction, an “imaginary formation” that reinterprets physical 
traits (in themselves as indifferent as any others but marked by the social 
system) across the web of relations in which they are perceived.  (He/she is 
seen as black, and so he/she is black; she is seen as a woman, and so she is a 
woman.  But before being seen in this manner, it was necessary for them to be 
made black, women). (11-12) 
 
Traits like sex and race are there for what they appear to be.  They are perceived as 
natural and inherent to bodies, but that perception is something already constructed.  
It is an artifact.  Understanding sex as a natural characteristic of women ensures the 
discursive reproduction of heterosexual categories and their oppressive exercise, 
for there is no sex.  There is but sex that is oppressed and sex that oppresses.  
It is oppression that creates sex and not the contrary.  The contrary would be 
to say that sex creates oppression, or to say that the cause (origin) of 
oppression is to be found in sex itself, in a natural division of the sexes 




The simultaneous creation of oppression and sex cannot be more striking than in 
language, which is, Wittig contends, “the first, the permanent, and the final social 
contract” (34).  Social contract and language being coincidental and practically 
identical, what occurs at the social level is always already inscribed into language.  
Not only does language bear the signs of social construction, it is indeed the very 
place of social construction.  It should not be surprising that the war of Les guérillères 
is ultimately a war on language.  Re-inventing language through fiction becomes one 
goal to act upon a discourse that is so enmeshed with sex that it “goes without 
saying.”  If one aim of the fictional war of Les guérillères is to disentangle the 
alliance between discourse and sex, it does so by exposing the constructed link 
between women and materiality, and by stressing what I would call with Butler the 
fictiveness of gender and all gendered representations.  Building on Butler’s argument 
that sex/gender is a fictive category in Wittig, that is a category produced through 
fiction, I will show that Wittig takes advantage of the fictiveness of sex/gender to 
navigate and blur the divide between theory and fiction, material and discursive, 
feminine and masculine, feminism and queerness, and extends our understanding and 
use of notions such as materiality and discourse.  
I have used thus far the terms sex and gender interchangeably.  My choice is 
not coincidental, though I am aware that the distinction and the refusal to distinguish 
sex and gender has been a contested terrain among feminist and queer theorists alike.  
In particular while commenting on Simone de Beauvoir’s famous assertion “One is 
born a woman, rather becomes one,” Butler argues that this assertion has itself urged 
a radical reformulation of the gender and sex distinction which has revealed 
productive in more than one respect: “This radical reformulation of the sex/gender 
distinction suggests that sexed bodies can be the occasion for a number of different 
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genders, and further, that gender itself need not be restricted to the usual two” 
(Gender 142).  In other words, Beauvoirs’s assertion has served as basis for thinking 
gender as both a discursive and a performative construction that questions the rigid 
duality of sexual difference.  However, in Wittig’s theory of sex/gender, Butler sees 
“no distinction between sex and gender” for “the category of ‘sex’ is itself a gendered 
category, fully politically invested, naturalized, but not natural.”  When I refer to 
sex/gender with this graphic modality of the slash, I intend to signal Wittig’s own 
working at the time across the divide between the two, a move that was specifically 
occasioned by Wittig’s grappling with the French meanings of the word “sexe” and its 
English translation with “gender.”  She nonetheless works across the translational 
divide to make her own theory of gender, one that has intrigued and inspired critics.  
But gender in Wittig’s work travels not merely across languages, but also across 
disciplines, back and forth between the social and the linguistic.  Wittig argues that 
“gender is the enforcement of sex in language, working in the same way as the 
declaration of sex in civil status” (Straight 79).  As a discursive mark, gender is 
primarily for her a grammatical and philosophical category of thought whose 
existence has never been questioned in grammar.  As a matter of fact, grammarians 
rely on sex to explain gender as “fictive sex” as if gender was merely the discursive 
name for sex, something material, tangible and more real.  Gender is fictive and sex is 
real.  Except that in Wittig’s understanding sex is already an “imaginary formation,” a 
product of the straight mind and thus its fictiveness can be reinterpreted as an 
artefact.106  The fact that fictive is a derivative of “fiction” is not coincidental here, 
                                                 
106 It is the American feminists, according to Wittig, who have “extrapolated the term gender from 
grammar to superimpose it on the notion of sex” (77).  Agreeing with this move Wittig acknowledges 
the political nuance that such extrapolation has brought to the understanding of heterosexuality as the 
social contract.  I would add that one sure consequence of this extrapolation is that the linguistic, the 
philosophical, the sociological and the political are dimensions that get intertwined in the very use of 
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but can help us also look at gender as descending from fiction.  In a way we do not 
want to separate gender/sex from its linguistic dimension because that dimension is 
what may enable us to envision gender in fiction, that is, in a dimension where things 
and realities are made through and because of words.  Perhaps envisioning gender as a 
matter of fiction was part of Wittig’s endeavour in Les guérillères in order to show 
that gender has a transformative character and can be changed through fiction.  I think 
I would not be mistaken if I say that Butler herself, in line with Wittig, sees no real 
distinction between sex and gender nor any causal relationship between the two 
categories.  That intriguing overlapping of sex and gender is also one that allows me 
to think about the complex and inextricable links between the material and the 
conceptual understanding of subjectivity in Wittig’s fiction.  In this perspective I 
build on Butler’s interpretation of Wittig’s materiality when she argues that Wittg 
“refuses the distinction between an ‘abstract’ concept and a ‘material’ reality and that 
language works in a material way to construct the world” (Gender 151).  I take 
Butler’s assertion as an invitation to see how Wittig’s fiction (literally her own body 
of thought) comes from the inextricable and complex relations between the material 
and the conceptual.    
 
Les Guérillères: Feminaries, Fictive Gender/Sex and Symbolic Attacks107 
 A privileged target of les guérillères is the wide array of images produced in 
masculine discourse with women’s bodies.  All those images make up the 
                                                                                                                                           
the word “gender.”  Thus gender, once expropriated from its linguistic dimension, becomes a multi-
layered and multi-functional category that acts upon language and that is acted upon.   
107 Wittig’s translations of Les guérillères and Le corps lesbien are by David Le Vay.  In order to be 
faithful to Wittig’s criticism of the term “women,” and to my own reading of Wittig, I made a few 
interventions into the translated texts.  Every time Le Vay translates “elles” with women, I restore the 
original “elles.”  I also restore “j/e” instead of I in order to reproduce and maintain the idea of the split 




“féminaires” (feminaries), sorts of female encyclopedias gathering knowledge about 
women in images of women’s genitals and body parts.  Moreover, the image of the 
vulva as a ring is referenced in the text and can be associated with the circle that 
punctuates the fiction physically occupying a whole page of the novel: “Elles disent 
que Clémence Maïeul a souvent dessiné sur le sol l’O qui est le signe de la déesse, le 
symbole de l’anneau vulvaire” (55).  [Elles say that Clemence Maïeul often drew on 
the ground that O which is the sign of the goddess, symbol of the vulval ring (27).]  
The vulvar ring thus shapes the text and the action of les guérillères who celebrate 
goddesses through the same vulvar ring.  By means of such an analogy between the 
vulva and the circle, the fiction itself seems to be shaped around an implicit reference 
to women’s genitals that we find in the feminaries as well.  Women’s genitals are the 
objects of a number of rhetorical procedures.  For instance they provide opportunities 
for comparisons: “Elles disent que le clitoris a été comparé à un noyau de cerise, à un 
bourgeon, à une jeune pousse, à un sésame décortiqué, à une amande, à une baie de 
myrte, à un dard, au canon d’une serrure” (42).  [Elles say that the clitoris has been 
compared to a cherry-stone, a bud, a young shoot, a shelled sesame, an almond, a 
sprig of myrtle, a dart, the barrel of a lock (32).]  In those images women’s genitals 
are associated in part with natural elements, a rhetorical technique that emphasizes 
femininity as inherently natural.  Is this rhetorical move a simple reiteration of the 
equation women = nature or is the text doing something with this equation?  If we 
look at other descriptions contained in the feminaries we may notice the insistence on 
details about the shapes and the parts of women’s genitals.  In the following passage 
the clitoris is taken to task and dissected in a way that is reminiscent of anatomical 
descriptions in scientific books:  
Elles disent que dans le féminaire le gland du clitoris et le corps du clitoris 
sont décrits comme encapuchonnés.  Il est écrit que le prépuce à la base du 
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gland peut se mouvoir le long de l’organe en provoquant une vive sensation de 
plaisir.  Elles disent que le clitoris est un organe érectile.  Il est écrit qu’il 
bifurque à droite et à gauche, qu’il se coude, se prolongeant dans deux corps 
érectiles, appuyés contre l’os pubien.  L’ensemble est une zone érogène 
intense qui irradie  tout le sexe en faisant un organe impatient au plaisir. (28-
29) 
 
[Elles say that in the feminary the glans of the clitoris and the body of the 
clitoris are described as hooded.  It is stated that the prepuce at the base of the 
glans can travel the length of the organ exciting a keen sensation of pleasure.  
Elles say that the clitoris is an erectile organ.  It is stated that it bifurcates to 
right and left, that it is angled, extending as two erectile bodies applied to the 
pubic bones…The whole constitutes an intensely erogenous zone that excites 
the entire genital, making it an organ impatient for pleasure. (23)] 
   
Here the resemblance of the clitoris with the penis is evident through the choice of 
words such as “gland,” “encapuchonnés,” or “prépuce.”  This vocabulary seems to 
recall the analogy between clitoris and penis that psychoanalytic discourses have 
reinforced in order to provide a representation of women’s sexuality and pleasure 
within a masculine rubric.  In chapter two I analyzed how such an analogy informed 
Carla Lonzi’s theory, constituting both a strategy of creation, but also the discursive 
limits of her theory of sexual difference and her practice of feminism.  One question 
arises with regard to the use of sexual organs and body parts to signify femininity in 
the feminaries: how is Wittig’s fiction departing from that discourse of sexual 
difference that used the labia and the clitoris as pretexts for the creation of a feminine 
language?  How can Wittig claim in theory that she rejects all affinities with the 
sexual difference feminists when in fact she seems to be using a sort of “écriture 
feminine” in her text? Isn’t Wittig reproducing the essentialist move that she purports 
to critique?  Isn’t she reiterating a dominant discourse of anatomy?  
 In a way Wittig may be said to feminize the text by returning to images of 
femininity and literally shaping the text out the vulvar ring.  Yet if we look more 
closely at some passages and even to the use of language we may note that her 
supposed “écriture feminine” is already a linguistic destabilization of writing and 
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discourse, an expression that Butler herself deployed to engage the fictional 
overthrow of sex.108  Yet the overthrow of sex cannot be oversimplified in an easy 
formula of gender destruction.  This is why thinking the space of fiction as a moment 
of destabilization may offer a more useful elucidation of Wittig’s call for gender 
destruction.  How is such destabilization achieved through fiction?   
  I believe that the key to understanding gender destabilization is found in 
effects of the rhetorical tactics deployed in fiction.  Two key tactics are repetition and 
the constant use of indirect speech.  Elles access representations of women’s bodies 
by reiterating what has been said about women, as in a passage portraying labia:  
Elles disent que le féminaire divertit les petites filles.  Par exemple trois sortes 
de nymphes y sont mentionnées.  Les nymphes naines sont triangulaires. Ce 
sont, accolés, deux replis étroits.  Elles sont presque invisibles parce que les 
lèvres les dissimulent. (41) 
 
[Elles say that the feminary amuses the little girls.  For instance three kinds of 
labia minora are mentioned there.  The dwarf labia are triangular.  Side by 
side, they form two narrow folds.  They are almost invisible because the labia 
majora cover them. (31)]   
   
The use of indirect speech “elles disent que” as opposed to “il est écrit” (in the 
passage on the anatomy of the clitoris) may signify an opposition of elles’ speech to 
masculine discourse and its apparent neutrality.  By repeating masculine discourse, 
elles do not simply mimick it, but also redeploy it in a way that somehow destabilizes 
its original meaning and its presumed naturalness.  But naturalness in discourse has 
been established, in the first place, through “a set of acts repeated over time,” through 
                                                 
108 In a chapter of BodiesThat Matter titled “Subversive Bodily Acts,” Butler looks at Wittig’s fiction 
and theory as the places where Wittig “calls for a radical reorganization of the description of bodies 
and sexualities without recourse to sex” (145).  One of the fundamental move for such radical 






“locutionary acts which, repeated, become entrenched practices and, ultimately, 
institutions” (Butler, Gender Trouble 147-48).   The performative impact of the 
indirect speech and of repletion is however crucial in showing how language works 
upon bodies and how those bodies, namely those of women, can work on those 
naturalizing effects.  The speech acts in the fiction do the opposite of what Wittig 
claims in “The Mark of Gender” where she contends that whenever women speak, 
they enter a linguistic domain in which, as women, they are deprived of agency and 
authority.  The phrase “elles disent que” is persistent in all those passages and it is 
both a consequence and a cause of elles’ act of reading and re-reading representation 
of women in the feminaries.  Speech acts are here instances of repetition and re-
reading through which elles can critically appropriate the content of the feminaries.  
Repetition works as a reappropriation of natural images of femininity.  But 
reappropriation does not erase those images; it overemphasizes them, making the link 
between women and bodies ever more apparent.  Hence when Wittig argues that 
gender is “harmful to women in the exercise of language acting as a denial at the very 
moment when one speaks” (Straight 80-81), she also uses her fiction to show how 
women can neutralize the harm that gender can do, by reiterating and thus exposing 
those images that are meant to harm.  Wittig’s fiction does not erase sex, but 
redeploys it in order to reveal its very constructed-ness and naturalness at the 
intersection between the conceptual and the material levels. 
 Yet there is more than repetition to Wittig’s fiction.  Elles also refer to the 
images in the feminaries as symbols that are part of an outdated culture.  The 
symbolic reference allows us implicitly to read the feminaries as a man-made 
symbolic system.  Symbol is also a term particularly relevant to my analysis.  Le Petit 
Robert gives the following definition for it: “Object ou fait naturel de caractère imagé 
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qui évoque, par sa forme ou sa nature, une association d’idée spontanée avec 
quelqu’un d’abstrait ou d’absent.” [Object or natural fact of the character image 
which evokes, by means of its form and nature, a spontaneous association with 
something abstract or absent.]  Symbolizing something or someone means therefore 
not only to objectify, but also to naturalize and make abstract at the same time.  When 
women are symbolized they enter a symbolic dimension that makes them, by means 
of a “spontaneous” association between their bodies and nature, abstract and absent.  
The problem is that this “spontaneous” association is always already constructed.  The 
term symbol then seems adequately to address that equation between women and 
nature that Wittig destabilizes in theory.  In fiction as well, elles make a similar 
operation.  Seemingly uttering a rallying cry, elles say that those symbols must 
disappear [“Elles disent que tout symbole qui exalte le corps fragmenté est temporaire 
et doit disparaître” (102)] [They say that any symbol that exalts the fragmented body 
is transient, must disappear (72)], and elles must stop exhalting vulvas (“cesser 
d’exalter les vulves”) in order “to break the last bond that binds them to a dead 
culture” (72) [“rompre le dernier lien qui les rattache à une culture morte” (102)].  
Elles do so first by refusing to recreate conventional images: “Elles ne créent pas dans 
leurs discours des figures conventionnelles à partir de ces symboles” (86).  [They do 
not in their discourse create conventional figures derived from these symbols (61).]  
For instance, elles refuse to reiterate women’s representation through the image of the 
lack of penis: “Je refuse de marmotter après eux les mots de manque de pénis” (152-
53) [I refuse to mumble after them the words lack of penis (106).]  The refusal to 
reiterate is a rejection of a mimicking gesture (“marmotter”).  Yet in such rejection, 
there is a reiteration of that same language.  The repetition here somehow dislodges 
the essentializing gesture of the masculine language, it does not endorse it.   
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 Instead irony and reversal come in its place: masculine images replace the 
feminaries to become objects of ridicule, as in the sequence where elles chase after a 
male prisoner turning his sex into a series of laughable comparisons: “Elle est ta 
verge/vergette/ batogue baguette/ broche brochette/ verge de plomb” (152).  [It is your 
rod/cane/staff/wand/peg skewer/staff of lead (106).]  Here it is not the vulva, but the 
penis that comes under attack, and elles subvert the rhetorical strategy of the 
feminaries whereby women’s vulvae are taken as symbols for femininity.  When this 
procedure is turned against men it immediately shows its disempowering effect since 
the male prisoner appears entrapped not so much by his female persecutors, by the 
metonymic chain of signifiers that define his masculinity through his penis.  His 
entrapment is a linguistic effect, just as the call of les guérillères against symbols is 
an attempt “to disinter the subject from layers of linguistic entrapment” (Katz and 
Epps 442).   
 In turn, vulvae cease to be objects of comparisons or metaphors, or to be 
hidden behind naturalistic images.  They are simply exposed to the sun so that “le 
soleil s’y réfléchisse comme dans un miroir” (24) [the sun may be reflected therein as 
in a mirror (19)].  The sun’s exposition is so glaring that it “makes the eye turn 
elsewhere, unable to stand the sight” (19) [“les yeux se fixent ailleurs n’en pouvant 
supporter la vue” (24)].  Hence the attention is both centered on and deflected from 
sex.  Sex is no longer the focus, but stays out of focus because of its unexpected 
glaring effects.  Putting sex out of focus is perhaps another strategy of elles, along 
with repetition and ironic reversal.  Sexual references are very much in sight but, 
having lost their functions as metaphors and symbols they are no longer in focus.  The 
double movement of the discursive exposure of sex and its being out of focus is 
conducive to the process of radical re-invention: elles can finally invent a brand-new 
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world or a brand-new fiction made of stories that elles recite to entertain themselves.  
The feminaries thus become texts to be read for the amusement and the distraction of 
elles [“elles disent que le féminaire divertit les petites filles” (41)].  I believe that it is 
precisely in the moment of re-reading and in the component of amusement that 
resides the power of Wittig’s fiction and its reinvention. 
 The act of rereading the feminaries for amusement is inscribed as a moment of 
invention: elles take turns and write on the blank spaces of a “grand registre” that 
lacks chronological order.  Sometimes what is written in the register is read out loud 
and shared among the readers.  Among the rewritten stories are the Snow White story 
and the legend of the Medusa, to name just a couple.  These fairy tales are radically 
reinvented as to bear very little or no resemblance whatsoever with the traditional 
versions of the stories.  In the tale of Sophie Menade, the wise madwoman, Sophie’s 
hairdo speaks through the mouths of her thousand snakes among which figures 
Orpheus who tries to entice Sophie-Eve to eat the apple which will give her wisdom.  
Here Sophie is a figure resulting from the blending of at least four other recognizable 
ones: Eve, Eurydice, the Menade and the Medusa, all mythical figures created by 
men.  Yet the collapsing of the four into one makes for another completely new figure 
that has nothing to do with the others; her specificity is that she plays as a re-reading 
of all of them.  In the retelling of the Snow White story, Scarlett Rose (Rose Écarlate) 
pursues Snow White in the woods.  In the pursuit, Scarlett Rose laughs so hard that 
she falls down and then shouts at Snow White, threatening to beat her with a stick if 
she does not stop.  Scarlett Rose keeps repeating the same refrain “tu n’en as pas!” 
(you don’t have any) referring to sacred ancestors.  But here Snow White, oblivious 
of her past and indifferent to tradition, could not care less for her ancestors.  
Brandishing the stick, Snow White turns around and beats Rose with a stick reducing 
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her/it to what she/it really is, the image of a “grosse racine, rose comme une rose 
rose” (65) [a stout root, pink as a pink rose (48)].  The character of Snow White is 
very unlike the one we hold in our memories.  The only thing the two have in 
common is perhaps a name.    
 What is at stake in the re-reading of those fairy tales?  For one thing there is a 
relationship with the past symbolic system or rather, a rejection of such a relationship.  
Like the oblivious Snow White, elles act as if they cannot remember: when elles 
attempt to remember their origins and their beginnings, the act of remembrance is 
impossible: “Elles disent que le temps où elles sont parties de zero est en train de 
s’effacer dans leurs memoires” (38).  [Elles say that the time when they started from 
zero is in process of being erased from their memories (27).]  The refrain of Scarlett 
Rose “tu n’en as pas” (you do not have any!) may as well refer to the past and to the 
refusal to associate with past symbols and stories.  But what kind of past is a past built 
on a fairy tale?  It is a past of representation, a past of fiction, and as such it is a 
fictive past.  Being past fictive, elles can give themselves the liberty to re-invent what 
was already invention, changing the features of those fairy tales at leisure.   
  Re-invention may lead elles to create figures that are unfamiliar or de-
familiarized from any past figure of femininity.  The grotesque image of Iris Our, the 
laughing dead woman is worth mentioning because, among the others, it captures the 
de-familiarzing gesture of elles vis-à-vis the symbolic.  Iris lies dead with an artery 
cut open producing with her mouth “un gargouillement qu’on peut attributer à la 
deglutition du sang” (56) [a gurgling attributable to the swallowing of blood (41)].  
Here the “gargouillement” is also confused with the sound of laughter, which causes 
Iris’ death agony to be confused with laughter.  Is the agonizing Iris laughing at a 
dead culture which her body incarnates?  Iris Our is an enigmatic figure indeed, more 
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than the hybrid Sophie Menade, and the unrecognizable Snow White whose names, at 
least, give us a clue.  Iris Our is not a recognizable figure from traditional fairy tales.  
She seems to be there as a figure for reading the rewritten fairy tales via the laugh.  
With her laughter Isabelle Our reminds us of the fictive nature of those 
representations and the possibility that fiction has to de-familiarize women from those 
representations.  In the examples of these fairy tales fiction becomes the form of 
writing that uses and transform traditional figures to reinvent the present and produce 
new unexpected figures.   
 Fiction also carries out what for Wittig is one fundamental function of writing: 
“every writer should take words one by one and strip them of their everyday meaning 
in order to be able to work, with words, on words” (Straight 43).  Situating invention 
not in the act of signifying, but in that of divesting words from their meaning, Wittig 
thus understands that “a writer must first reduce language to be as meaningless as 
possible” (72) in order to invent.  Making language meaningless in the process of 
invention may involve indeed stripping words of all the layers of signification, of 
unburden language of its symbolic burden.  Moreover, if we agree with Wittig that 
“language has a plastic action upon the real” (78) we can also understand the attack of 
elles on language as an attempt to wrest discourse from its conventionally rigid forms; 
in other words, by acting upon language, elles reveal that language is plastic, 
bendable, and modifiable and not a rigid system, with all the phallic allusions this 
attribution may have.  Fictional re-invention is one place in which language and 
gender can simultaneously be destabilized and transformed for it is in the exercise of 
language that women can act upon gender representations as Wittig herself suggests.   
  Rather than following critics and even translators who qualify Les guérillères 
as a fiction about the overthrow of sex, we might more appropriately follow Wittig’s 
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thinking and look at the destabilizing effect that her fiction produces.  Such a 
destabilizing move, which the war of elles represents, is performed and achieved 
through a variety of rhetorical tactics.  These include repetition and re-appropriation, 
reversal and rereading.  All those tactics do not quite do away with gender; they 
simply overemphasize and expose the discursive associations between women and 
nature, and the representation of women through their bodies and their sexual organs.  
Constant repetition and rereadings constitute a reappropriation of images that also re-
invents them by undoing their forms and their contents.  The destabilizing effect of 
fiction is particularly evident in the retelling of the fairy tales in which the new 
heroines bear only a remote resemblance to the originals.  Aside from destabilizing 
the original narrative, the new stories also defamilarize the reader from those 
originals.   
 Defamiliarization can be another way to name the process of undoing forms in 
Wittig’s fiction.  Defamiliarizing readers or provoking a shock in the reader was 
indeed one of Wittig’s goals while composing her fiction:  to judge from her own 
words fiction and defamiliarization go together.  Wittig starts Les guérillères by 
inserting an unfamiliar subject pronoun elles, who are the sole inhabitants of the 
fictional space after ils have been swept away.  As Wittig suggests in “The Mark of 
Gender,” elles is not meant to be a female pronoun, but rather to carry the universal 
value that ils has always had within discourse: “Elles is a pronoun that gets used very 
little in French where ‘ils’ acquire a more general meaning that also includes elles 
while in fact erasing it.  As a result, elles never stands for the general and is never the 
bearer of a universal point of view” (Straight 85).  One should be careful not to 
confuse elles with “women,” which would subvert Wittig’s discursive attempt to 
universalize the pronoun and its referents.  What is even more surprising is the fact 
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that elles make their own kind of war by expropriating one of the most masculine 
activities.  In her critical reading of Wittig, Butler points out that works of literature 
such as Wittig’s function for minorities as the discursive strategy that helps “preempt 
the position of the speaking subject in its invocation of the universal point of view” 
(Gender 152).  What we see at work in the elles war is supposedly the attempt on the 
part of elles to preempt the speaking position and thus appropriate what has been 
traditionally gendered masculine.  Yet in elles’ appropriation of the masculine 
discourse of war, gender becomes a laughable matter: “Elles disent que la guerre est 
une affaire de femmes.  Elles disent n’est-ce pas plaisant?” [They say that war is an 
affair for women.  They say, is this not laughable? (180).]  The adjective “plaisant” in 
the original version is more than pleasant or gratifying; being “plaisant” linked with 
the word “plaisanterie” (joke), it makes the idea of a female war into a joke.109  It is 
gender that contributes this nuance to war, for war has been traditionally and 
universally represented as masculine.  The expropriation of war from the masculine 
domain does not so much “feminize” war, or universalize it in a different way; rather 
it makes the gender attribution visible and laughable.  Except that the war led by elles 
is already very different from the war we may have in mind; hence the ironic effect of 
the elles’ war is that it de-familiarizes us from the very concept of war while elles 
perform it.  The rereading of war and the subjective transition from ils to elles 
produce an unforeseen effect which recalls that provoked by the image of the male 
prisoner entrapped in the metonymy of his own sex [“Elle est ta 
verge/vergette/batogue/baguette/brochebrochette/verge de plomb” (152)].   Yet, in 
spite of Wittig’s claim that elles is universal and ungendered, I continue to perceive 
                                                 
109 David Le Vay translates “plaisant” with “gratifying.”  I propose instead the use of the attribute 
laughable in order to maintain a relation with the noun “plaisanterie” (joke in English) and to justify 
laughter as the destabilizing/undoing practice of the guérillères.     
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elles as a feminine pronoun; the novelty of it lies for me in the transitive property of 
the subject position from ils to elles, one that can put the whole question of gender 
into a different light, provoking unexpectedly hilarious effect.  The defamiliarizing 
strategy of Wittig’s fiction does not come without laughter, an effect that prompts me 
to ask how laughter intervenes as an après coup tactic, and as the very effect of 
destabilization and fictive undoing. 
 The assault to masculine language is a central preoccupation of Les guérillères 
and Le rire de la Méduse.  It is through laughter that Cixous fancies this assault will 
be carried out: “à mettre en pièces les bâtis des institutions, à faire sauter la loi, à 
tordre “vérité” de rire” (49) [to shatter the framework of institutions, to blow up the 
law, to break up the ‘truth’ (888)].  Laughter does not cause but rather signifies the 
moment in which the “truth” is broken into pieces.  Which truth? Whose truth? Can 
truth be located in the masculine system of representation that we take as true, as 
natural?  Who laughs at this truth?  The Medusa does, she who is the mythical figure 
that just earlier amused us and les guérillères with the de-familiarized and de-
familiarizing look of Sophie Menade.  As an estranged product of Wittig’s fictive 
undoing, the Wittig’s Medusa of Wittig is different, from the fictional point of view, 
from the Medusa of Cixous.  She is quite a different subject, the effect of the 
transformation she herself enacts and imposes onto other people, according to the 
legend.   
     The legendary Medusa has the power to transform male human essence into  
stone, something solid and unchanging.  What if the Medusa were to direct her gaze  
to Wittig’s “lesbian?”  Would the fact that the Medusa directs her gaze to men implies  
that Wittig’s lesbian should be assumed to be a man and turned into stone?  The  
particular gender effect occasioned by such encounter may be troubling for Wittig  
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who, in spite of her claim that “lesbians are not women,” would perhaps cringe at the  
idea that her lesbian is taken for a man: “To refuse to be a woman, however, does not  
mean that one has to become a man” (Straight 12).  Hence in Wittig’s anti sexual  
difference logic, being a lesbian amounts not only to a rejection of “woman,” but also  
of “man.”  Wittig’s rejection leaves me wondering about alternatives for conceptually  
embracing bodies and subjectivities.  Wittig’s sceptical attitude towards an easy  
endorsement of sexual categories for making sense of the lesbian has opened up for us  
the possibility of expanding our criteria for reading bodies and subjectivities.  In a  
passage of Les guérillères, elles utter another of their rallying cry: “Elles disent, si je  
m’approprie le monde que ce soit pour créer des rapports nouveaux entre moi et le  
monde” (107).  [They say, if I take over the world, let it be to forge 
new links between myself and the world (154).]  We may think of les guérillères’ cry  
as the urge to find new relations among subjects other than those described by gender. 
Perhaps the theoretical figure of the lesbian and the fiction of The Lesbian Body are  
one way to think relations between subjects and bodies otherwise.  I will thus turn to  
the fiction of Le corps lesbien to examine how the text can constitute this possibility  
for an alternative reading of materiality as it pertains to lesbianism. 
Subjective Struggles and Material (De)construction: Elles, je, tu and the Lesbian 
Body 
Le corps lesbien came out in 1973, a few years after Les guérillères and after 
disagreements among members of the MLF had, led to a major split within the French 
feminist movement.  One may wonder whether Le corps remotely bears signs of those 
internal splits.  One answer may be found in the subject pronouns of the fiction whose 
dynamics describe two very different struggles: the love struggle between j/e and tu, 
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the lover and the beloved; and the struggle between the loving couple and elles.110  
The presence of elles in the fiction is striking and reminiscent of the warriors of Les 
guérillères.  It seems, however, that elles have a different function in Le corps.  Given 
the internal tensions in the MLF, I am inclined to think of elles as all the French 
feminists united under the banner of the MLF.  A communitarian subject entrusted 
with a collective value in Les guérrillères, elles seem to have lost that collective 
endeavor in Le corps.  In the latter, elles dwell in a separate dimension from j/e-tu, 
who also appear estranged: “Elles courent sur la plage et se poursuivent.  Elles sont à 
peine visibles à présent.  Tu es seule comme j/e le suis avec toi face à face” (71). 
[Elles run and chase each other on the beach.  Now they can barely be seen.  You are 
alone as I am with you face to face (67).]111  Here the distance of elles makes elles 
barely visible, and contributes to foreground not only the separateness of j/e and tu, 
but also their solitude vis-à-vis the group: “Tu n’es dans aucun groupe. J/e te cherche.  
Tu n’apparais pas” (91).  [You are not in any group. J/e seek you.  You do not appear 
(84).]  The dis-appearance of tu may as well signal the fact that tu is lost in the group 
or rather that she does not belong to any group.  How can we interpret the couple’s 
solitude, their sense of no belonging, of homeless-ness?  Were I to take the dynamics 
of the MLF into account, I would read the distance between elles, j/e and tu as 
reminiscent of the rupture between hetero-feminists and lesbian feminists which I 
earlier mentioned, a schism that makes them unfamiliar to each other.  Elles also have 
a destructive function towards j/e, a destruction to which j/e lends her body: “Elles me 
détruisent avec une minutie si parfaite qu’on ne trouve plus de moi cendres sur la terre 
                                                 
110 There is yet another meta-narrative struggle that involves the author/Wittig and the fictional matter 
to be forged, to which I return shortly.   
111 All translated passages are taken from The Lesbian Body translated from French by David Le Vay.  
Every time Le Vay translates “elles” with women, I will restore the original “elles” to be truthful to 
Wittig’s critical stance about the term “women.”  I will also restore “j/e” instead of I in order to 
reproduce and maintain the idea of the split subject that Wittig originally conceived. 
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traces dans les mémoires” (150).  [J/e cry out let them do it if they dare let them 
destroy m/e with such perfect meticulousness that no ashes of m/ine will remain on 
the earth or traces in the memory (132-133).]  It is as if j/e was asking elles to destroy 
her body and leaving no trace of it.  This gesture may also be emblematic of the 
conceptual rupture among French feminists in the MLF concerning women’s bodies 
and feminist matters that resulted in a rejection of the lesbian matter.     
The encounter between these two subjects, elles/hetero-feminists and j/e 
lesbian is one of estrangement and self destruction.  I recalled earlier that division 
among feminists occurred due to the lack of social and political recognition of 
lesbianism within the MLF.  Another issue at stake was Wittig’s own skepticism 
towards the denomination “feminist:”  
The ambiguity of the term “feminist” sums up the whole situation.  What does 
“feminist” mean?  Feminist is formed with the word “femme,” “woman,” and 
means: someone who fights for women as a class and for the disappearance of 
this class.  For many others it means someone who fights for woman and her 
defense–for the myth, then, and its reinforcement. (Straight 14)  
 
Wittig cautions about the uncritical use of the denomination “feminist” as it lumps a 
diverse range of subjective experiences into an abstract category that so closely 
recalls that of “woman,” the myth, the social construction.  Hence the destructive 
effect that the word “woman” can have is perhaps the one at work in the tense 
relationship between elles and j/e in Le corps.  Wittig refused the term “woman” for 
the destructive effects the word could have for the subjects who uncritically identified 
with it.  As long as elles/hetero-feminists advocate a feminism based on “woman” 
there cannot be any liberation or any transformation since lesbians, for Wittig, do not 
identify as “women,” nor as “men” and cannot see the political validity of such 
identity labels.  As a result, lesbians such as Wittig, were not easily subsumed into 
either the label “woman” or the label “feminist,” and therefore the lesbian found 
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herself out of place, or with no place at all.  She did not have it in the movement or in 
fiction, and thus becomed the paradoxical place of a material and symbolic void: “Ce 
qui a cours ici, pas une ne l’ignore, n’a pas de nom pour l’heure” (Corps 7).  [There is 
not one who is unaware of what takes place here, which has no name yet (15).]  “Ce 
qui a cours ici” has no name, and naming what the fiction is about (properly “ce qui a 
cours ici”) becomes impossible because of the very fact that it has no name.  That 
blank space appears to be the creative realm that Wittig share with other writers, but 
also the conceptual space of the lesbian.  The problem is then how to articulate a void 
with a fiction that has never being imagined as Monique Wittig explained: 
With The Lesbian Body I was confronted with the necessity of writing a book 
totally lesbian in its theme, its vocabulary, its texture, from the first page to the 
last, from title page to back cover.  I was thus located in a double blank.  The 
blank that all writers have to face when they begin a book.  The other blank 
was of a different nature.  It was the nonexistence of such a book till then. 
(Shaktini, 44) 
 
Once again we are confronted with a language struggle, as in Les guérillères, but here 
the struggle is not over existing representations, but over the fabrication of a new 
fictional form, previously inexistent.  As a result, the fiction is less about the telling of 
a story than the search for a new form, a new matter.  As much as fiction relies on the 
act of invention so does the lesbian, and in this respect, the pair “fiction” and 
“lesbian” become almost synonymous.  Perhaps the cryptic nature of Le corps, which 
critics have highlighted, draws upon the dilemma that the simultaneous discursive 
invention of “fiction” and “lesbian” poses.  For if invention was in Les guérillères a 
matter of re-reading or re-writing, a movement back and forth between tradition and 
newness, in Le corps lesbien invention becomes a much more complex issue.  
201 
 
The Lesbian Body: A Concept that Mattered 
The lesbian had for Wittig and other critics such as De Lauretis, who is one of 
her finest readers, a social and political relevance:  
Lesbians should always remember and acknowledge how “unnatural,” 
compelling, totally oppressive, and destructive being “woman” was for us in 
the old days before the women’s liberation movement.  It was a political 
constraint, and those who resisted it were accused of not being “real” women. 
(Straight 12) 
  
Lesbianism was not merely a form of subjectivity, but a form of historical  
consciousness, a particular position vis-à-vis women’s material oppression.  Because  
lesbians saw the destructive effect that the word “woman” could have, they actively  
resisted it with the consequence of being considered less than women.  De Lauretis  
pointedly grasped the discursive nuances of Wittig’s lesbian, highlighting its  
subjective and its relational import: 
Wittig’s “lesbian” was not just an individual with a personal “sexual 
preference” or a social subject with a simply “political” priority, but the term 
or conceptual figure for the subject of a cognitive practice and a form of 
consciousness that are not primordial, universal, or coextensive with human 
thought, as de Beauvoir would have it, but historically determined and yet 
subjectively assumed. (Shaktini 55) 
 
Recognizing all the different layers that the term “lesbian” involves, De Lauretis 
situates the lesbian as a discursive figure, at once theoretically produced, but also 
socially produced to contrast and critique the categories of “woman,” and of “man”: 
“Thus a lesbian has to be something else, a not-woman, a not-man, a product of 
society, not a product of nature, for there is no nature in society” (Straight 13).  The 
presence of lesbians suggests the fictiveness of any idea of a “natural” society or a 
“natural” being.  Wittig embrace of the lesbian as a social product helps to better 
understand the constructed-ness of the sex categories.  Wittig’s lesbian urges women 
to think of how conscious women are of inhabiting constructed categories, since 
consciousness is, for Wittig, already, “the whole conceptual reevaluation of the social 
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world, its whole reorganization with new concepts, from the point of view of 
oppression” (18).  De Lauretis celebrates the lesbian as the new emerging 
consciousness which she qualifies as “eccentric,” for its particular power of 
destabilizing the social while experiencing it from within.  This particular position is 
one that derives from the consciousness of oppression: “The movement back and 
forth between the levels of reality (the conceptual and the material reality of 
oppression, which are both social realities) is accomplished through language” (19).  
Once again, as in the case of elles, the lesbian brings us back to the linguistic 
implications of social constructions, the tensions between the linguistic and the social, 
between the conceptual and the material.  This tension is one that can be productive in 
conditions of oppression, and one from which the lesbian body emerges in the 
paradigmatic void of fiction.        
Le corps is composed of a number of fragments in which the subject pronouns 
j/e and tu, like a lover and her beloved, come together in a series of erotic and 
destructive encounters.  Those fragments are also interspersed by sections that list 
body parts, organs or physical characteristics which meticulously describe an anatomy 
of the lesbian body: 
Le corps lesbien la cyprine la bave la salive la morve la sueur les larmes le 
cérumen l’urine fèces les excréments le sang la lymphe la gélatine l’eau le 
chyle le chyme les humeurs les sécrétions le pus les sanies les suppurations la 
bile les sucs les acides les fluides les jus les coulées l’écume le soufre l’urée le 
lait l’albumine l’oxygène les flatulences les poches les parois les membranes 
le péritoine, l’épiploon, la plèvre le vagin les veines les artères les vaisseaux. 
(22-23) 
 
[The lesbian body the juice the saliva the snot the sweat the tears the wax the 
urine the faeces the excrements the blood the lymph the jelly the water the 
chyle the chime the humours the secretions the pus the discharges the 
suppurations the bile the juices the acids the fluids the fluxes the foam the 
sulphur the urea the milk the albumen the oxygen the flatulence the pouches 
the parietes the membranes the peritoneum, the omentum, the pleura the 




The lesbian body appears here in a dissected materiality that reveals both its 
heterogeneity and its similarity with any other human body.  This particular 
combination of bodily components from fluids to gases, however, serves to emphasize 
its fluid material quality.  Such fluidity includes elements of sexual desire and 
pleasure such as la “cyprine,” Wittig’s neologism for vaginal fluids.  Interestingly, 
those body parts that evoke pleasure are integrated with different components that are 
associated with scatology and secretion as to make the lesbian body a heterogeneous 
blending that disturbs the distribution of elements under recognizable categories.  
While some elements are indeed recognizable, some of them may also remain quite 
obscure, for instance the chyle, the chime or the omentum.  The accumulation of 
details is such that the body unfolds like the unsentimental production of a scientific 
treatise, but its parts can become quite unfamiliar.  The anatomical listing has the 
effect of becoming so objective as to defamiliarize the reader from the body and 
produce it as disintegrated materiality.    
Disintegration is perhaps, as Butler argued, one of the strategies of the fiction, 
and I would add one of the ways in which the lesbian body can materialize through 
fiction and even collapse with it.  Anatomical listings can thus be read as a 
consequence of a disintegrating approach to the body, which becomes ever more 
apparent in the encounters of j/e and tu.  Their encounters oscillate between 
destruction and recomposition.  Destruction is at times performed through a 
cannibalistic urge:  
M/a très délectable j/e m/e mets à te manger, m/a langue humecte l’hélix de 
ton Oreille  se glissant tout autour avec délicatesse, m/a langue s’introduit 
dans le pavillon, elle touche l’antélix, m/es dents cherchent le lobe, elles 
commencent à le broyer, m/a langue s’immisce dans le conduit de ton oreille. 
J// arrache un os, j/e tombe sur le superbe limaçon os et membrane tout 
enroulés. j/e les dévore, j/e fais éclater les canaux circulaires…j/e suis 
emprisonnée par toi qui m/e nourris. (17) 
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[M/y most delectable one j/e set about eating you, m/y tongue moistens the 
helix of your ear delicately gliding around, m/y tongue inserts itself in the 
auricle, it touches the antihelix, m/y teeth seek the lobe, they begin to gnaw at 
it, m/y tongue gets into your ear canal. J/e wrench away a bone, I fall on the 
superb cochlea bone and membrane all wrapped round together, j/e devour 
them, j/e burst the semicircular canals. J/e am poisoned by you who nourish 
m/e. (24)] 
    
The cannibalistic drive of j/e coincides with acts of consumption and absorption of the 
beloved on the part of the lover; it also simultaneously depicts a penetration of the 
beloved’s body parts.  Penetration is not merely a cold bodily invasion, but a 
recognizable gesture of seduction, like the penetration of the ear.  Its seductive allure 
is disturbed and almost made unfamiliar by the precision of the description of a 
cannibalistic ritual.  The cannibalistic relation of the lover and the beloved is erotic 
and returns throughout the fiction.  While in this instance the lover eats up the 
beloved, in another section, it is the beloved who gets to taste the lover’s body by the 
hand of elles who present the lover’s limbs for a cannibalistic banquet: 
Sur m/on ordre elles apprêtent m/es membres sectionnés m/es bras m/es 
cuisses m/es jambes dont les chairs sont retirées avec précision et longuement 
bouillies, elles te les présentent entourées de sauces diverses sur des plats 
brillants chaque mets portant pour te plaire un nom différent. (117-18) 
 
[At m/y order the women prepare m/y severed limbs m/y arms m/y thighs m/y 
legs whose flesh is meticulously removed and boiled for a long time, they 
offer it to you surrounded by different sauces on glittering plates each plate 
bearing a different name to please you. (105)]  
 
Critics of Wittig have often expressed a discomfort with the apparent violence that 
emerges from Le corps lesbiencannibalism, bodily dissection and 
dismembermentarguing that such violence would align the text with a masculine 
discourse.112 Both De Lauretis and Butler seem to understand the seemingly 
                                                 
112 Namascar Shaktini detects in the uncomfortable reception of the text’s violence (cannibalism, 
bodily dissection, dismemberment) a distinctive trait of Wittig’s feminist readership as if the very fact 
of violence was in contradiction with a feminist approach.  Building on a piece by Clare Whaling 
“Wittig’s Monsters: Stretching the Lesbian Reader,” Shaktini urges us to understand Wittig’s textual 
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discursive violence of the text as a discursive strategy much in the way Wittig herself 
suggested in her commentary to her fiction: “It’s necessary to talk about violence in 
writing because it is always the case with a new form: it threatens and does violence 
to the older ones” (Shaktini 45).  Butler instead regards the act of doing violence to 
older forms as an engagement with the violence produced by the compulsoriness of 
the heterosexual institution upon bodies:   
The violence is neither a simple ‘turning of the tables’ in which women now 
wage violence against men, nor a simple internalization of masculine norms 
such that women now wage violence to themselves.  The violence of the text 
has the identity and coherence of the category of sex as its target, a lifeless 
construct, a construct out to deaden the body…Wittig’s textual violence is 
enacted against that institution and not primarily for its heterosexuality, but for 
its compulsoriness. (Gender 161) 
 
In a similar move De Lauretis argues that the violence of the text is the necessary 
strategy for the representation of the death of the anatomical female body that 
patriarchal discourse produced: “The dismemberment of the female body limb by 
limb, organ by organ, secretion by secretion, is at the same time the deconstruction 
term by term of the anatomical female body as represented and mapped by patriarchal 
discourse” (Shaktini 58).  Hence Wittig’s fiction implies an amount of violence which 
is itself a translation of the violence exerted at the material and symbolic level.  I 
would add that the coming together of j/e and tu is necessarily embedded in such 
violence, the violence of an institution that regulates bodies and desires.  What critics 
have perceived as violence may be nothing but the struggle that the two loving 
subjects go through in order to inscribe onto the text their eroticism.  This tension at 
once subtends and produces the fictional materialization of a lesbian body/text as a 
narrative of erotic struggle.   
                                                                                                                                           
violence as the mark of a different relation between author and reader, a relation in which the reader is 




The disintegrating encounters have a transformative impact over the body that 
loses at times its human contours to become “something else.”  I think of this 
transformation in terms of the “medusean” effects of fiction.  Wittig’s fiction, like the 
Medusa, can act upon the body to affect its nature, or rather its material quality, to 
change it and deform it.  Transformation can thus take several modalities.  It can be a 
literally physical metamorphosis by which the body turns into another substance: 
J/e  m/e transforme en boue m/es jambe m/on sexe m/es cuisses m/on ventre 
debout entre tes jambes saoule de l’odeur qui de la cyprine vient montant de 
tin milieu, j/e m/e liquifie au-dedans et au dehors…m/es muscles se séparent 
les uns des autres par mottes détrempées.  Tout m/on corps est gagné.  Le 
premier à tomber est /on anus.  Quelques fessiers suivent de près.  M/es biceps 
abandonment m/es bras.  Les bras tout entiers tomber par terre. J/e perds 
courage, j/e m//abandonne à ta volonté m/a déplorable j/e n’ai aucune part à 
cette transformation systématique que tu commets sur m/oi. (76) 
  
[J/e am transformed into mud m/y legs m/y sex m/y thighs m/y belly standing 
between your legs glutted with the smell of the vaginal secretion rising from 
your middle, J/e liquefy within and without.  My muscle separate from each 
other in sodden masses.  M/y entire body is overwhelmed.  First to fall is my 
anus.  Some glutei soon follow.  M/y biceps abandon m/y arms.  The arms 
themselves fall entire to the ground…J/e lose my heart, J/e submit m/yself to 
your will m/y deplorable one J/e have no share in this systematic 
transformation you impose on m/e. (72)]  
                
J/e yields to the process of liquefaction lending her body to the impetus of 
transformation, a change that is occasioned by the pleasurable effect of the erotic 
encounter with the beloved.  The beloved’s vaginal secretions and the overwhelming 
feelings of pleasure are the signs of an erotic materiality whose main attribute is a 
material metamorphosis for which j/e seems to have no control (“j/e perds courage, j/e 
m//abandonne à ta volonté”).  Interestingly the body changes into a natural element, a 
process we also witness in Les guérillères when women’s bodies are associated and 
made into natural elements by means of metaphors and comparisons.  Here it is not a 
matter of metaphor, it is a material transformation that the language of fiction enables.  
The fictive metamorphosis that changes the human body into mud also results in a 
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chain of metamorphoses through which the body progressively turns into a winged 
creature resembling a bat: 
M/on cerveau assailli produit des ondes de plus en plus rapides.  Les ailes 
naissent sans discontinuer avec une vitesse qui s’accélère.  M/es bras se 
trouvent reliés à m/es côtés par deux gigantesques ailes de couleur noire, une 
fois pliée elles n’ont pas plus d’épaisseur que le tranchant d’un couteau, leur 
matière est identique à la soie noire dont on fait les drapeaux. Leur forme est 
comparable à celle des chauves-souris. (77-78) 
  
[M/y brain assailed produced increasingly rapid waves.  The wings are born 
incessantly with ever-increasing speed.  M/y arms are attached to m/y sides by 
two gigantic wings of a black color, once folded they are no thicker than a 
knife-blade, their substance is identical with that silk flags are made of.  Their 
shape is comparable to that of the wings of bats. (73)] 
    
As the j/e-bat approaches the body of the beloved, the encounter between the lover 
and the beloved is transformed into something different, an exchange quite 
ungraspable, in which the wings of j/e embrace tu, attracting the screaming beloved 
into a vertiginous movement.  Here the metamorphosis brings together the body of the 
lover and the beloved while affecting a simultaneous change in the lovers’ encounter 
and in the materiality of j/e, who gets undone.   Is the image of metamorphosis there 
to signify that the lesbian body can matter and be fictionalized through a 
defamiliarization of its own material features?  How does this defamiliarization 
contribute to make the lesbian body into a different and unfamiliar experience of 
materiality?    
Writing over the Woman’s Corpse: Lesbianizing Myths, Rewriting Culture 
The different encounters between j/e and tu, whether disintegrating or 
metamorphic, seem to expose and question both a notion of materiality as stable and 
unchanging, and a certain relationship of the subjects to the construction of their 
bodies.  I noted earlier that the making of fiction is very much intertwined in the 
making of materiality, to the point that fiction and materiality are inextricable.  If 
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fiction in the beginning is also that which does not have a name, it seems to acquire 
its name through the different material experiences that unravel throughout the 
narration.  To the extent that material experiences are produced through and by the 
dynamic struggle between loving subjects, the fiction can thus be read as the product 
of the different processes in which the loving subjects are implicated.  One example is 
given by the relationship of the subjects to naming.  I pointed out above that the 
fiction of the lesbian body is nameless due to the fact that its subject matter was thus 
far inexistent, not yet forged.  Like fiction, the beloved tu is nameless or rather cannot 
be named: “J/e tairai ton nom adorable.  Tel est l’interdit qui m’a été fait, ainsi soit-il” 
(11).  [J/e shall not utter your adorable name.  Such is the interdict you have laid on 
m/e so be it (19).]  As a result of this prohibition tu becomes the place of a taboo that 
projects onto the subjects mystery and secrecy: [“la vie secrete de tes viscères” (7)] 
[the hidden life of your viscera (15)]; [“J/e deveins brusquement le lieu des plus 
sombres mystères” (8)], [“J/e become the place of the darkest mysteries” (16)].  The 
beloved is invoked through a variety of appellations such as “m/on ineffable,” “m/a 
plus interdite,” “m/a glorieuse,” “m/on adorable,” epithets that either emphasize the 
ineffability and the inaccessibility of the beloved’s name or celebrate her.  Forbidden 
to utter the beloved’s name, j/e can only recall how tu goes to look for her lover in 
hell: [“J/e dirai seulement comment tu viens m/e chercher jusqu’au fond de l’enfer” 
(11)].  [J/e shall recount only how you come to seek m/e in the very depths of hell 
(19)].  The love search in hell is reminiscent of that of Orpheus who suffers from a 
prohibition as well: if he wants to take Eurydice back with him to earth, he must not 
turn around and look at her during his journey upward.  The narrative analogy with 
the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice allows Wittig to act upon a myth of heterosexual 
love and longing producing some interesting fictional effects.    
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First of all, the mythical subjects are no longer a heterosexual couple formed 
by a man and a woman, but two lesbians.  This mythical rewriting contributes to 
“lesbianize” a heterosexual myth of Western love and to reread love as lesbian.  
Moreover, the gender positions of the lover and the beloved is inverted.  Such an 
invention precludes an easy differentiation between an active male subject who 
engages in a rescue and a feminine object of love who is been rescued.  For what is at 
stake here is not merely the desire to resuscitate a lost object of love, but rather to 
grant the lesbian loving subjects a visibility.  The condition for such visibility lies 
paradoxically on the beloved’s ability not to turn back and look at the lover’s body 
and on the recognizability of a myth about a man and a woman.  Whereas in the 
traditional myth Orpheus transgressed the prohibition not to look back, thus losing 
Eurydice for ever, in the lesbian re-writing the beloved never yields to Orpheus’ 
temptation: “Pas une fois tu ne te retournes,” (11) [You do not once turn (19)], thus 
succeeding where Orpheus failed.  Only when the beloved reaches the earth’s surface 
can she face her lover and gaze at her, an act that has an expectedly reviving effect:  
Tu m//entraîne jusqu’à la surface de la terre où le soleil est visible.  C’est là 
seulement là au débouché vers les arbres et la forêt que d’un bond tu m/e fais 
face et c’est vrai qu’en regardant tes yeux, j/e ressuscite à une vitesse 
prodigieuse. (13) 
   
[You drag m/e to the surface of the earth where the sun is visible.  Only there 
at the exit towards the trees and the forest do you turn to face m/e with a 
bound and it is true that looking into your eyes J/e revive with prodigious 
speed. (20)] 
  
At that exit on earth where the sun becomes visible, the lesbian lovers linger after a 
de-ambulation across “the underground tunnels, the crypts, the caves, and the 
catacombs” (19) from which the guardians of the dead released them. 
The guardians of hell are another interesting twist of the lesbianization of the 
Orpheus myth.  The guardians are feminized figures (“les gardiennes des mortes”) 
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who grant the beloved the permission to bring j/e back to light: “Tu obtiens d’elles de 
m/e ramener jusqu’à la lumière des vivantes à condition de ne pas te retourner sur 
m/oi pour m/e regarder” (11).  [You obtain their permission to bring m/e back as far 
as the light of the living on condition that you not turn round to look at m/e (19).]  I 
am inclined to see in those figures a disguise of elles, the women, the hetero-
feminists.  Yet, if those guardians are indeed a disguise of the hetero-feminists, who 
are “les mortes” that those guardians watch over?  Is there any relation between the 
namelessness of the beloved and those female dead bodies over which the guardians 
watch?  We may argue that “les mortes” are female corpses, a fact that may change 
the way we look at j/e and tu’s journey from hell to earth.  The guardians are the 
preservers of the corpse of a female materiality which “les mortes” evoke.  J/e seems 
to be kept among “les mortes” (female corpses) from which the beloved is coming to 
liberate her.  Consequently, the journey of the lover and the beloved back to light may 
be the struggle of a body (and a fiction) to resuscitate from the female corpses (the old 
myths).  What comes to the surface of earth, after an interminable journey across is a 
purulent body in decay [“m/on corps putrifié” (12)] to which the beloved, unlike 
Orpheus, refuses to turn to and to see: 
Pas une fois u ne te retournes, pas même quand j/e m/e mets à hurler des 
désespoir les larmes roulant sur m/es joues rongées à te supplier de m/e laisser 
dans m/a tombe à te décrire avec brutalité ma décomposition les purulences de 
m/es yeux de m/on nez de m/a vulve les caries de m/es dents les fermentations 
de m/es organes essentiels la couleur de m/es muscles blets. (12) 
 
[Not once do you turn around, not even when J/e begin to howl in despair the 
tears trickling down m/y gnawed cheeks to beg you to leave m/e in m/y tomb 
to brutally describe to you m/y decomposition the purulence of my eyes m/y 
nose m/y vulva the caries of my teeth the fermentation of m/y vital organs the 
colour of m/y rotten-ripe muscles. (20)]  
  
The beloved’s refusal to turn around and rescue that decaying body may symbolize 
the refusal to embrace once again the symbol of a dead culture.  Rather, the beloved 
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brutally lets the lover’s body to decompose so as to expose the process of material 
undoing that the body has to undergo in order to come to the surface and gain its 
visibility.   
Limb after limb, piece after piece, the material process the body undergoes is 
that of a dead body literally coming to terms with its own de-composition.  How does 
such decomposition translate?  I would say that it translates precisely into a different 
and renewed materiality or form that arises from the undoing and the re-deployment 
of old narratives.  The re-writing of myth is but an example of the process begun in 
Les guérillères.  In it elles take the old culture of myths and fairy tales and transform 
it into a different body/creation.  If that move was about undoing the masculine 
symbolic in Les guérillères, in Le corps is about lesbianizing the myth while letting 
go of a dead female body, perhaps the female body of patriarchy as De Lauretis 
would suggest.  “Letting go” entails a process of mourning and a recollection of 
which the lesbian re-writing of the myth of Orpheus love is but the beginning.  
Wittig’s skillful lesbianization of the myth at the beginning of her work ensures that 
the fiction of Le corps lesbien may be read both as a search for the missing body of 
the beloved and as the mourning of love.  
Embracing the Lesbian Body: The Experience of Emotional Materiality 
I argued earlier that the fiction of the lesbian body emerges from a void of 
representation which makes it unnamable.  I also argued that the beloved shares some 
of the characteristics of the fiction, namely the impossibility of being named.  
Material loss and fictional void thus become intertwined in a variety of ways, but in 
the case of the beloved, lack is due less to the representational void than to the sense 
of loss that accompanies the lover’s search of her lost love.  J/e recalls that, at the 
origin of loss was a “forfeit” that involved elles: an infamous incident turned tu into 
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stone and made tu impenetrable: “Les parois de ton vagin sont jointes et scellées” 
(26).  [The walls of your vagina are shut tight and sealed (30).]  Because of a 
prohibition standing between elles and the loving couple, the beloved is made to 
change her nature.  Ironically, that incident is once again reminiscent of the curse of 
the Medusa, but in this case men are not the objects of the curse, the beloved and her 
lover are.   
The “forfeit” caused j/e to separate from tu.  Since that separation j/e has 
wandered in search of tu, finding and losing her “amante de pierre” [stone lover].  
Everything is carefully and painfully registered on the surface of the body of j/e:  
Il n’y a pas de trace de toi.  Ton visage ton corps ta silhouette sont perdus.  Il y 
a un vide à la place de toi.  Il y a dans m/on corps une pression au niveau du 
ventre au niveau du thorax.  Il y a un poids dans m/a poitrine.  Il y a des 
phénomènes à l’origine d’une douleur intense.  A partir d’eux je te quiers mais 
j/e l’ignore.  (31) 
 
[There is no trace of you.  Your face your body your silhouette are lost.  In 
your place there is a void.  In m/y body there is a pressure at the level of the 
belly at the level of the thorax.  There is a weight on m/y chest.  Initially these 
phenomena are intensely painful.  Because of them J/e seek you but without 
knowing it. (35)] 
 
The absence of tu is perceived as a hole, an emptiness that excavates the body from 
within.  The loss of tu has left a material void in which the physical presence of the 
beloved (the face, the bodily contours) is replaced by signs of its disappearance, like 
the pressure on the stomach and on the chest (“une pression au niveau du ventre;” “un 
poids dans ma poitrine”).  All those signs describe, on the one hand, a 
phenomenology of loss and, on the other hand, an attitude of longing and desire (“à 
partir d’eux je te quiers”).  Let us note that j/e does not talk of absence, preferring the 
term “non-présence” that reinforces the idea of a denied presence: “J/e te sollicite de 
sortir de cette non-présence où tu t’abîmes. Tu me tourmentes d’un lent amour” (31). 
[J/e solicit you to emerge from this non-presence which engulfs you.  You torment 
213 
 
m/e with a slow love (36).]  In the abysmal non-presence of tu, j/e senses the painful 
presence of love.   
Marked by the loss of tu, j/e is unable to pronounce the death of the beloved.  
The burden of loss makes tu ever more present, ever more alive so that the 
impossibility of pronouncing the beloved’s death becomes the tenacity of tu’s 
survival:      
J/e prononce l’interdiction d’enregistrer ta mort, que la traîtresse responsable 
de ton déchiquètement ne soit pas inquiétée, j/e prononce que tu es là vivante 
quoique tronçonnée, j/e cherche en toute hâte tes morceaux dans la boue. (86) 
 
[J/e pronounce a ban on the recording of your death so that the traitress 
responsible for your being torn to pieces may not be alerted.  J/e announce that 
you are here alive though cut to pieces, J/e search hastily for your fragments in 
the mud. (80)]   
 
The survival of tu is postulated on her being ripped apart as a body 
(“déchiquètement”).  J/e, who refuses to announce her death, declares that tu is alive 
and carefully searches for bodily fragments of the beloved: 
Ce sont tes lèvres jointes jetées un peu plus loin que m/es mains touchent.  
Tout ton corps est là fragmenté, je ramasse tes cheveux par poignées, à 
quelque distance il y a ton nez, ton visage est tout épars.  J/e te prends 
morceau par morceau, j/e te reconstitue. (127) 
  
[It is your closed lips thrown a little further off that m/y hands touch.  Your 
whole body is in fragments here, j/e pick up your hair in handfuls, your nose is 
at some distance, your face is all dispersed.  J/e gather you up piece by piece.  
j/e reassemble you. (113)] 
 
The beloved’s body lies fragmented before the lover, whose search turns into the act 
of re-membering scattered body parts like in the myth of Isis.  Bodily recollection is 
then linked with the rereading of a myth which collapses material recollection with 
fictional recollection of past stories as in Les guérillères.  Moreover, the act of 
remembering the body of the beloved is not the cold anatomical recollection of the 
body parts that punctuates from time to time the fictional rhythm.  It is an 
excruciatingly moving gesture of re-composition and recognition: 
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J/e m/e mets à crier de toutes m/es forces, j/e rampe à même le sol les cheveux 
hérissés.  J/e reconnais un de tes bras puis l’autre…j/e touche tes mains 
ouvertes, tes cuisses sont là, tes genoux tes jambes toutes entières.  J/e 
m//écroule sur ton ventre, des larmes de sang coulent sur m/es joues, j/e 
t//appelle à voix stridente, m/on cœur m/e fait mal à mourir sautant jusqu’à 
mes lèvres. (127) 
    
[J/e begin to cry out with all my might, J/e crawl along my ground m/y hair on 
end.  J/e recognize one of your arms then the other.  J/e touch your outspread 
hands, your thighs are here, your knees your legs all intact.  J/e collapse over 
your belly.  Tears of blood flow over my cheeks, J/e call to you in a strident 
voice, m/y heart makes m/e feel like death leaping into m/y mouth. (113)] 
 
With the recollection of the scattered body parts, feelings of pain surface (“sautant 
jusqu’à m/es lèvres”), investing the body parts with emotional value.  The recollection 
of the beloved’s body makes the lover weep with tears of blood and collapse over the 
fragmented body almost as to embody the death of the beloved.  The fragmentation of 
the beloved body recalls the destruction of the body of the lover enacted by elles and 
invoked earlier by j/e.  In that occasion a tension emerged between the lover’s desire 
to be reduced into pieces by elles, and the desire to be kept intact within the beloved’s 
body as a fragment of memory:  
Mais dans le plus secret de m/on corps j//écoute un feulement doux et furieux, 
ton nom m/e parcourt et m//enorgueillit, pourvu que toi m/a chérie tu m/e 
retiennes et me recèles en toi, j/e vis à jamais dans la mémoire des siècles. 
(150) 
 
[But in the secret privacy of m/y body J/e hear a soft and furious growling, 
your name pervades and elates m/e, given that you m/y dearest one retain and 
harbour m/e within you J/e live for ever in the memory of the centuries. (133)] 
 
Even though j/e and tu have been separated, acts of bodily recollections function as 
encounters between the loving subjects which reveal a certain amount of erotic 
tension and even of erotic fusion.  To say it with De Lauretis, such tension signifies a 
highly de-constructive moment of the old dismembered anatomical body (Shaktini 
58).  Yet, the dismembred body gives way to the making of a different materiality, 
one that is conveyed through the emotional experience of loss and mourning.   
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Interestingly, the loss of the beloved body is not the only experience of 
material loss in the fiction.  The pain for the loss of the beloved is suggestive of the 
desperate cry of j/e for the mother who abandoned her:      
J/e suis au Golgotha par vous toutes abandonnée.  La peur m/e vient et le désir 
de vivre avec toi encore dans ce jardin pas une de vous ne sait rien de m/on 
angoisse, alors j//implore la grande déesse ma mère et j/e lui dis mère mère 
pourquoi m//as-tu abandonnée, elle en silence se tient tandis que vous dormez, 
pas un souffle de vent ne soulève m/es cheveux, j//e crie dans m/a détresse, 
mère pourquoi m’as-tu abandonnée. (138) 
     
[J/e am at the Golgotha you have all abandoned.  Fear grips m/e and the desire 
to go on living with you in this garden, not one of you knows anything of my 
anguish, then J/e implore the great goddess m/y mother and J/e say to her 
mother mother why have you forsaken m/e, she remains silent while you 
sleep, not a breath of wind stirs my hair, J/e cry out in m/y distress mother 
mother why have you forsaken m/e. (123)] 
     
The passage plays a couple of discursive functions: first of all, the daughter’s cry for 
the missing mother’s goddess is a rewriting of the Golgotha scene from the Gospel in 
which Jesus calls out for God who has abandoned him to the cross.  Then it is also a 
search for a female archetype of loss which establishes a rather queer parallel between 
the grief of the lover for the lost beloved and the grief of the daughter for her missing 
mother.  Although reading the lesbian loving couple as a reproduction of the mother-
daughter bond may appear problematic because of its Freudian underpinnings, I think 
the text is not quite reproducing that psychoanalytic dynamic.  The Golgotha scene, 
when linked with the intimate and material experience of mourning that j/e undergoes, 
can be re-signified as a mourning of lost love; but the difference from the original 
scene is that the gender of the narrative changes: where Jesus forcefully says “father 
father” j/e addresses instead the mother with the same force.  The sacred love between 
Jesus and God, and the loss of the father on the part of the son are re-conceptualized 
as an all-female experience.  The regendering of the story and its contextualization in 
a narrative of lesbian loss may contribute to the queering of the original.  
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Le corps lesbien is not all about destruction and remembering, loss and 
mourning, all of which emphasize nonetheless a strong component of desire and 
erotic tension.  The erotic encounters can also be a fusional moment: “J/e me souviens 
du doux contact des seins et des ventres des allées et venues lentes et sinueuses de la 
tiédeur des peaux de la délicatesse des bonheurs” (115). [J/e recall the soft contact of 
breasts and bellies the slow sinuous coming and goings the warmth of the skins the 
delicacy of touching (103).]  If for Butler love-making is “what tears the body apart” 
and produces it as “an incoherent center of attributes, gestures and desires,” (Gender 
160) the material experience of love is not always posited through split and 
fragmentation, but also through fusion.  At times the fusional encounter is so intense 
as to provoke the collapsing of the bodies into one living organism: “Nos deux corps 
organisme unique parcourue des vibrations trépidant plein de ses propres courants” 
(Corps 123) [Our two bodies which now constitute a single organism pervaded by 
vibrations quivering full of its own currents, is it not so m/y dearest (109).]  Swept by 
the intensity of the encounter, the previously separated loving subjects reunite in one 
single organism that prefigures a dual subjectivity that only love-making or love loss 
can produce.  Both experiences of love-making and love loss have a material 
component that is constituted by the emotional quality of the encounters of j/e and tu.  
This emotional component produced by contacts and sensations, movements and 
vibrations, tensions and struggles I would call emotional materiality.  From the 
torments of separation and loss to the painful recollection of the beloved remnants, 
from the delicate encounter of bodies to their fusion, the text and the body that 
emerge are perhaps the ones that bear the sign of the only thing which has a lesbian 
name in the fiction.  That is love: “Que l’étoile noire pour finir te couronne, te 
donnant de t’asseoir à m/es côtés à l’apogée de la figuration de l’amour lesbien m/a 
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plus inconnue” (166) [May the black star crown you finally, giving you to sit at m/y 
side at the apogee of the figuration of lesbian love m/y most unknown (146).]  This 
image, like the one of Golgotha may carry a sacred allure in the reference to the 
beloved sitting next to her lover like Jesus next to his father in the moment of his 
resurrection.   
Whether awaiting for the beloved in hell, or sitting in heaven like Jesus, j/e 
continues to bear the mark of a split (graphically signaled by a slash).  Critics have 
commented on the split status of j/e in a variety of ways.  For Butler, j/e signals the 
constant movement of construction and reconstruction of a lesbian subject who “can 
wage war linguistically against a ‘world’ that has constituted a semantic and syntactic 
assault against the lesbian” (Gender 153).  Butler’s argument echoes Wittig’s 
hermeneutics of her own text, in which j/e, like a “lava flow” invades the text, 
attacking a heterosexual discourse and lesbianizing it.113 I showed how this attack 
becomes possible through a lesbian re-reading of the myths of Orpheus and Eurydice, 
and Isis as well as a regendering of the Golgotha passage.  Wittig goes at the heart of 
the heterosexual and masculine construction of the foundational Western myths, 
reversing, destabilizing and undoing their contents and their forms.  The result of this 
fictional lesbianization is a body that is not produced through sexual categories, but 
arises from the fictional de/composition of the female body, which the female corpses 
(“les mortes”) recall.  The decomposition of the female body symbolizes not merely 
the death of a female biological body, but also the deconstruction of a phallic culture 
and discourse whose straight “nature” has gone unquestioned.  The process of re-
                                                 
113 “The bar in the j/e of The Lesbian Body is a sign of excess.  A sign that helps imagine an excess of 
‘I,’ an ‘I’ exalted.  ‘I’ has become so powerful in The Lesbian Body that it can attack the order of 
heterosexuality in texts and assault the so-called love, the heroes of love, and lesbianize them, 
lesbianize the symbols, lesbianize the gods and the goddesses, lesbianize the men and the women. 
Nothing can resist this ‘I’ (or this tu, which is its same, its love), which spreads itself in the whole 
world of the book, like a lava flow that nothing can stop” (Straight 87).  
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invention that we witness in both Les guérillères and Le corps lesbien is thus crucial 
to the dismantling and the undoing of such discourse since invention lies in a whole 
variety of rhetorical techniques which engage the old (inversion, repetition, negation, 
rereading, rewriting) and ultimately constitute the very fabric of Wittig’s fiction.    
The lesbianization of fiction is like a body whose materiality is reconfigured 
through the erotic encounters between the lesbian lovers which distillate a specific 
moving and emotional quality.  For one thing, j/e is defined by the erotic tensions that 
traverse her body.  Those tensions are the product of an inter-subjective relationship 
and describe a dynamic map of the bodies, made of dis-memberment and recollection, 
absorption and penetration, desires, pleasures and pains.  J/e thus becomes the place 
not so much of a division predicated on sexual categories, but the space of an 
encounter with another body, another subject with whom j/e erotically engages 
throughout the fiction.  Perhaps the graphic split should not be read as a cut, but more 
like a transversal sign that can account for the multiple and pervasive tensions that 
produce the lesbian body as emotional materiality, a body made through emotions.  
As a moving subject, the lesbian body is ultimately a body capable of moving 
(physically and emotionally) another body.  Perhaps the readability of Le corps 
depends upon the ability and the willingness of the reader to move beyond the 
meticulous anatomical constructions of the fiction and to be moved, to be touched by 
the emotional body woven into those constructions.  The challenge of reading Le 
corps lesbien and of making it readable resides in that what I call the emotional 
materiality of the text and that Seth Silbermann refers to as queer intimacy: “Tu 
prends m/es doigts pour qu’ils touchent ton corps pour que j/e m/e familiarize avec ta 
nouvelle apparence pour que j/e te déchiffre m/a plus mauve, gloire à Sappho dans les 
siècles des siècles” (132.  [You take ahold of m/y fingers so they may touch your 
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body so I may familiarize m/yself with your new appearance so I may interpret you 
m/y most mauve one, glory to Sappho over centuries of centuries (116).]114  Perhaps 
that queer intimacy is the one that the loving subjects rediscover by becoming familiar 
with a new material form, with an emotional matieriality, as the beloved touches the 
lover under the auspices of Sappho. 
Although Wittig sought to create a fiction beyond the categories of sex/gender, 
sex/gender cannot be eluded completely.  In both Wittig’s text and Cixous’ theoretical 
fiction, gender becomes the pretext and one of the means for feminist and queer 
discursive invention.   Moreover, one significant achievement of this reinvention is to 
lead us to a reconsideration of the intricate relations between the material and 
conceptual, of which women’s bodies are but a starting point.  Cixous does so through 
a performative writing that bends the conceptual rigidity of sexual difference and 
shows that writing can allow her to perform different gendered and even sexual 
positions and even turn her “feminine” pen into a “butch” one.  The textual 
materiality that results from Cixous’ playful manipulation of the categories of the 
“feminine,” “the masculine,” the “maternal,” “the gay” and the “lesbian” is an 
unforeseen queer dimension that the laugh of her Medusa inaugurated.  For the laugh 
of the Medusa as well as the laugh of the lesbian is the strategy that ensures that a 
woman writing need no longer inhabit a specific sex and a particular body, but the 
queer place where multiple subjects may embrace.  Far from positing one single body 
and sex, Cixous’ “écriture féminine” problematizes the idea that writing from the 
standpoint of sexual difference amounts to reproducing one single essentialized body 
                                                 
114 Seth Silbermann offers one compelling and moving reading of Le corps lesbien titled “I have access 
to your glottis: the Fleshy Syntax, Ethical Irony and Queer Intimacy of Monique Wittig’s Le corps 
lesbien.”  In his piece he folds his own analytical reading of Wittig’s fiction into the narration of the 
mourning for his mother’s loss.  He also understands “lesbian” not as a sexual signifier, but as an 
attribute which defines a particular subject position through which J/e is partially “outside of herself” 
as she provides the context of tu’s death.   
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of femininity.  Cixous redeploys sexual difference and the feminine as sites for the 
proliferation of different gendered and sexualized positions (butch, femme, 
masculine, gay, bisexual).  In this respect, the Medusean writing subject of Cixous 
can find herself unexpectedly close to Mario Mieli’s “transessuale” (see chapter 3) 
insofar as she traverses and navigates sexual and erotic boundaries by means of 
fiction, making fiction into both a moment of transformation and of queer fictive 
transit among positions.   
It is precisely in this fictional context in which bodies are redeployed to 
account for different, performative, trans-subjective notions of materiality and 
subjectivity that Wittig’s lesbian matters.  First of all Wittig’s fiction is built upon a 
destabilization of old forms and contents.  It is postulated on the undoing of 
materiality by means of a number of narrative and rhetorical strategies.  Through her 
fiction Wittig seems to suggest that no form, no body can emerge without a 
movement and a gesture of undoing.  Undoing is also to some extent and 
paradoxically, a foundational moment in Wittig’s texts.  While reading them we may 
have the sense of standing at the threshold of something that is no longer (but that we 
keep doing and undoing) and something that is yet to be.  Our body comes undone 
through the reading while participating in the erotic struggles of j/e and tu, awaiting a 
new form to emerge, a new body to arise.  The lesbian body is no longer the “female 
anatomical body” of sexual difference and patriarchy, a body defined through sex, but 
a body that lends itself to the flux of emotions and the tension of eroticism.  The 
lesbian body is thus not so much about the making and the naming of a new sexual 
identity, as it is the emblem of a material threshold, it is the threshold where the 
subjective, the material, the conceptual, the symbolic meet and get intertwined.  The 
result of Wittig’s fictional movement is a complex text (or body) in which all those 
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dimensions are present and cannot be easily separated nor reduced.  Similar to the 
aborting bodies of Ernaux and Maraini, Wittig’s lesbian bodies becomes the complex 
site of negotiation of material and symbolic meanings.  It is through their symbolic 
and material complexities that those bodies and those texts urge us to reconsider what 
women’s feminist bodies have contributed and can contribute to a queer interrogation 




















Literature and theory are by no means the only place for queer embraces in the 
1970s.  Italian cinema and in particular the cinema of Lina Wertmüller is another 
place of passionate and irreverent queer embraces.  Of course the embrace in question 
is the memorable one between Mariangela Melato and Giancarlo Giannini in Travolti 
da un Insolito Destino nell’Azzurro Mare d’Agosto [Swept Away by an Unusual 
Destiny in the Blue Sea of August] (1974).  Travolti, like so many other Italian 
movies of the 1970s, used sexuality as an allegory to represent the socio-political 
climate of the years.  Yet, unlike other movies that focused on the perverse 
association between Fascism and the nation through sexuality, Travolti is a sexy 
political satire of the communist revolutionary credo.  The co-protagonist of the 
movie, the Southern deck-hand Gennarino Carunchio (Giancarlo Giannini) is almost 
leader of the Communist party of his town” (Russo Bullaro, 56).   
Travolti is enmeshed in the climate of political oppositions of the 1970s and 
the appeal of political and social communism.  However, the narrative is purposefully 
removed from that tension as the story takes place on a scorching summer day and is 
set for the most part on a remote island of the Mediterranean, which becomes for the 
occasion the site of a rather queer sexual and social reversal.  The spatial and 
temporal setting of Travolti evokes that of Donna in guerra (set in an imaginary 
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island of Southern Italy) and Gennarino has much more in common with the 
masculine characters of the novel (Giacinto and Santino) than his love of the 
seacritics have actually pointed to the chronological and social proximity of the 
novel and the movie.  A queer parallel between the novel and the film can be useful 
and productive and further will allow me to point to the postcolonial implications of 
my queer embraces.  I shall use this brief conclusion on cinema and sexuality to 
briefly sketch out the encounter between the queer and the postcolonial in the 1970s 
body politics.        
The story line of Travolti is quite simple: the deck-hand Gennarino gets 
stranded on an island with Raffaella Pavone Lanzetti, the boisterous and bitchy 
bourgeoise for whom Gennarino slaves as a deck-hand.  Deprived of the basic 
survival skills, the arrogant Raffaella is as needy on the island as she was pampered 
on her husband’s yacht.  Gennarino, however, turns out to be much more resourceful 
and comfortable in the natural element.  But determined to seek revenge he offers no 
help or support to Raffaella until she agrees to become his slave.  As Gennarino 
demands that Raffaella call him “Signore” (Sir/Lord) the interpersonal dynamics that 
existed on the yacht are reversed.   
This film is perhaps among the best known comedies of 1970s Italy but has 
been largely discredited in Italy and in the US because of its indulging in misogynistic 
clichés.  In the 1970s Tania Modleski mainained that the movie was anti-feminist and 
even vented at Wertmuller’s presumed misogyny.  In the 1980s Millicent Marcus 
highlighted “the reductivist and exploitative uses” that Wertmuller makes of comedy 
for commercial reason and “comic pleasure” (314).  Marcus attributes the supposed 
reductivism of Wertmüller to what she calls her “politics of polarity” (Marcus 318) 
that amounts to an aesthetic of “dualities, dichotomies and reversals” (Russo Bullaro 
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56).  In the 1990s Molly Haskell begrudges “the one filmmaker who least identifies 
with the concerns and interests of the women’s movement” and considers outrageous 
the fact Wertmüller proclaims herself an androgynous artist (86).  Only recently has 
Grace Russo Bullaro reconsidered Wertmuller’s 1970s comedies arguing that “Lina 
Wertmuller is simply exposing, not endorsing or condoning the abuses and injustices 
of society” (71).  I agree that Wertmüller makes use of an array of clichés and 
dichotomies that can raise more than an eye-brow among feminist critics and that it 
would be hard to easily condone the director’s abuse of stereotypical images. Nor are 
her clichés limited to the relationship between sexes, but also encompass those 
between the North and the South.  However, I believe that, because of the pleasurable 
effects the movie can produce, it is worth taking a second look at Travolti da un 
insolito destino.  Rewatching the movie in light of the queerness of 1970s feminist 
body politics leads me to view it less as reductively antifeminist than as productively 
queer.  One way a feminist might avoid being outraged by Wertmüller’s movie is by 
looking at it with a queer eye and considering it within the complex body politics of 
the 1970s.  Indeed, the cinematic aesthetics of Wertmüller is very close to the 
transsexual theory of Mario Mieli, and her film may be seen as a cinematic version of 
the theory of erotic communism that I discussed in my third chapter.                
 Wertmüller herself gave a very important clue for reading Travolti when 
stating that “Raffaella really represents the manartificially elevated into a position 
of superiority by societyand Gennarino the woman” (Marcus 317).  Raffaella, by 
her wealth, her power, her arrogance, and her speech (she constantly speaks as if she 
knew everything) embodies the phallic woman.  Her position of superiority, as critics 
have already noted, is also conveyed cinematically, at the beginning of the movie, by 
standing at the top of the boat in relation to Gennarino.  His intense gaze, constantly 
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directed at Raffaella, is also that of the camera tilting up to her as if to convey fear 
and seduction.  This top/bottom relation is kept throughout the movie, but gets 
reversed during the couple’s stay in the island; it even takes on a queer twist in a 
couple of scenes that I believe crucial to a queer reading of the film. 
Raffaella has just yielded to Gennarino’s will and discovered herself to be 
madly in love with him.  As a result she has relinquished the position of top to assume 
that of the bottom.  Politically speaking this switch represents a materialization of 
Marxist utopia in which the master becomes the slave and viceversa.  The scene 
revolves around Gennarino’s sexist assertion that “il partito è sacro e tu sei puttana e 
io ti fotto” [the party is sacred and you are a whore and I fuck you].  Gennarino 
defends his communist credo and protects its sacredness against the bourgeois whom 
he deems corrupt and dirty, or rather “ricchioni, porconi e drogati” [faggots, pigs, and 
drug addicts].  Not only is Gennarino sexist, but he is also homophobic in his 
definition of the bourgeois.  What do the sexism and the homophobia of Gennarino 
conceal?  If, following Wertmüller’s assertion, Gennarino is the woman, or at the 
least the effeminate man, once he is on top of the phallic woman, he is in the position 
to dominate and, so to speak, to penetrate him/her; by contrast Raffaella, the man or 
the phallic woman becomes the penetrable one.  Wertmüller however plays with the 
role reversal (whether social or sexual) by following the two bodies with her camera 
as they alternatively switch positions between top and bottom, which renders the 
mechanics of the reversal rather dynamic and queer.  The genders we are looking at 
are not exactly the genders we see.  Can we still say that the representation is sexist if 
we think that the woman at the bottom is the man?  And if the bottom is a man what 
does that do to the homophobic assertions of Gennarino?        
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The top/bottom dynamic of the film produces two sexual/narrative climaxes: 
one mild climax is reached when Raffaella demands that Gennarino sodomize her 
(“sodomomizzami”).  This is perhaps one of the most pleasurable scenes in the movie.  
Its comic effect has very little to do with sex and very much to do with language and 
accent.  Gennarino supposedly never heard the word “sodomizzare,” and when 
Raffaella pronounces it, he lingers incredulous with his eyes wide open looking at us 
looking up at him (the spectator is a bottom, as well!).  He first timidly withdraws 
from Raffaella saying that he does not feel like it; he then discloses that he does not 
know the word; Raffaella has managed to humiliate him by using one of her 
sophisticated bourgeois terms.  While pronouncing the word, Gennarino also deforms 
it (“sotorazzame” instead of “sodomizzami”) in a distinctively Sicilian accent thus 
reinforcing the cliché that certain sexual practices are foreign not only to the non-
bourgeois, but also to the Sicilian man who remains impenetrable to sodomy both 
linguistically and sexually.  In turn Raffaella’s request not only reveals the desire of 
the phallic woman/man to be penetrated but also reinforces its queerness by virtue of 
the queer gender identification of the two characters’ queer gender identifications.  
Yet we will never know for sure whether Gennarino actually sodomizes Raffaella, 
whether any other kind of intercourse takes place (except in allusions to Raffaella’s 
satisfaction). What we do see is that Gennarino temporarily regains a “bottom” 
position precisely when he is playing the role of the master and the man, which once 
more makes the sexual polarization dynamically queer. 
The second climax occurs at the end of the movie when Gennarino and 
Raffaella leave their erotic communism and go back to their previous social roles or 
as some have said to “civilization.”  One of Gennarino’s overstated goals is to fuck 
Raffaella (“io ti fotto”).  “Io ti fotto” has in Italian a social and a sexual meaning for it 
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also means “I fuck you over.”  On the island Gennarino entertains the pleasurable 
thought of fucking Raffaella and also of fucking the bourgeois over, socially and 
politically.  This erotic dream will come true for ever provided that Raffaella agrees to 
go back to the island with Gennarino and leave behind her bourgeois privilege.  In 
other words Raffaella has to relinquish once and her position as top.  But this dream 
in turn gets an unexpected reversal when the bourgeois phallic woman turns around 
and takes off aboard her helicopter regaining her top position and leaving the 
miserable Gennarino behind.  The one who really gets fucked over in the end is 
Gennarino.  The camera tilts down at him (from the top view of the helicopter as 
Raffaella takes off) while the desperate cry of Violetta, the protagonist of Giuseppe 
Verdi’s La Traviata is superimposed to that of abandoned Gennarino.115  Gennarino 
thus regains the position of bottom thereby becoming the queer embodiment of the 
“seduced and abandoned” stereotypical image of the “commedia all’italiana.”116  
Ironically Gennarino is also the infinocchiato, a word that in Italian refers to the man 
who is been baffled, fucked over, and disempowered.  Infinocchiato has both a sexual 
and a social meaning since it symbolizes the lack of economic and social power 
through sexual inadequacy.  Moreover, because the term contains the word finocchio 
(faggot), the infinocchiato is queered by virtue of being turned into a faggot.  The 
implicit characterization of Gennarino as the infinocchiato or the socially castrated is 
reminiscent of the representation of masculinity in Donna in guerra and of Mieli’s 
                                                 
115 La Traviata by Giuseppe Verdi is a romantic drama based on Alexandre Dumas’s novel La Dame 
aux camélias.  It also represents an attack on conventional bourgeois morality and its sexual hypocrisy. 
116 Sedotta e Abbandonata (1964) is a movie by Pietro Germi who is also the director of 
DivorceItalian Style.  Both movies deal with the issues of female chastity codes and marriage.  
Cinema scholar Jacqueline Reich explains that one important feature of these “commedie all’italiana” 
is that they are embedded in Italy’s major social and political issues of the 1960s.  Among these issues 
are the North and South disparity and the political opposition Communists and Christina Democrats 
(Reich, 66).  Germi’s movies influenced Wertmuller’s own cinematic production and treatment of 
social, sexual and political issues.   
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marginal masculinities (proletarian double males).  Therefore the queering of 
Gennarino cannot be viewed simply in terms of reversed gender dynamics; it also 
bears social and geographical implications based on the depiction of Southern 
masculinity as socially and sexually disempowered.      
The representation of Gennarino’s disempowered masculinity is further 
complicated in the beginning of the movie by the deliberate association that Raffaella 
makes between Southerness and race.  When the small boat goes adrift Raffaella 
starts wining about being stuck with a Negro (“il negro”); the word Negro is replaced 
by Sicilian in the English subtitles, a move that makes even more explicit the 
racialization of Gennarino’s masculinity.  The use of the word Negro not only aligns 
Sicilian-ness with race in derogatory ways, but also contributes to a definition of the 
relationship between the North and the South in colonial terms.  The colonial nuance 
of Gennarino’s queer masculinity, then, can help us frame the cinematic construction 
of erotic communism as a satirical response to a colonial discourse.   
             If Travolti is a queer cinematic rendition of Mieli’s erotic communism, this 
cinematic representation also entails some unexpected postcolonial implications.  It is 
plausible to think with John Michalczyk that Wertmüller’s depiction of the South as 
Third World comes from her “sympathy for the poor, the downtrodden, and the 
proletariat” (Michalczyck, 238).  Yet this sympathetic depiction remains to be 
explored within a post-colonial critical perpsective that could certainly enrich the 
critical work done in this dissertation.  Some of the theoretical terms that I have 
analyzed and engaged with such as discursive excision have apparent postcolonial 
implications that invite for a further exploration of the intersection between a queer 
feminist and a postcolonial approach.  Wertmüller’s own play with social and sexual 
dichotomies such as wilderness and civilization, North and South, man and woman 
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point to the importance to reconsider 1970s queer body politics in dialogue with 
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